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An Ethnography of Brand Piracy in Guatemala 
 
Abstract 
 
 An important dimension of contemporary capitalism is the global spread of 
intellectual property rights law, drawing new attention by governments and media to 
the unauthorized copying of fashion brands. In this dissertation, I draw on sixteen 
months of ethnographic research with small-scale, indigenous Maya garment 
manufacturers to examine the cultural and moral context of brand piracy in Guatemala.  
I analyze what practices of copying and imitation, some of which qualify as piracy 
under national and international law, among Maya manufacturers reveal about two 
aspects of the social field: first, changing economic and cultural conditions following 
waves of neoliberal economic and legal reform, and, second, the nonlinear reproduction 
of forms of moral and legal reckoning at the margins of the global economy and amidst 
mounting insecurities that include rising violent crime rates and legal impunity for 
violent crime. I examine how practices of copying and imitation among manufacturers 
and competitive behavior more generally are evaluated locally in light of kin relations 
that promote the sharing of knowledge and resources within a somewhat loose 
property regime and given ideologies of race and nation that encourage class-based 
solidarity among Maya people. I find that the normative models and business practices 
evident among these manufacturers parochialize official portraits of progress, business 
ethics, and development promoted in neoliberal policy agendas and international law.  
Professor Kimberly S. Theidon  Kedron Thomas 
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In addition, I analyze significant gaps between what fashion and branding mean 
in Guatemalan Maya communities and how they are understood in international 
projects of legal harmonization that are also about re-branding and re-imagining the 
Guatemalan nation. Neoliberal statecraft following a long internal armed conflict in 
Guatemala involves policy approaches that amplify the presence of global brands while 
compounding conditions of social and economic inequality that limit Maya men and 
women’s access to authorized goods. Meanwhile, Maya people are invited to 
participate in a modernist vision of citizenship and social progress that encourages a 
privatized model of indigenous identity mediated by branded commodities and formal 
market transactions. The brand emerges as a powerful medium through which claims to 
legitimacy and authority and senses of belonging are negotiated at national and local 
levels.
 v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgments vi 
Introduction 1 
Chapter One: Culture and Intellectual Property 32 
Chapter Two: Maya Workshops in the World System 71 
Chapter Three: The Ethics of Imitation 117 
Chapter Four: Piracy and the Politics of Branding 155 
Chapter Five: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law 191 
Conclusion 231 
Bibliography 250 
 vi 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 Funding for this dissertation was provided by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral 
Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship, the Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral 
Dissertation Fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, Foreign Language and 
Area Studies fellowships, and numerous sources at Harvard University, including the 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin 
American Studies, the Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, and the Department of 
Anthropology.  
 I thank the many people in Guatemala who opened their homes and workshops 
to me during my travels and research for this dissertation. Thank you to Te Ix’ey and the 
other teachers at Oxlajuj Aj Kaqchikel Maya Institute for their instruction and for 
introducing me to so many aspects of highland life. I am also grateful to the research 
assistants in Tecpán and Guatemala City who devoted so much of their time and 
attention to this project.  
My time spent at the Universidad del Valle as a visiting professor was 
indispensible to this project, and I especially thank my remarkable students and the 
chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Andrés Álvarez Casteñeda, for 
their support and intellectual engagement. Thank you to the staff members of the 
Universidad del Valle, Universidad de San Carlos, Universidad Mariano Gálvez, 
Universidad Rafael Landívar, the Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica 
 vii 
 
(CIRMA), and the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), for making 
the library resources of their institutions available to me.  
Thank you to the various scholars of the Maya region who generously offered 
comments and criticisms of this project throughout its unfolding, especially Pakal 
B’alam, Carmelina Espantzay, Ted Fischer, and Carol Hendrickson. I also appreciate the 
comments offered by the many scholars who participated with me on panels at the 
American Anthropological Association annual meetings and various other conferences 
and symposia in the U.S. and Guatemala, all of which contributed to this project.  
I am eternally grateful to Kimberly Theidon for her unwavering support, 
encouragement, and intellectual guidance throughout my graduate studies. Thank you 
to Michael Herzfeld and Ted Bestor for their mentorship and inspiration. I would also 
like to acknowledge my deep indebtedness to other faculty within the Department of 
Anthropology and across the University who taught me and contributed to my scholarly 
and professional development during my time at Harvard, my fellow graduate students 
who offered both their friendship and lively intellectual debate, and the department’s 
staff members who were so generous with their kindness, time, and expertise. 
Finally, thank you to Pete for his inestimable contributions to this work, for his 
tireless support throughout the research and writing, for his relentless and contagious 
pursuit of conversation, and for introducing me to the lore and the lure of anthropology, 
and also to Manny, who unwittingly inspires me to be a braver scholar and a better 
person.
 1 
 
Introduction: Postwar Style 
 
 
I sometimes took evening walks with friends and informants through Tecpán, the 
highland Guatemala town where I carried out the ethnographic research for this 
dissertation. The central plaza, a paved square edged by the colonial-era Catholic church 
and town hall, bustles after sunset with taco and shuco vendors offering cheap dinner 
fare. Adolescent boys kick soccer balls back and forth across the pavement. Old women 
sell atol, a hot beverage made of rice or corn, from heavy baskets and wooden carts. 
Dozens of young men lounge against the basin of the empty fountain or stroll the plaza. 
They all wear sudaderos, sweatshirts with oversized hoods pulled up over gel-drenched 
hair and shadowing their pimpled faces. Each of these sweatshirts features a US brand 
name – Abercrombie & Fitch, Hollister, or Ecko – splashed across the front. A pair of 
torn and faded blue jeans with wide legs and a pair of shiny black leather shoes – freshly 
polished by one of the adolescent boys lugging wooden shoe-shine kits and shouting 
“lustre, lustre!” – completes the look. 
The sweatshirts these young men wear are part of the global piracy trade. 
Pirates are fascinating figures in the Western social imaginary. “The pirate,” writes one 
historian, “has become an instantly recognizable and identifiable image,” a symbol of 
“rebellion against authority” (Konstam 2008: 8). Pirates are liminal figures who “operate 
on the margins of acceptable society” (7), troubling the boundaries of the economy, the 
law, and especially, the nation-state. “Pirates deny the legitimacy of nations by taking 
their stuff,” writes literary scholar Talissa Jane Ford (2008: 12). She continues, 
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“Historically, pirates were deemed hostis humani generis, the ‘common enemy of 
mankind,’ and therefore outside the law; in some fundamental (legal) way, they didn’t 
count. … Upon turning pirate, they forfeited all national identity” (13). This dissertation 
is concerned with the lived experience of people who are dubbed “pirates” under new 
international legal regimes because they copy fashion brands. What Arjun Appadurai 
(1996) calls “modernity at large” involves the worldwide consumption of commodities 
that reference other places and temporalities and denote status, power, and affiliation. 
The ethnographic investigation of clothing has been important for understanding the 
globalization of particular cultural styles, dress as a marker of social distinction and a 
cultural practice that shapes relations of gender, class, national identity, and ethnicity, 
and how fashion figures into hegemonic political projects of control and subordination.1 
Fashion brands have received less attention even though the brand form, what 
Rosemary Coombe calls a “hallmark” of late modernity (1993: 413), is integral to 
globalized material culture (Miller 1994; 1997).  
An important dimension of contemporary capitalism is the spread of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) law to the developing world,2 drawing new attention on the part of 
law enforcement, government officials, and the media to the unauthorized copying of 
                                                           
1
 On cultural styles, see Ferguson 1999; Brydon and Niessen 1998; Hansen 2000; and Niessen et al. 2003. 
On dress as a cultural practice, see Banerjee and Miller 2003; Kondo 1992; Moeran 2004; Polhemus and 
Procter 1978; and Tarlo 1996. On colonialism and the politics of dress, see Allman 2004; Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1997. 
 
2
 My use of the term “developing” in this dissertation is strategic and intended to call to mind the 
teleology of development that accompanies processes of economic and legal globalization. 
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fashion brands.3 The World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, signed by member states in 1995, tied international 
trade policy to intellectual property law and signaled a new era in the globalization of 
IPR protections. Despite the subsequent process of legal harmonization across member 
states, however, practices of piracy and counterfeiting in developing countries like 
Guatemala are on the rise. As a recent study of piracy explains, “We have seen little 
evidence – and indeed few claims – that enforcement efforts to date have had any 
impact whatsoever on the overall supply of pirated goods” (Karaganis 2011: iii). 
According to US recording and film industry estimates, digital piracy comprises 82 
percent of the music market in Mexico and 90 percent of movies in India (Karaganis 
2011). The unauthorized reproduction of fashion brands represents a $350 billion 
market worldwide (Hilton et al. 2004). 
Maya people are not just consumers of pirated fashion brands. They make 
pirated apparel and sell it in regional markets and city streets.4 Situated on the Pan-
American Highway about an hour’s drive from Guatemala City, Tecpán is an important 
center of nontraditional clothing production for Guatemala’s domestic market. In a 
town of approximately 20,000 people, the majority Kaqchikel Maya, there are hundreds 
of Maya-owned garment workshops. Most consist of a few knitting and sewing 
                                                           
3
 See Prendergast et al. 2002; Yang et al. 2008; and Chaudhry 2006 on emerging law enforcement efforts 
and other state interventions aimed at controlling piracy and counterfeiting. 
 
4
 Business and legal scholars have recently begun to distinguish between counterfeits, which are 
manufactured to pass as authorized goods, and “non-deceptive fakes” or “pirated” goods (Prendergast el 
al. 2002: 406), acknowledging the fact that trademarks are often appropriated in ways that may be illegal 
but not intentionally deceptive. I use the term “piracy” throughout this dissertation for this reason – the 
unauthorized use of brand names in Guatemala’s domestic apparel trade generally falls into the non-
deceptive category. 
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machines housed in a spare room of the owner’s home. The largest producers employ 
dozens of workers at sewing machines and own high-capacity knitting machines that can 
turn out a hundred sweaters per day. They manufacture stylish clothing to sell in 
regional marketplaces and to urban wholesalers, most of which features unauthorized 
brand names such as Converse, Lacoste, and Tommy Hilfiger or, in the case of children’s 
clothing, unauthorized cartoon characters from Walt Disney and Nickelodeon. Pirated 
logos, labels, and tags are easy to come by. Local embroidery shops reproduce the most 
popular labels to varying degrees of verisimilitude. Producers travel to markets in 
nearby departments – Totonicapán, Sacatepéquez, or Guatemala (the capital district) – 
to purchase brand-name tags and labels in bulk or order them from local embroidery 
and screen-printing shops. They also purchase tags, size stickers, and embroidered logos 
that have been snuck out of maquiladoras, the large-scale factories where authorized 
name-brand clothing is assembled for export.  
My goal in this dissertation is to analyze the cultural context of brand piracy in 
this marginal corner of the fashion industry and to situate the business ethics and moral 
economy that guides piracy production within broader debates regarding the global 
spread of intellectual property frameworks. I use the term ethics to refer to the 
metadiscourse among piracy producers regarding proper marketplace behavior. My use 
of the term moral economy follows the work of James Scott (1976) and references 
deeply-held ideas about economic justice and community obligations that structure 
property relations and social interactions among garment manufacturers and other 
town residents. I understand the moral economy of Tecpaneco producers as one aspect 
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of the “local moral world,” where social participants have strong commitments “about 
what is at stake in everyday experience” (Kleinman 1995: 45). Both ethical discourses 
and moral commitments are integral to how garment manufacturers reason about the 
law and other state institutions.  
What people make and wear and what it means to them also offers a critical lens 
for examining practices of postwar statecraft in Guatemala. Tecpán’s garment 
manufacturers not only “trouble the boundaries” of the nation-state because they are 
pirates, but also because they are indigenous, part of the country’s Maya majority that 
has been a “finger in the wound” (Nelson 1999) of the Guatemalan elite and their hopes 
for a “modern,” that is, not traditional and not ethnically- or culturally-marked nation, 
since independence from Spain in 1821. Nearly four decades of internal armed conflict, 
including a genocidal campaign against the Maya people, came to an end in Guatemala 
in 1996. As part of the state’s postwar effort to establish rule of law (Sieder 2003) and in 
compliance with TRIPS and other multilateral trade agreements, the national legislature 
recently strengthened the country’s IPR protections. Trademark laws, which effectively 
criminalize Maya people who affix Nike and Tommy Hilfiger logos to their shirts, are 
mandatory for participation in international trade. The adoption of these laws is also a 
symbolic statement about national sovereignty at a time when many people, including 
Mayas, say that things are worse – more violent, more uncertain, more corrupt – than 
during the war. 
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“Postwar” Guatemala 
After one stroll through the plaza in Tecpán, I jotted down in my field notes: 
“With all of these guys wearing the same clothes, it must be hard for Tecpanecos to 
distinguish between the delincuentes and the ‘regular’ kids!” Delinquency is a frequent 
topic of conversation in Tecpán, a running commentary on the level of insecurity that 
people face and the corrupt youth who are presumed to be the cause. Indeed, I was 
discouraged from taking my evening walks alone, told by friends and informants that 
the youth strolling the plaza in their hooded sudaderos are delinquents, maybe even 
gang members, prowling for people to rob and assault after dark.  
The internal armed conflict may have ended more than a decade ago, but 
everyday life for many Guatemalans continues to be fraught with violence. Guatemala 
has the fourth highest murder rate in the world, due mostly to drug trafficking between 
South America and the US (UNODC 2010) and indicative of a regional spike in 
transnational gang activity over the past ten years. Neighboring El Salvador and 
Honduras rank first and second in per capita homicides globally (OCAVI 2006; El Heraldo 
2011). Besides the drug trade, paramilitary groups of ex-soldiers carry out so-called 
“cleansing” campaigns against Guatemala City’s poor (Sanford 2008). There are political 
assassinations, and gangs wage brutal turf wars and command extortion rings that 
target businesses (O’Neill and Thomas 2011), including the small clothing workshops in 
Tecpán that are the subject of this study. Everyone I spoke with over the course of my 
field research had been witness to or victimized by crime, from the armed robberies 
that are daily occurrences on the public buses that run up and down the Pan-American 
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highway to hold-ups outside banks and ATM machines in the capital city. To understand 
the piracy of global brands in this setting – why Maya people engage in illegal activity 
and how the law impacts their lives and livelihoods – it is necessary to see Guatemala 
for what it is: a place where almost everything is illegal, informal, or illegitimate, where 
opportunities for education and formal employment remain severely limited for Mayas, 
and where various forms of insecurity are routine parts of everyday life. 
Most recent scholarship in Guatemala has taken the armed conflict, its legacy of 
violence, the promises and failures of the peace accords, and the struggles for 
indigenous rights that became central to the peace negotiations as focal points. Even 
fifteen years later, anthropologists have been reluctant to move beyond the “postwar” 
period, and, indeed, the titles of my own research papers and published works have 
often included this modifier. One goal of my research and writing, however, has been to 
maintain a sense of the historical and cultural importance of the war without allowing 
issues that were so crucial to Guatemalans and Guatemalanists in the 1970s and 1980s 
to wholly determine the scholarly conversation. A preoccupation with the conflict era, I 
contend, can sometimes obscure aspects of how the conflict’s legacies are actually 
playing out. Processes of democratization and judicial reform, integration into the global 
economy, even indigenous rights struggles and current levels of violence in Guatemala 
cannot be adequately understood as simple byproducts of the armed conflict and peace 
accords, nor is the armed conflict a sufficient context for analyzing how these processes 
continue to evolve. For example, I have sought elsewhere to understand contemporary 
crime and violence in Guatemala not as an inevitable outgrowth of the war years, but as 
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a complicated context of economic, physical, and existential insecurity tied to rising 
levels of inequality, the hemispheric drug war and the related influx of transnational 
gang activity into Guatemala’s capital and border regions, and the historical 
marginalization of the capital city’s indigenous population, poor classes, and women 
(Thomas et al. 2011). 
Following the lead of anthropologists of Guatemala and Latin America including 
Eric Wolf, Carol Smith, and June Nash, I argue there is an urgent need to understand 
Guatemala within a broad context of world systems and transnational processes, and 
find it crucial to write on topics and in ways that speak to anthropologists outside the 
region. I hope that in doing so I might encourage comparative analysis of the problems 
and promises with which Guatemalans are today faced. Thus, in this dissertation, I draw 
inspiration from property debates in Melanesia, postcolonial studies in South Africa, and 
ethnographic analyses of brands in Southeast Asia as well as from historical and 
ethnographic work in highland Guatemala. Although the Guatemalan highlands offer a 
special vantage point for understanding the intersection of branding, style, 
postcoloniality, and indigeneity, the research on piracy and petty capitalism that I 
undertook in Tecpán could have, in fact, been done almost anywhere in the world. I see 
this fact as an opportunity to write the highland Maya into stories about global 
capitalism, modernity, and transnational issues of law, security, and style in ways that 
have not been done before, possibly to the detriment of our understanding of precisely 
how highland Maya men and women understand their own connections to other places 
and people.  
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Maya Fashion 
Guatemala is perhaps best known for traditional clothing. Hand-woven huipiles 
(blouses) and cortes (skirts) worn by Maya women adorn the pages of guidebooks and 
illustrate tourism websites and advertising. People who might have been killed during 
Guatemala’s internal armed conflict if they seemed a bit too proud of their indigenous 
heritage – ethnic difference read as communism to justify atrocity – the Maya and their 
textiles are now the primary selling point for attracting foreign dollars. The state and 
private enterprise capitalize on culture to create a national brand around indigeneity.   
For example, an internet advertisement from Guatemala’s National Tourism 
Institute displays the crisp blue of Lake Atitlan, a favorite tourist destination, and reads, 
“With your vote, we’ll be one of the seven natural wonders of the world.” The ad 
references an online contest sponsored by the United Nations. It is not entirely clear 
whether the “natural wonder” the text references, however, is the volcanic lake or the 
indigenous woman, dressed in her huipil and corte, who is pictured in the foreground of 
the advertisement. She stands with her back to the viewer, gazing out across the lake, 
and carries an infant on her back, tucked snugly inside the peraje (shawl) cinched tightly 
around her shoulders. This kind of image participates in a pervasive cultural politics in 
Guatemala, where the Maya woman, and her clothing, are appropriated as a basis for 
nationalism (Nelson 1999). Naturalized as a static custom, her clothing serves as a 
reference point for tradition and a counterpoint for what it means for Guatemala, and 
Guatemalans, to become modern and developed, not part of a natural landscape. She is, 
 10 
 
quite literally, the progenitor of Guatemala’s national culture and, at the same time, a 
symbol of the country’s native past, with her back turned to the presumably modern 
viewer and the digital age he inhabits. This politics covers over the deep historical and 
ongoing subordination of indigenous people in Guatemala. It also illustrates how 
indigenous clothing is treated as a kind of property, the cultural property of the state, 
packaged and sold to foreign audiences. 
During preliminary fieldwork, I apprenticed with a traditional weaver, a woman 
from the small highland town of San Antonio Aguas Calientes, and learned to speak 
Kaqchikel Maya, one of more than 20 languages spoken in Guatemala and the primary 
indigenous language spoken in and around Tecpán. Women are less likely to be bilingual 
in Spanish than indigenous men, part of a long and familiar history of women belonging 
to private spheres and men to public ones. This public-private divide also means that 
indigenous men are much less likely to wear traje, or traditional clothing, than 
indigenous women. Colonial sumptuary laws required Maya men who held political or 
religious office and interacted with the Spanish to wear shoes, long pants, a collared 
shirt, and a hat (Carrillo Ramirez 1971: 49; Otzoy 1996). Today, this colonial vestige is 
ironically seen as a traditional outfit for older Maya men in many parts of Guatemala.  
Women’s traje is “a symbolically rich, polyvalent and visually stimulating domain 
of representation,” writes the anthropologist Edward Fischer (2001: 117). Carol 
Hendrickson notes that for many Maya men and women, “there is an ideological and 
emotional identification with traje such that dress is inextricably associated with the 
person’s very being.” There is a felt “equivalence between dress and cultural heart,” she 
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writes (1995: 193). Traje is an important marker of ethnicity as well as geography. Each 
town in highland Guatemala has its own distinctive traje, and, in the past, the color, 
style, design, and manner of wearing traditional dress signaled the municipality from 
which the wearer originated (51). Today, it is increasingly common for Maya women to 
wear styles from various towns, a trend promoted by leaders of the pan-Maya 
movement, a loose affiliation of cultural rights activists, during the peace process to 
encourage a sense of commonality and solidarity among indigenous Guatemalans 
regardless of regional, linguistic, or historical differences.  
Among younger generations, there are other rapid and significant 
transformations going on in how Maya people dress. Women’s traje is, of course, a 
dynamic system – weaving is a lively and competitive business, styles change from 
season to season, and older women like to complain about “how the young women 
dress these days”: too many flowers in the designs, the colors aren’t properly 
coordinated, no one wears the huipiles that come from their hometowns anymore. But, 
increasingly, indigenous Guatemalans wear what might be called Western styles: t-shirts 
and sweaters, baseball caps, jeans and sneakers. Among teenagers and young adults – 
mostly men, but increasingly women, too – what is popular are global brands such as 
Nike, Converse, Diesel, and Lacoste. The Maya men and women who sport these 
garments participate in a local scene where particular looks are as carefully crafted as 
hand-woven huipiles. It is a fashion system every bit as wrapped up with local histories, 
questions of citizenship and the state, and dynamics of tradition and modernity as is the 
“traditional” dress worn by older generations. 
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Given the strong personal and political significance of traje in Guatemala, why 
are so many Maya youth and adults wearing vestido, the “common clothes” that reveal 
a “foreign element in clothing merchandise and fashion (inspiration)” (Hendrickson 
1995: 66)? Certainly, nontraditional clothes can be much cheaper than hand-woven 
traje. There is also the fact, noted above, that men have been wearing European-style 
pants and shirts for a long time. Perhaps young Guatemalans want to be viewed by their 
peers as in-style, and in Guatemala as in many other places, this means adopting 
clothing that is recognizably popular within the global fashion system (Barthes 1990), 
what Appadurai (1996) might call the contemporary “fashion-scape.” The privatization 
and consolidation of media, the rise of transnational capitalism and global marketing, 
and the proliferation of communications technologies conspire to pare down the kinds 
of messages and images to which people are exposed, leaving youth around the world 
with a rather homogenous vocabulary for expressing taste and style. This pattern of 
“taste transfer” from center to periphery thus fuels the globalization of consumption 
patterns (Appadurai 1993: 419). Youth in Guatemala are regularly exposed to the brand 
names, looks, and styles promoted in advertisements, on television, online, and in 
department stores as “fashion.” They listen to Latin and US pop music during the day 
and watch Argentinean, Mexican, and US cable channels at night. They head to internet 
cafes after school or work to download music, watch movie trailers, play video games, 
and surf entertainment sites. The fashion styles of soccer players, singers, film stars, and 
television actors become topics of conversation and influence style choices.   
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Certainly, brand piracy, and fashion design and consumption conceived more 
broadly, are, at base, acts of imitation and mimicry. Carol Hendrickson catalogues 
newspaper advertisements in Guatemalan dailies from the early 1980s promoting 
“American sweaters with buttons,” “Clothes with the stamp of Europe,” and “Exclusive 
designs in sports clothes, imported directly from Europe and the United States” (1995: 
69). She also recalls a children’s game played in Tecpán that asks,  
A: Where are you coming from? 
B: From New York. 
A: What did you bring? 
B: Something really nice. 
A: What letter does it start with? 
B: With ____ . [names the first letter of the object; A then tries to guess the 
object] (Hendrickson 1995: 70) 
Things do travel between Tecpán and New York, or at least New Jersey, where several 
dozen Tecpanecos have settled as immigrants. At least two men from Tecpán who were 
able to obtain extended travel visas to the US now make regular trips, sometimes 
multiple times per year, to carry everything from clothing to photographs to tortillas and 
fried chicken back and forth between these usually undocumented ex-patriots and their 
families. But, many Tecpanecos have a complicated and critical relationship to the US, 
which is not surprising given the nation’s history of interventionism in the region and its 
ongoing role in shaping domestic policy. As discussed in Chapter 3, for instance, 
although imitations of US brands and fashion styles might be popular among many town 
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residents, there are also complaints about how the Guatemalan government imitates US 
development models seemingly without concern for the effects those policies have on 
ordinary people, the environment, and local values.   
Moreover, imitative flows are never unidirectional (Taussig 2009). Fashion styles 
in Guatemala, even when modeled on US and European designs, cannot be said to 
simply follow from foreign trends. Guatemalan youth style is not merely the same as 
youth style in other parts of the world. Even if Abercrombie & Fitch logos are ubiquitous 
among Indian Tamils and Guatemalan Mayas, the look of Maya fashion remains unique. 
There are distinctive regional influences, especially from Mexican popular culture. Maya 
men and women who migrate to places like New Jersey return to the highlands having 
adopted elements of Latino and Chicano and other dress styles, and, in turn, set new 
trends in their hometowns. Even when apparel producers said to me that the popularity 
of brands and styles depends on “como se mueve lo original (how the original is 
‘moving,’ or selling),” the term “original” indexes a set of spatial, class, and ethnic 
divisions that structure consumption patterns in Guatemala rather than an authorized 
brand name or “authentic” garment that comes from somewhere else (see Chapter 4).  
Fashion in highland towns such as Tecpán also reflects a more generalized look 
and feel that describes daily life in that region. An oversized logo on an Ecko sweatshirt 
appears as one more iteration of an effusive aesthetics that makes life in rural 
Guatemala visually loud. The second-hand US school buses operated by private 
transportation companies in Guatemala are famously painted in bright hues of blue and 
red and green, with streamers and reflective stickers and stuffed animals and blinking 
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lights strung inside and out, and high-powered speakers blasting norteña music. The 
same goes for tuc-tucs, the motorcycle taxis imported from India that fly through the 
streets of Guatemalan towns, sporting brightly-colored decals, bold paint jobs, and 
custom electric horns that blast a popular song or a humorous sound effect. This is not 
to mention the striking colors and patterns of indigenous dress. This aesthetic 
effervescence links together Christmas Eve fireworks shot off from every home in town, 
to the enormous speaker systems rented out for baptisms and weddings so that entire 
blocks are forced to share in the celebration, to the reflective decals proclaiming “Dios 
Es Amor!” on the front of highway buses. Each of these examples is a mode of 
expression and an affective moment in which people are not so much attempting to 
signify something about themselves or their relationship to the West or to “fashion,” for 
instance, as simply being part of the scene.  
But, have young people in Tecpán lost something of their “Maya identity” by 
wearing vestido adorned with global brands? Are they hiding ethnic heritage behind 
Western fashion styles? This is a common assertion among some Tecpanecos who read 
the popularity of nontraditional clothing as a sign that young people have forgotten “los 
abuelos” (the ancestors) and lost respect for the old ways of doing things. Middle-aged 
men often commented to me that they are embarrassed that so few men in town now 
wear the loose-fitting cotton pants, collared shirts, and rodilleras (folded cloth, secured 
by a belt, that drapes down to one’s knees) that Maya elders in Tecpán once wore, 
seeing it as a sign that they themselves have lost some of their “cultural values.” 
Tecpanecos often state that women who continue to wear traje are braver (más 
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valiente) in the face of ethnic discrimination and the pressures of modernization 
(Hendrickson 1995: 119; Otzoy 1996). 
The search for authenticity and the recuperation of lost values are themes that 
will arise throughout this dissertation in relation to what people wear in Guatemala, the 
kinds of work they do, the language they speak, and even the socioeconomic class to 
which they belong. Although these issues are genuine concerns among the people I got 
to know in Tecpán, my analysis agitates against any kind of scholarly search for 
authenticity in Maya styles or ways of life. Such a search could too easily take on the 
tone of an intellectual property regime that narrowly ascribes authenticity and authority 
based on an abstract set of rights as well as the contemporary politics of 
multiculturalism in Guatemala that claims to bolster inclusivity but so often incites the 
gross reduction and objectification of cultural difference. Following Beth Conklin (1997), 
I suggest that searches for authenticity in indigenous dress styles more often reflects the 
hegemonic demands, desires, and expectations of the West and its institutions rather 
than historical realities or even the lived experience of indigenous peoples themselves.5  
As one might expect, the superficial homogeneity of youth style in Tecpán that I 
initially noted in my field journal gives way, on further inspection, to an array of 
differentiated looks and styles. There is, for example, the “ponky” style, popular among 
a small segment of young men in Tecpán, that exhibits the influence of US and European 
punk fashion in its rock-band t-shirts, chain wallets, faded Ecko or Diesel jeans, and 
mohawk hairstyles. Youth are quick to point out the wide gap they perceive between 
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 See also Elizabeth Povinelli’s (1993, 2002) work on how Western legal systems make similar demands of 
indigenous people to enact and embody “authenticity.”  
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the “formal” style – consisting of Lacoste or Ralph Lauren polo shirts, fitted jeans, a 
peinado hairstyle (combed forward and secured with lots of Moco Gorilla gel), which 
was more popular in 2006 and 2007 – and the unmarked style that generally consists of 
the oversized sweatshirts or sweaters and baggy jeans so common in 2009 in Tecpán’s 
central plaza. There are youth who prefer chapulines, the colloquial term for Converse 
sneakers, over polished leather shoes, and there are “roqueros” who keep their hair 
long instead of short and heavily gelled.  
Each of these styles says something about the class and social position of the 
youth who adopt it, and most men seem to outgrow the “ponky” and “roquero” styles 
as they leave their teenage years behind. Within these style categories, there are also 
more or less expensive versions, depending on whether one can afford the more 
“original” garments purchased in Guatemala City or in retail stores in Chimaltenango or 
if one must settle for the “imitaciones” hawked in the municipal market. Traveling to the 
capital to buy clothes can involve a degree of risk, however, since one can be engañado 
(tricked) by the high prices of urban shopping. As one young man who had worked in 
Tecpán’s apparel trade for several years explained to me, “Sometimes my friends go 
into the capital to buy clothes before school starts, and when they get back to Tecpán, 
they see the same shirt for sale at a local store. They paid 100 quetzales for something 
that was made here, in Tecpán! They could have bought it here for 40, from the guy 
who made it.” Although IPR scholars insist that trademark law is necessary for avoiding 
marketplace confusion (see Chapter 1), this is hardly the context of trickery they 
presumably have in mind.  
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Fashion Statements 
The chapters that follow explore multiple layers of values, norms, and modes of 
legal reasoning that inform how Maya garment manufacturers understand their work, 
including practices of copying and imitation criminalized as piracy. In the course of this 
analysis, I discuss how people in Tecpán talk about class, gender, and ethnicity, including 
what it means to them to be Maya when one works in commerce rather than 
subsistence agriculture and adopts a relatively middle-class lifestyle, given the 
stereotypical portrait of an uneducated, agrarian, indigenous peasantry that is so central 
to the politics of citizenship and identity in Guatemala. I outline grand histories of legal 
and economic globalization, the evolution of trademark law, and the legacies of 
corporate strategies to thwart counterfeit production. I trace small histories of people 
struggling to come to terms with a violent past and earn a living amidst rising 
insecurities. Themes of rural and urban space become important as I examine the local 
worlds of garment manufacturers whose geographical orientations are also moral 
bearings. Spatial imaginaries build up around particular spaces – the coastal plantation, 
the rural hamlet, the capital city – and powerfully shape ideas about work, health, 
crime, and community.  
Another part of what this dissertation seeks to accomplish is to understand 
fashion styles and “cultural styles” (Ferguson 1999) from the perspective of people who 
produce them, but who are also utterly marginalized in international law and in the 
global fashion industry. Here, I provide just a brief example from perhaps the most 
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marginalized of the style-producers in Guatemala, the garment workshop employees. 
While workshop owners talk about the importance of creativity and design sensibilities 
for their success, workshop employees are valued more for their diligence and industry 
than for their stylishness or creative spark. Depending on whether they work in shops 
that produce school uniforms or knock-off polo shirts, however, employees may see 
themselves as active participants in the development of fashionable styles.  
In one of the fábricas (factory or workshop) where I worked for several months 
as part of my research, I occupied my time at a sewing machine, stitching together the 
bodices of sweaters that would eventually be sold in highland markets, and making 
conversation with the teenage boys sitting nearby at their own machines.6 At ten o’clock 
each morning, we took a half-hour break, referred to as “la refa,” short for “refacción,” 
or snack. The refa is part of the routine at every workshop in Tecpán. It is something of a 
ritual in town. Old women set up small tables in front of their homes to offer mugs of 
hot cereal and French bread smeared with refried black beans or guacamole to the 
workshop employees who pour out into the streets each morning. The young men I 
worked with checked the time compulsively on their cell phones as the appointed hour 
approached, not wanting to miss a minute of their break time. At ten o’clock sharp, we 
jumped up from the sewing machines and paused the automatic knitting machines, and 
then filed out the door to find a cheap bite to eat. Sometimes we bought from the old 
                                                           
6
 Whereas the large-scale maquiladoras that produce name-brand merchandise for export typically 
employ young women, garment workshops in Tecpán almost exclusively employ men. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, garment production is overwhelmingly gendered as male work.  
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ladies, sometimes we opted for a sweet roll from the bakery a few houses down from 
the workshop or a bag of chips from the tienda across the street. 
Most days, we grabbed a snack and then started walking. We frequently made 
our way to the main street through town to visit the Tigo or MoviStar cell phone 
retailers, check out the latest models (and the young women working as sales clerks), 
and find out about offers on saldo, or pay-as-you-go cell phone minutes. The young 
men, who earned an average of 50 quetzales (about US$7) per day, always found five or 
ten quetzales to spend on saldo they used to send text messages to girls during the day 
or make quick calls to friends in the evenings. Some of them had phones with memory 
chips that could hold several dozen mp3 format songs, and all of them regularly 
downloaded ring tones at two or three quetzales each that featured snippets of popular 
bachata, cumbia, reggaetón, or rock en español tunes. 
The refa was an ideal time to browse vendors’ offerings on market day in 
Tecpán. Each Thursday, we made a wide loop through the crowded plaza to survey the 
market stalls, especially the clothes. Whereas the retail shops in Tecpán generally carry 
a mix of imports from China and Mexico and sometimes overruns from Honduran and 
Guatemalan maquiladoras in addition to various garments made locally or in similar 
workshops in Guatemala City or other highland towns, the market vendors deal almost 
exclusively in “producto nacional (products made in Guatemala).” Vendors who sell in 
Tecpán travel to larger market towns – Guatemala City, Xela, Totonicapán, and San 
Francisco El Alto – to buy from wholesalers, or buy from the local producers who visit 
them each week to sell a few dozen shirts, sweaters, sweatshirts, or ball caps. The 
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market is full of global brands, from Hollister and American Eagle sweatshirts to Levi’s, 
Jingo, and Diesel denim, women’s sweaters with White Stag labels, and men’s sweaters 
with Tommy Hilfiger logos. I never saw one of the young men purchase anything, 
though they frequently engaged in conversation with the only slightly older vendors 
about which styles were the most popular, even trying on a shirt or sweatshirt to check 
the fit.  
Back in the workshop one afternoon, Armando, one of the young men who 
worked at the automatic knitting machines, was sorting through a pile of fabric and 
stashing a few pieces in a plastic supermarket bag. I asked Armando why he was sorting 
through the remnants. He replied that he was going to make himself a hooded sweater, 
adding that all of the chavos (guys, his fellow employees) did this, fashioning their own 
clothing from discarded material. Although most machine errors could be fixed with a 
needle and thread, there were inevitably pieces with too many mistakes to warrant the 
time it would take to mend them as well as remnants from the cutting stage of 
production. When I asked the other young workers, they all agreed that these pieces 
were good for making clothes for themselves, and one of them said that he had made 
the sweater he was wearing in this way, even affixing to it a patch with the Converse 
sneakers logo he purchased in the market for a few quetzales.  
Armando, who at 18-years-old had worked in the garment trade for three years, 
was always looking for something to occupy his time. The routine of running the knitting 
machines bored him, and my entrance into the workshop was a welcome distraction 
since he could teach me the work and chat with me between changing the threads on 
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the machine or fixing a mistake. The workshop owner had taken some time to mentor 
Armando, whose pleasant demeanor, intelligence, and adeptness with both operating 
and repairing the machinery made him a valuable employee, so that Armando had also 
learned some design techniques and how to operate every piece of equipment in the 
workshop. Like the other young employees, Armando was resourceful, and making his 
own clothes out of remnants made sense given the skills he were learning in the trade 
and the impoverished conditions in which he lived with his mother and four siblings in a 
village just outside of town. He could little afford most of the styles we saw in retail 
stores or even in the municipal market stalls. But, like the other employees, he picked 
up on fashion trends during our walks through the market and in conversations with the 
vendors each Thursday and tried on garments to find the right fit for the next sweater, 
sweatshirt, or t-shirt he might make for himself from the knit and other textiles he could 
scrounge together at work.  
Homemade vestido is considered the least prestigious among the various types 
of nontraditional clothing available in Guatemala (Hendrickson 1995: 67), even less 
desirable to some people than second-hand clothing from the US (see Chapters 2 and 
4). Yet, the young men I worked with saw the clothes they made for personal use as 
distinct from “homemade” clothing, since they were using industrial machinery, and not 
the “domestic” sewing machine models gathering dust in the homes of their mothers or 
grandmothers (see Chapter 2). And, although their design work was limited to what they 
could gather up from the sewing tables and piles of remnants in the workshop, they 
took great satisfaction in this design work. As Armando crafted his sweater during the 
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lunch break and after hours over the next two weeks, he and the other teenage 
employees sometimes looked over the incipient garment, joking with him that the fit 
would be way too loose around his skinny body or admiring the way he had joined two 
remnants to make a deep V-pattern in the back of the bodice. He crafted an oversized 
hood for the sweater, similar to the styles we had seen in the market, and added his 
own touch in the form of a shallow cut in the front collar tied up with laces.  
Armando showed off his finished sweater late one afternoon, and the workshop 
owner, who was surveying what we had accomplished that day and figuring how many 
hours it would take to finish filling the order he planned to deliver to the market later 
that week, paused to admire it. Everyone in the apparel trade in Tecpán learned design, 
cutting, and assembly through a similar process of trial and error, often working closely 
with older relatives or employers, and Armando was learning the trade and improving 
his skills at the same time as he was participating in the production of new styles. His 
sweater was an imitation, but also a creative interpretation, of that season’s market 
offerings. It was a collective project, in which several young employees had input. It was 
also an improvisation crafted from the leftovers of the production process, much as 
Tecpán’s apparel trade has been largely cobbled together from the leftover machinery 
and second-hand instruction manuals from the developed world’s now defunct textile 
and apparel industries, the leftover tags and labels and imperfect fabrics from the 
developing world’s maquiladoras that replaced those industries, and the copies of 
copies of imported, “original,” and second-hand garments that circulate in Guatemala.  
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Some Notes on Methodology 
In the chapters that follow, I draw on sixteen months of ethnographic research in 
garment workshops and informal markets where clothing is sold. This research was 
carried out between 2006 and 2009, including a year-long investigation in 2009, during 
which I conducted ethnographic interviews with more than 100 clothing workshop 
owners, employees, suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers in Spanish and Kaqchikel Maya. 
I also surveyed approximately 250 clothing vendors in municipal markets and retail 
stores throughout Guatemala, and worked on an unpaid, flexible basis in two apparel 
workshops. I spent time in dozens of workshops to observe the design, production, and 
marketing processes and had daily informal conversations with people involved in the 
apparel trade and town residents. Brand piracy is a public and generally-accepted 
practice in Guatemala, and Tecpán is a well-known center of clothing production. 
Nonetheless, all names and identifying characteristics have been changed in this 
dissertation to protect informants’ identities.  
The recent criminalization of brand piracy and informal nature of apparel 
production in Guatemala posed particular methodological obstacles during my 
investigation. For example, at the end of an otherwise routine, hour-long interview with 
one clothing manufacturer, he suddenly changed the tone of the conversation and 
asked, 
You know that you are lucky that I am talking to you, don’t you? There was 
another foreigner here a few years ago, asking questions about our businesses, 
and when we found out that she was telling the government everything that we 
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were doing – where the factories were, who wasn’t paying taxes, who sells the 
popular brands – everyone got together and threw her out. 
The gist of this warning probably sounds familiar to many researchers whose 
investigations touch on illicit practices. At the time, it was unsettling and a bit confusing. 
I thought I had followed procedures to mitigate any potential risks to people involved in 
the research and avoid this kind of response. On this occasion, I had asked a close 
informant and neighbor of this producer to arrange the interview and make 
introductions. I opened the conversation with a set of rehearsed assurances regarding 
confidentiality and anonymity. Yet, this person still offered up the thinly-veiled threat, 
and not just on his own behalf but on behalf of “everyone,” all those whose ability to 
earn a living and participate in a valued form of work might be threatened if the wrong 
information ended up in the wrong hands. 
These threats followed on the heels of a quick set of questions I posed about the 
use of Abercrombie & Fitch logos on the sweatshirts manufactured in this producer’s 
workshop. I also asked to take a few photographs of the final products. Brand piracy can 
be a sensitive issue among apparel manufacturers. International trade agreements, the 
Guatemalan state, and the national media characterize piracy as a serious crime (see 
Chapter 1). Research on brand piracy could easily start from this premise as well, with 
the research program built around questions and hypotheses having to do with the 
“problem” of piracy and how actual pirates respond. Such a project would begin with a 
narrow view of pirates as law-breakers and then investigate why deviance is prevalent 
within this particular population of Maya entrepreneurs. Many studies of consumer 
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behavior have been carried out in this manner, asking consumers if and why they might 
be inclined to purchase a pirated product rather than an authorized original (Albers-
Miller 1999). Ethnography pushes the researcher to approach illicit behaviors from a 
different perspective, however. Bracketing social science explanations regarding the 
significance of brands and the importance of strong intellectual property rights, I 
approached apparel manufacturing in Guatemala with open-ended questions about 
how brands are used, what they signify, and how branding figures into a broader 
context of commercial and social life.  
I raised sensitive questions about the illicit nature of these activities only after 
extended interaction with a given informant. For most manufacturers, the illicit nature 
of brand piracy is basically an afterthought, at this point not an issue that directly 
impacts them, though there is a general sense that copying a Tommy Hilfiger logo could 
get one in some kind of financial or legal trouble (see Chapters 4 and 5). Manufacturers 
are much more concerned about keeping up with local competition and watching 
market trends, including what styles are gaining in popularity, and, in spite of the media 
stereotypes, they do not see themselves as people who live shadowed lives because of 
participation in a stigmatized behavior. 
Admittedly, apparel workshops in Tecpán are not easy to spot. Despite their 
numbers – there are perhaps 300 workshops in the town center, adjacent colonias, and 
neighboring hamlets – they are generally tucked away out of sight. Knitting and sewing 
machines are often housed in a back room of the workshop owner’s home. Employees 
either walk to work or ride a bicycle, which is parked out of sight in the home’s central 
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courtyard or patio. There are no signs advertising that a home is also a clothing 
workshop. Publicity takes the form of handshakes and design samples traded during 
face-to-face meetings in municipal markets and retail stores throughout the country. 
Factories that are registered with the state tax and business administrations and that 
have the name of the business painted on an outside wall are exceptions to the general 
rules of secrecy and informality.7 Upon arrival at a workshop without an introduction 
from a close friend or relative of the producer, I was commonly asked if I was an agent 
of the state tax administration or a representative of Nike (or some other multinational 
apparel company) tracking down pirates. 
Secrecy is motivated not only by desires to avoid interference from state 
agencies, police, and other authorities. Business owners in the apparel and other sectors 
safeguard the locations and activities of their enterprises to protect themselves and 
family members from crime, especially extortion, which became a problem in many 
business sectors in Guatemala during the armed conflict and is today sharply rising 
alongside all other forms of petty and violent crime (see Chapter 5). Demands for one-
time or regular payments are generally accompanied by the threat of harm to one’s 
family members made over the phone or in person by individuals claiming to be part of 
gangs or organized crime rings. There is also reluctance among workshop owners to 
share information about economic endeavors, since success in business and the 
accumulation of wealth are eyed with suspicion given a longstanding emphasis on class 
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 Workshops that advertise, whether via a painted sign on the side of their home/workshop, a van with 
the business name on the side, a local sponsorship, or a highway billboard (I have documented a handful 
of cases representing each of these forms of publicity), are generally the oldest and most established 
apparel businesses, and were registered with the state decades ago (see Chapter 2). Their owners 
commonly complain about the unfair competition within the industry due to tax evasion. 
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and ethnic solidarity among Maya peoples and rising levels of capitalist competition 
among neighbors and kin (see Chapter 3). 
Historical and contemporary contexts of violence, mistrust, and suspicion con-
spire to create a context in which secrecy is an important value among Maya apparel 
producers, although not one that reflects either a simple response to the criminalization 
of piracy or a defining cultural trait. My research reveals a complicated tension between 
desires to keep business practices secret to protect personal and community interests 
and an ethic of open exchange that has driven the commercial success of the region’s 
apparel industry. There are important trade secrets that workshop owners strive to 
protect. There are also commitments to communal development that push 
entrepreneurs to share knowledge and resources among family members, neighbors, 
and employees looking to start their own workshops or build their businesses. 
Through preliminary research, it became apparent to me that apart from 
assurances of anonymity and confidentiality I needed to work within my existing 
network to build contacts with apparel manufacturers during the extended research 
phase. When I could not secure an introduction from a close friend or family member of 
an apparel manufacturer, I relied on contacts who were not involved in the apparel 
industry, but who were well-known and well-connected in the region. It was important 
that I worked with indigenous men and women to make contacts, since the history of 
discrimination and unequal access to resources in highland Guatemala often pits 
indigenous people against their Ladino (non-indigenous) neighbors. One of my research 
assistants who assisted with locating factories and introducing me to owners and 
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employees was the daughter of a retired school teacher, and her Kaqchikel family 
names were immediately recognizable to many people in Tecpán. Her family’s 
reputation and the fact that they were not involved in apparel manufacturing, which 
made it less likely that she would be working with me to gather secrets to help out other 
manufacturers, worked in our favor in meeting producers and gaining their trust. 
In the course of talking with manufacturers about their lives and work, the types 
of questions that I asked mattered greatly in sustaining trust. Whereas asking direct 
questions about the use of pirated brand names could spark suspicion, asking open-
ended questions about the design process proved much more successful in eliciting 
viewpoints on brands, property, and imitation practices. Producers are comfortable 
talking about the use of designs copied from imported sweaters or jackets, such as 
those manufactured in Mexico or Taiwan. They are also comfortable discussing the 
morality of copying designs (which often includes the use of particular brand names) 
created by a neighbor or a competitor from another town and acknowledge that the 
creative process depends heavily on borrowing ideas from other manufacturers. This 
practice becomes suspect only in certain types of cases, as when a manufacturer 
reproduces a competitor’s design more or less exactly and then charges a lower price 
for the garment (see Chapter 3).  
Conversations regarding the design process allowed for a discussion of intel-
lectual property and permitted access to producers’ perspectives on international trade, 
relationships to state authorities, and other topics integral to the research project. 
Precisely because I avoided asking specific questions related to the law or invoking a 
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discourse of criminality or deviance, the research project was successful in terms of 
gaining access to a population engaged in illicit behavior and documenting the social 
and moral context of brand piracy in highland Guatemala. This is not to say that simply 
asking indirect questions rather than direct questions related to a stigmatized or illicit 
behavior is a surer method for building rapport and gaining access. On the contrary, 
asking a set of indirect questions related to piracy, especially questions that implied 
illegality, without addressing the law directly, could have heightened suspicion among 
the research subjects. Indeed, this was the case in my conversation with the 
manufacturer mentioned in the beginning of this section. I had attempted to use 
indirect questions to get at whether or not he saw his use of trademarked brand names 
as legal or legitimate. His response reflected the fact that these questions had come too 
soon in our relationship, the timing was wrong, and what he and others have at stake in 
the apparel business is valuable whether or not it was legitimate in the eyes of the state 
and other authorities. 
Ethnographic research among piracy producers is essential for understanding the 
vernacular context of intellectual property rights and why policies that seek to root out 
informal activities and trademark infringement are not always, or even usually, 
successful (see Chapter 1). In this case, ongoing problems of political and juridical 
legitimacy in Guatemala make the law seem like a vehicle for the protection of outside 
and elite interests. At the same time, apparel manufacturers who participate in piracy 
are viewed as hard-working entrepreneurs, participants in a vibrant regional tradition of 
commercial enterprise, and people whose creativity, which often involves practices of 
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imitation and combination, is essential to their success. Participation in a valued form of 
work as well as problems related to economic and physical security are much more 
pressing concerns for people involved in the apparel market than are questions of 
legality. My research suggests that a policy approach that does not address issues of 
insecurity and uneven access to political, legal, and economic resources in a country like 
Guatemala will have little impact on piracy markets, apart from contributing to 
dangerous processes of criminalization and stigmatization. 
Maya apparel manufacturers admit that their ability to succeed in the market 
depends on imitating popular styles and copying brand names. But questions that imply 
that “imitation” is an activity lacking creativity, reflecting negatively on the producer’s 
skill, put research subjects on the defensive or offend them. Research in this social 
context depends on an understanding that illegal activity is actually not a sensitive 
matter in the way that one might expect and also awareness that in the local view 
imitation is not seen as stealing. Beneath this cultural awareness is the ethnographic 
understanding that managerial skill and entrepreneurship in business are deeply at 
stake for apparel producers, definitive of moral worth in the local world. 
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Chapter One: Culture and Intellectual Property 
 
The global spread of intellectual property rights (IPR) law in recent decades has 
brought a set of previously inconspicuous practices under the purview of judicial 
systems and international institutions. What are often mundane, everyday practices in 
many regions are now labeled “piracy” by governments, law enforcement officials, and 
rights-holding multinational corporations. This transformation lends a new moral, and 
potentially criminal, burden to livelihoods and forms of work that are of great 
importance in many communities. However, the threat that piracy producers pose to 
rights holders and more broadly, market systems, is not always clear (DeCastro et al. 
2008). When young people in Nigeria trade in pirated compact discs of American pop 
music, do they substantially threaten the profits of giant recording companies?8 When 
Mexican manufacturers put a Levi’s label on a pair of jeans to sell in informal urban 
markets, what harm is inflicted on the fashion industry? 
This chapter begins with an overview of the globalization of IPR law and then 
explores anthropological engagements with this legal framework to understand how 
ethnography has been useful for interrogating its basic premises. Building on this work, I 
argue that trademark law is as much as a moral regime as a legal precept and provide 
evidence from industry public relations and legal and business scholarship. I show how 
moral overtones in the trademark law literature come to dominate official and popular 
discourse about piracy in Guatemala. While a feeble criminal justice system limits the 
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 See Larkin 2004.  
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state’s ability to enforce international trademark protections, the process of 
moralization that has accompanied the implementation of IP law has social and political 
consequences that will be explored in greater depth through the course of the 
dissertation.  
 
Global Intellectual Property 
The globalization of IPR law  reflects the interests of powerful corporate lobbies 
in the fashion, film, music, pharmaceutical, and software industries claiming that the 
worldwide explosion in piracy and counterfeiting since the 1980s drastically impacts 
their profitability. Although piracy often helps more than hurts trademark owners, IPR 
now travels as a core feature of the international economic development agenda, as a 
formal, legal apparatus presumed to create the conditions for unleashing 
entreprenuerial potential in developing countries, a program akin to Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto’s (1989) neoliberal plan to grant formal land titles to Latin America’s 
urban poor in order incite capitalist enterprise and rectify structural inequalities in both 
its basic premises and, thus far, practical failings (Gilbert 2002). Economists, legal 
scholars, and business scholars claim that IPR encourages innovation by making new 
ideas profitable, and that innovation drives economic growth (Grossman and Helpman 
1991); firms are unlikely to invest time and resources in building a brand or developing 
technology if these are not protected. “Competition is anticipated, even imagined” 
within the IPR framework, writes Marilyn Strathern (2002: 254). Meanwhile, neoliberal 
economists and allied international institutions strategically compel competition 
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through the promulgation of a homo economicus ideology and legal and economic 
frameworks that enforce and expand particular political-economic relationships and 
modes of behavior.9 
Applied to a global scale, IPR protections are said to generate a legal and 
economic framework for innovation and growth in the developing world, while 
protecting the property of innovators and owners in industrialized nations. Studies 
indeed show that licensing and property protections correlate with foreign direct 
investment, international trade, and technological growth (Gould and Gruben 1996, 
Ryan 1999). At the same time, scholars critical of IPR argue that any correlation between 
intellectual property law and increased investment in or trade with developing countries 
must be weighed against the fact that once IPR law has been fully globalized, it becomes 
a “less important factor” in determining a nation’s relative investment appeal (Correa 
2000:23-24). In other words, adoption or adherence to IPR law is often now a condition 
of international trade agreements, so the correlation between strict laws and foreign 
investment may simply reflect the outcome of such negotiations.    
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994 resulted in a “monumental change” in the 
global governance of intellectual property (Ricketson 1995: 881), the “beginning of the 
global property epoch” (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 63). The TRIPS Agreement, 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round, built on earlier treaties, namely the Paris Convention 
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 Rosemary Coombe writes, “Intellectual property regimes were inevitably one of the first means 
suggested to promote the protection and use of traditional environmental knowledge, and through it, 
biological diversity. Conservation, it was suggested, was not being implemented in developing countries 
because of the lack of any incentive structure for preserving rather than destroying biological resources. 
Means had to be found to value them before measures could be found to protect them” (2003: 300). 
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for the Protection of Industrial Property, originally signed in 1883, and the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, first accepted in 1886, 
which established international unions to facilitate mutual recognition of patent and 
copyright protections, respectively, for rights-holders from all signatory countries. The 
TRIPS Agreement largely integrates these early treaties with obligations established in 
the Rome and Washington conventions covering copyrights related to audio 
performances and recordings and patents for integrated circuits, respectively, while 
supplementing these conventions with additional protection standards and 
enforcement requirements. What clearly distinguishes earlier conventions and the TRIPS 
Agreement, however, is the fusing together of trade issues with IPR protections (Correa 
2001: 79-80). Each of the nearly 130 nations that were WTO members at the time of the 
Uruguay Round was required to implement the TRIPS Agreement along varying 
timelines depending on development status (Guatemala, as a “developing country” had 
until January 1, 2000). After implementation, violations may be reviewed under a 
dispute resolution system that allows for significant trade sanctions against countries 
not abiding by or enforcing IPR protections. 
Under pressure from corporate lobbies, the US had pushed hard for the inclusion 
of IPR protections in the Uruguay Round.  Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement’s basic approach 
to linking trade and property rights had first been tested in US trade policy in the 1980s 
when intellectual property lawyers, the film industry (concerned at the time with media 
piracy primarily in the Caribbean basin), and pharmaceutical companies looking to 
manufacture drugs abroad cheaply and without the threat of their formulas being 
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“stolen,” had organized lobbying efforts. Their representatives had convinced members 
of Congress and US delegates to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that 
intellectual property was a key indicator of a country’s economic viability and that a 
country’s enforcement record should be taken into account in making trade policy and 
lending decisions (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 66). By 1994, the US had negotiated a 
number of bilateral agreements linking trade and IPR protections and had successfully 
coerced states including India, Thailand, and South Korea – states that had previously 
promoted alternative property rights approaches based on ideas such as “common 
heritage” (Sell 1995: 318) – to adopt or enforce Western IPR laws by threatening trade 
sanctions. By the time of the Uruguay Round, international opposition to the US model 
of private property rights enforced via trade mechanisms had largely been squelched 
through such bilateral negotiations (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 63). A set of 
protections that are “suitable for industrialized countries, or, more precisely, for certain 
industrial sectors in which firms based in such countries dominate” has now been 
universalized (Correa 2000: 5). 
 
The Anthropology of IPR 
As IPR has expanded to new world regions, anthropologists have questioned 
their ethics and universal applicability. In general, anthropological engagements with 
IPR have taken one of three interrelated and often overlapping forms: 1) critique of the 
concept of property embedded in IPR law based on comparative case studies; 2) analysis 
of the expanding role of biopower in modern societies through the application of IPR 
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law in the life sciences; and 3) discussion of the challenges and potential benefits of 
international IPR law for indigenous populations seeking to advance rights claims and 
secure protections for “cultural property.” Here, I briefly outline these conversations 
and consider what each has to offer the emerging anthropology of piracy, to which this 
dissertation contributes. I draw heavily in this section on ethnographies of Melanesia, 
primarily because those islands have been especially fruitful terrain for conversations 
about culture, property, and personhood since the earliest days of the discipline. 
 
Property Debates 
 Anthropology has a long history of the comparative analysis of property regimes 
across cultural settings. Whereas property is generally defined in terms of exclusive, 
individual ownership in the Western tradition, anthropologists call attention to 
collective and communal property arrangements and other ways of relating to the 
natural world and cultural products (Hann 1998). Anthropologists have also illustrated 
how, even in Western contexts, property is about more than ownership over discrete 
objects. As Maurice Bloch (1975) and others have argued, property relations are social 
relations. Indeed, property relations are inevitably bound up with cultural concepts of 
personhood as well as beliefs about the relationships among subjects, objects, and 
actions. “Every theory of property is necessarily a theory of the person,” notes Simon 
Harrison (1992: 238).   
Stuart Kirsch (2004) offers an exemplary case related to the patenting of genetic 
material, a relatively new domain of IPR law that has drawn attention from a number of 
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anthropologists.10 Kirsch analyzes a debate between a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) fighting attempts to “patent human life” and scientists from the US National 
Institutes of Health who had been granted a patent for a cell line extracted from a 
member of a “lost tribe” (as the Papua New Guinea media referred to the Hagahai of 
the Schrader Mountains). Both parties, argues Kirsch, relied on understandings of the 
body and ownership that reinforced Western views, “including the supposition that 
genomes contain information which can be treated as property” (2004: 23). Meanwhile, 
many societies in Papua New Guinea conceptualize the body not in terms of individual 
sovereignty or ownership, but through lenses of kinship and social reproduction.  
[They] recognize specific male and female contributions to procreation, 
commonly identifies as bones and blood. These contributions create 
entitlements that are realized in the form of limited claims on one’s offspring 
and what they produce. … The resulting claims to persons and their productive 
capacities are largely incommensurable with Euro-American assumptions about 
the ‘possessive individual’ derived from Lockean conceptions of labor and 
property. (Kirsch 2004: 25) 
While international debates over genetic material are generally divided into two 
perspectives – that such material belongs either to a particular person or to the genetic 
commons – neither of these approaches “accommodates Melanesian treatment of the 
body in terms of investments from parents, contributions to bridewealth [that make 
reproduction socially possible], and other transactions” (Kirsch 2004: 25). Not only is 
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 See, for example, Høyer 2002; Cleveland and Murray 1997; Rabinow 2008; and Stone 2002. 
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genetic material considered as apart from and independent of procreative processes 
under IPR law, but procreation itself is discounted completely as a form of creative 
work. The anthropologist James Leach notes that, from a Western vantage point, 
procreation and the process of human development is treated as a kind of “becoming” 
rather than an act of creation directed by the will or works of intentional beings.  “As 
creativity is separated from the process of becoming,” he writes, “it is valued and 
validated as a contingent extra to the mechanistic (that is undirected) recombination of 
elements … Thus the correct conditions for recognizing personhood among Euro-
Americans – control over the object world by the thinking subject – are fulfilled” (2004: 
161-162). Understandings of ownership, investment, and entitlement based on the 
recognition of reproduction as a form of work are incommensurate with globalized IPR 
regimes. This case highlights one aspect of the cultural bias of globalized intellectual 
property regimes. It is of particular relevance for my analysis of the work done by 
garment manufacturers in highland Guatemala, since kin relationships, and especially 
ideals of reciprocity grounded in understandings of filial obligation, have been integral 
to the growth of the trade and to the development of norms regarding proper and 
improper modes of copying and imitation (see Chapter 3).  
Disjunctures between Western property models and native concepts lead 
Marilyn Strathern to argue against the very use of the term “property” to describe 
relations of ownership and responsibility among certain ethnic groups of New Guinea.  
Although Hagan men, for example, commonly say that they “own” wealth objects and 
even women, it would be a fallacy to apply the term “property,” in the sense of an 
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alienable commodity, in such contexts. Among the Hagan people, writes Strathern, 
“things cannot be opposed to persons, as our own [Western] subject-object matrix 
postulates,” (1984: 165).11 Conversely, Simon Harrison argues that the anthropological 
analysis of cross-cultural property regimes has been limited by a too narrow view of 
what constitutes property. Anthropologists have been caught up in the idea that 
property relations have to do with the expression of social relations through “things,” he 
suggests, leading them to overlook diverse approaches to intellectual property among 
the societies they study. Intellectual property exists only on the “plane of 
intersubjectivity,” writes Harrison, “It is the ownership, not of things, but of classes of 
things, of their images or typifications” (1992: 235). Questioning Strathern’s position, he 
contends that the notion that people, their ideas, and their attributes cannot be 
transacted as property “without doing violence to their integrity,” assumes that the 
“canonical model for property transactions is commodity exchange” (240). Meanwhile, 
gift economies, as Mauss (1990) noted long ago, are premised precisely upon the 
transaction of social identities. Citing arguments made by Malinowski (1922) and Robert 
Lowie (1921) for the importance of “incorporeal property” to the groups they studied 
and surveyed, Harrison argues that transactions of ritual action and belief, experienced 
as parts of the self and traded according to principles of the gift economy, are indeed 
governed by an intellectual property regime in diverse cultural settings. “The ownership 
by individuals or groups of exclusive rights to dances, songs, legends, personal names, 
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 It is interesting to note that, in subsequent work, Strathern (1999) contends that the Melanesian world 
view is more appropriate for thinking about property and ownership in general given the undermining of 
Western notions of bodily integrity by life science research and biological patenting (see Hann 2007). 
 41 
 
magic, modes of body decoration and special roles in ritual” provides evidence, writes 
Harrison, of elaborate copyright and patent systems among many indigenous peoples 
(1992: 233).  
I find this argument compelling insofar as it encourages the recognition of 
alternative intellectual property regimes while also acknowledging a degree of 
incommensurability between Western IPR law, firmly rooted in the principles of 
commodity exchange, and alternative approaches based on gift-giving, reciprocity, and a 
shared social as well as economic space of interaction. Harrison’s argument, in the end, 
does not so much disprove Strathern’s point about the misuse of the term “property” as 
open up new spaces for exploring the disjunctures between Western modes of 
ownership and other possible arrangements. In Guatemala, the trademarked brand 
names bought and sold in highland markets cannot be said to exist apart from or be 
opposed to the persons who appropriate them. They accrue their meaning and value 
from various social fields such that trading in brand names is also trading in the kinds of 
roles and identities about which Harrison writes. Yet, even for all their mobility and 
“dematerialization” (Manning 2010), fashion brands are important in Tecpán’s apparel 
trade precisely because they are integral to particular styles and not necessarily because 
of the kind of abstract representational value with which IPR law seeks to endow them 
(see Chapter 4).  
 
 
 
 42 
 
Biopower 
 Kirsch’s work (cited above) on genetic materials is one contribution to the larger 
work being done in anthropology on intellectual property and the life sciences. This 
research has been essential for understanding how new technologies for engaging with 
the natural world are also compelling novel ideas about biology, materiality, and 
information and novel approaches to the government of human health and the 
environment. As Cori Hayden notes, the rise of “biodiversity” as a natural resource, a 
field of corporate investment and scientific investigation, and an object of property 
rights protections represents a continued extension of “the market” into both “nature” 
and the developing world (2003: 62). Following neoliberal logics, nature is being 
reframed as a “storehouse of valuable genetic resources and as a resource to be 
managed as an explicitly economic enterprise” (Hayden 2003: 49). Discourses and 
practices surrounding biodiversity, genetic research, and other biotechnology and life 
science fields shape not only the objects of their investigation and ownerships claims, 
but also their subjects.  Intellectual property agreements assume, for example, that 
indigenous people have an “interest” in biodiversity or genetic material as a natural 
resource. The goal of these agreements, in fact, “is to turn often-conflicting parties – 
developing nations, indigenous or local communities, the pharmaceutical and 
agrochemical industries – into mutually dependent ‘investors,’ by actively producing 
one piece of shared ground: that each has something tangible to gain from the 
sustainable management of biodiversity” (Hayden 2003: 61). Hayden argues that such 
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arrangements therefore presume and produce self-interested, maximizing actors who 
will, so the logic goes, act rationally given material interests and market conditions.   
 Intellectual property frameworks are productive of rational subjects at the same 
time as they rationalize modes of government and economic enterprise that 
increasingly depend on their application and enforcement. Kaushik Sunder Rajan (2006) 
explains how capitalism is more and more organized around the exploitation of life – the 
fields of medicine and medical research, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, genetic 
testing, the list goes on, are at the forefront of capitalist investment and the geographic 
expansion of market systems. This transformation, in turn, opens onto new definitions 
of life itself, “as that whose futures we can calculate in terms of probabilities of certain 
disease events happening,” for instance (Sunder Rajan 2006: 14). Paul Rabinow and 
Nikolas Rose (2006) interpret this kind of epistemological shift as part of the ongoing 
elaboration in modern society of what Michel Foucault (1978) termed “biopower,” 
briefly define as follows: “a form of truth discourse about living beings and an array of 
authorities considered competent to speak that truth; strategies for intervention … in 
the name of life and health; and modes of subjectification, in which individuals can be 
brought to work on themselves … in the name of individual or collective life or health” 
(Rabinow and Rose 2006: 203-204). While enabling a new “political economy of hope” 
(Rose and Novas 2005) convergent with Sunder Rajan’s new definition of life, the 
patenting of genetic materials and new areas of biological research that such intellectual 
property applications open up also permits a ratcheting-down of the problems of health 
and illness to microbiological processes and components in ways that reconfigure 
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knowledge, expertise, health practice, and individual subjectivities (Rabinow and Rose 
2006: 214-215).  
The life sciences are an obvious domain for exploring the relationship between 
biopower and intellectual property. But concerns about health, life, and productivity are 
embedded in general discussions of IPR as well. “The rigorous specification of private 
property rights is nowadays almost everywhere thought to be a necessary condition not 
only for improved economic performance but also for healthy societies founded on civil 
and political liberties,” notes Hann (1998: 1). The moral health and welfare of a 
population as well as its capacities for creativity and economic production is as much an 
object of IPR discourse and practice as is its biological well-being, a point that is evident 
in the moral discourses, described below, that accompany the spread of trademark law 
to the developing world.  
 
Indigenous Rights 
Anthropologists have recently examined IPR in relation to the appropriation of 
traditional knowledge and commodification of indigenous culture by corporate 
interests. Such studies have looked at the patenting of crop varieties and other 
biogenetic resources,12 the circulation of native art forms and designs, and the 
translation of herbal medicines into pharmaceutical drugs.13 This research points to the 
fact that traditional knowledge and other cultural and natural resources controlled by 
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 See, for example, Brush 1993; Cleveland and Murray 1997; and Hayden 2003. 
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 See, for example, Greaves 1994; Posey and Dutfield 1996; and Brown 1998. 
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indigenous groups often receive little or no protection under global legal regimes, while 
multinational corporations reap enormous profits from these materials and knowledge 
systems.   
As a remedy to this situation of legal and economic inequality, some 
anthropologists and native activists argue for a set of property rights and recognitions 
uniquely tailored to indigenous groups, based on the right to development and self-
determination recognized in the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and other international accords (see Benthall 1999). 
Although critical of the ideologies of individualism inherent in IPR regimes, 
anthropologist and legal scholar Rosemary Coombe (1998) notes that IPR law could be a 
powerful tool for indigenous peoples struggling against exploitative market forces. On 
the other hand, “communities that cultural rights proposals are designed to protect 
generally lack the knowledge, political resources and economic networks required to 
take advantage of the opportunities seemingly afforded to them. Development at the 
local level is contingent on the reform of the political and economic conditions 
responsible for inequality” (Kirsch 2004: 33). Today, demands for “cultural rights” and 
“traditional knowledge” protections, initially made by academics and activists, then by 
indigenous peoples themselves, have become important rallying cries, “axes of 
mobilization” in the larger sphere of indigenous organizing (Hayden 2003: 38).   
These rights and protections have been extended through various national 
legislative acts (in Ecuador, Brazil, and India, for example) and through United Nations 
provisions as far back as 1982 (Correa 2000: 220), most notably the UN Convention on 
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Biological Diversity. The WTO continues to debate the issue. The 2001 Doha Declaration 
urged member states to consider new protections for “traditional knowledge and 
folklore” alongside a review of current approaches to the patenting of biological 
materials. Ongoing discussions in the TRIPS Council and the office of the WTO director-
general have focused on several proposals, including a requirement for the disclosure of 
the source of genetic resources and traditional knowledge in patent applications, a kind 
of “informed consent” process between indigenous peoples and corporations seeking to 
appropriate their knowledge and resources, and a searchable, online database of 
traditional knowledge (WTO 2006).   
Some anthropologists contend that granting indigenous groups new rights and 
protections based in the IP framework – patents for cultivated seed varieties or a 
perpetual copyright for an indigenous art form14, for example – only serves to expand 
the reach of Western modes of governance with little regard for indigenous concepts of 
property, personhood, or ownership and in ways that may actually further disadvantage 
indigenous peoples in relation to multinational capital and bureaucratic states. Creative 
projects that stretch back through time and across entire communities – folklore, 
performances, oral histories, what legal scholar Susan Scafidi (2005) calls “cultural 
products” – do not easily fit into existing IPR frameworks, while indigenous peoples and 
other groups who would lay claim to such cultural forms must define themselves in 
essentialist terms so as to present a unified front – a kind of juridical individual – before 
the law. Even the development of sui generis property systems built around native 
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 The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty provides a measure of protection for performances of 
traditional music (see WTO 2006).  
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concepts and practices and local needs, something that both the WTO and WIPO are 
considering, depends on the translation of local cultural norms into a set of legal rights 
that can be harmonized with other systems, leaving anthropological questions of 
incommensurability by the wayside (Kirsch 2004; Povinelli 2001). As Marilyn Strathern 
and Eric Hirsch write with regard to such proposals for protecting “cultural property”: 
“Rather than ‘cultural’ separating out one kind of property from another, the 
connotations refer to making ‘property’ out of whatever appears to be culturally 
important” (2004: 1). 
Further, the WTO’s proposal to guarantee the “fair and equitable” (WTO 2008) 
treatment of indigenous populations through an informed consent model opens onto 
serious concerns raised in medical anthropology scholarship about the variability of 
capacities for consent across diverse and differently-positioned populations. Adriana 
Petryna’s (2002) work offers a fitting example. Her analysis of how Ukrainian citizens 
were led into experimental processes that were clearly beyond their consent in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster illustrates how contextual factors, including 
structural disparities and citizen relationships to the state and other institutions, make 
the granting of consent much more than a simple cost-benefit calculus on the part of 
potential research subjects (or, in the case of IPR, potential business partners). Her 
subsequent work on pharmaceutical clinical trials in low-income countries demonstrates 
how the fact of informed consent and its status as a formal and bureaucratically-legible 
mode of reckoning leads researchers to collapse procedural formality and ethical 
practice in sometimes dangerous ways (Petryna 2009). These same concerns would 
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apply to bilateral contracts between corporations and indigenous groups or individuals, 
with the informed consent procedure potentially covering over continued inequalities 
and all kinds of unsettled questions regarding the nature of consent as well as the 
nature of property.    
Another concern is that the implementation of special IPR frameworks for 
traditional knowledge inevitably requires that indigenous peoples be subjected to 
extensive judicial procedures and national debates aimed at defining indigeneity, 
tradition, and ownership (Brown 1998). This has been true in the case of land rights 
struggles, where questions about what it means to be indigenous, who qualifies, and 
how citizenship and its privileges apply (or do not apply) across populations have been 
central to legal proceedings.15 Elizabeth Povinelli’s work on Aboriginal land claims in 
Northern Australia makes clear how questions of identity and epistemology become 
deeply entwined in courtroom debates: “The land claim process teeters on the ability of 
the court to maintain control over the grounds of knowing what is what. The court must 
frame who you are, how you obtained this identity, and what knowledge and practice is 
a necessary or sufficient corollary to it … In other words, what were the conditions by 
which your knowledge was produced?” (1993: 248).   
The coupling of discussions about traditional knowledge with negotiations over 
the management of biodiversity at the UN and WTO already reflects stereotypical 
assumptions about who indigenous people are and what they do (i.e., agriculturalists, 
guardians of nature) and their relationship to the world and to technology (i.e., they are 
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sources of raw materials that may be converted to modern technologies, but they are 
not themselves part of the modern techno-scientific world). Meanwhile, the fact that 
indigenous populations often sit at the bottom of the socioeconomic order within the 
nation-states where they reside, participate in transnational movements of goods and 
ideas, and increasingly live in cities (Morgan and Gulson 2010), where their indigenous 
status often gives way to a more general classification as part of the urban poor, means 
that they are more and more confronted with IPR not as benefactors of special 
protections but as participants in the informal economy, and often times, producers and 
consumers of pirated and counterfeit goods.   
 
Piracy 
Each of these dimensions of the anthropological engagement with IPR is helpful 
for approaching the study of IPR violations – that is, the study of piracy. Anthropologists 
demonstrate that diverse cultural understandings of authenticity, originality, and 
ownership also guide consumption habits and complicate the implementation of IPR 
frameworks.16 Elizabeth Vann (2006) finds that among Vietnamese consumers the 
categories “real” and “fake” have more to do with a product’s utility than with the 
formal relationship between products, brand names, and corporations spelled out in 
trademark law. Yi-Chieh Jessica Lin (2009) argues that counterfeit production in China is 
rooted in the long-standing cultural practice of Shanzhai, or imitation, which is 
commonly valued as a “grassroots” mode of innovation, self-expression, and even 
rebellion against mainstream values and corporate hegemony. Ethnography is useful for 
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understanding the failures of implementation efforts and the limitations inherent in 
globalized property regimes.  
In this dissertation, I attempt to push this literature in several key directions. I 
seek to understand not only how brand pirates understand the differences between 
“real” and “fake,” but to also situate this understanding within the broader property 
regimes at work in the local setting. What model of property do piracy producers draw 
upon in their social relations with family members and neighbors? How are relationships 
between people and things, but also among objects, reflective of local concepts of place 
and personhood (Kondo 1990; Herzfeld 2004)? How does the problematization of piracy 
in the media and official discourse change how people understand intellectual property 
and their relationships to (distant and nearby) others? What forms of life and modes of 
living are managed and fomented in producer communities through the globalization of 
IPR? Who gets recognized as a “creator” or “producer” according to the current IPR 
framework and how does this play out in local settings?   
I am also interested in both the political and moral economies of IPR law and the 
broader relationship among capitalism, law, and society. Rosemary Coombe and 
Andrew Herman offer a starting point for addressing these concerns in their discussion 
of the dual meanings embedded in “property.”  The term derives from the Latin 
proprius, meaning both “that which one owns and … a standard of behavior or correct 
conduct that is ‘proper’” (2004: 562-564; see also Herman 1999). This second meaning is 
strongly linked to determinations of ownership and citizenship within the ethos of 
capitalism. That is, in modern, capitalist societies, rights, privileges, and entitlements are 
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intimately bound up with moral evaluations of persons and populations (Foucault 1991). 
Intellectual property law institutionalizes a dialectical movement between one’s right to 
ownership (an ostensibly universal capacity formally recognized in specific cases) and 
one’s status as a rightful owner (a legal but also moral determination based on cultural 
norms and social structures). As Coombe and Herman phrase it, “the capacity to 
appropriate is contingent on being appropriate” (2004: 561). One aim of my work here 
is to understand what it means to be appropriate within producer communities and 
examine how that might differ from conceptions of “proper” behavior and “property” 
rights at the global level. The next section opens up a discussion about how such 
concepts have figured into the globalization of trademark law, the area of IPR law that 
concerns the brand pirates in highland Guatemala with whom I carried out my research. 
 
Trademarks and Global Trade 
 The TRIPS Agreement significantly expanded international trademark 
protections.  Trademarks – defined as any visually-perceptible signs that distinguish the 
good or service of one entity from that of another entity – can be words such as a 
company name or the name of a particular product or service, graphics or images, tag 
lines, and may also include the color combinations and font styles pertaining to a 
company’s name, logo, or graphic scheme. Whereas the Paris Convention had required 
that a trademark be in use in a given country in order to merit protection there, the 
TRIPS Agreement protects marks that are not in use but are nonetheless publically 
recognizable in a WTO member state because of marketing and promotion. These are 
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known as “well-known marks.” For example, even if the Gap retail chain does not 
operate in Guatemala, the Gap brand name and logo merit protection in Guatemala 
because Guatemalans have been made aware of the company and its brand through the 
company’s multinational marketing campaigns and promotional tie-ins to popular media 
vehicles. Another key extension of trademark protections under the TRIPS Agreement 
has to do with the association between marks and particular goods or services. An entity 
can now be prosecuted for trademark violation (and the state held accountable for 
infringements) if it uses a mark that resembles that of another company even if the 
companies market completely different categories of products. The Paris Convention 
had limited protection to marks based on the goods or services in respect to which the 
mark had been registered. Now, a beverage marketed in Guatemala under the brand 
name “Nike” violates the Nike Corporation’s rights, even though Nike is not in the 
business of selling beverages (at the time of this writing).   
Corporations invest heavily in the development and promotion of brands. The 
term “brand” encompasses a company’s trademarked signs but also the public image 
associated with those signs. Trademark proponents argue that the law must protect 
investments in corporate branding to ensure an orderly marketplace, where rational 
actors can make informed decisions about their purchases. This argument assumes that 
brands are seals of ownership and authenticity and that brands function as a social 
contract, relaying information about the origin of a commodity to consumers (Coombe 
1996: 205). “The core of trademark law … [is] the ‘information transmission model’,” 
explains legal scholar Robert Bone. “This model views trademarks as devices for 
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communicating information to the market” (Bone 2006: 549). Such an idealized 
relationship between logos, producers, and consumers is challenged, however, by the 
same processes of globalization that make fashion brands appealing to new populations 
(Balkin et al. 2004). As legal scholar Frank Schechter pointed out nearly a century ago, 
prefiguring the crisis of authenticity that Walter Benjamin (1968) would later describe, 
“Four hundred years ago a trademark indicated either the origin or ownership of the 
goods to which it was affixed. To what extent does the trademark of today really 
function as either? Owing to the ramifications of modern trade […] the source of origin 
of the goods bearing a well known trademark is seldom known to the consumer” 
(Schechter 1927: 814). Nonetheless, the IPR model globalized through the TRIPS 
Agreement has been touted as a mechanism for protecting consumers from 
marketplace confusion (Besen and Raskind 1991; Cornish 2004).   
The scholarship on trademark law also carries moral overtones. Piracy is 
commonly depicted as deviant behavior because pirates are said to steal from 
corporations and trick consumers. Robert Bone continues, “[T]he goal of trademark law 
[is] preventing others from using similar marks to deceive or confuse consumers” (Bone 
2006:549). Trademark law is regarding in the legal scholarship as a way to protect “the 
people” from “actions of deceit” (Schechter 1925). Business scholars add that people 
must be protected from trademark infringement because fakes are a danger to society. 
Pharmaceuticals and airplane parts are frequently-cited examples of goods that could 
cause serious harm to consumers if trademark laws guaranteeing their origin, and, by 
extension, their quality, content, and reliability, are not enforced (Jennings 1989; USCC 
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2007). Business scholars move quickly from Gucci bags to jet engines and heart 
medications in such analyses, a strategic means for promoting the broad-scale 
application of IPR law even for industries – such as fashion and luxury goods – that 
might not clearly merit strict protections. Not everyone sympathizes with major fashion 
labels losing a small portion of their profits to the knock-off trade. Stressing the dangers 
of piracy also encourages readers to understand counterfeiting as a kind of public health 
problem, even a human rights issue, with pirates positioned as agents of “human 
suffering”:  “[T]he sale of pirated goods cannot be exclusively measured in terms of their 
economic consequences for genuine article manufacturers,” write management 
professor Gael McDonald and marketing professional Christopher Roberts. “In addition, 
the losses, measured in terms of human suffering, that have occurred as a direct 
consequence of the consumption of pirated goods also need to be considered” (1994: 
57). The authors note that a number of deaths have been attributed to the consumption 
of fake Chinese wine and that death and illness related to counterfeit pharmaceuticals is 
a growing international concern.   
Piracy is also linked in some scholarship to organized crime, even terrorism 
(Nasheri 2005: 83). Portrayals of pirates as dangerous criminals are only amplified in 
corporate public relations and trade association campaigns against trademark 
infringement. The website of the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, a US non-
profit organization formed in the late 1970s by the film, fashion, and pharmaceutical 
industries, among others, and whose membership includes IPR law firms and 
investigators, features a page titled, “About Counterfeiting: Get Real.”  The page reads:   
 55 
 
The real truth is people who purchase counterfeit merchandise risk funding 
nefarious activities, contributing to unemployment, creating budget deficits and 
compromising the future of this country in the global economy.  The real truth is 
counterfeiters are hardened criminals, exploiting consumers, businesses both 
large and small, inventors and artists and children laboring in sweatshops in 
Third World countries.  You should know the truth about counterfeiting.  (IACC 
2011) 
These statements play on feelings of nationalism and seek to incite a sense of moral 
outrage among consumers who presumably believe that criminal behavior, child labor, 
and exploitative working conditions are no longer problems for legitimate, rights-
bearing corporations. The website asks consumers to combat counterfeiting through 
their purchasing decisions, to take individual responsibility for putting a stop to piracy. 
What is lost amid the hyperbole is the “real truth” of who pirates are, why they deal in 
fake goods, and how IPR law affects people in “Third World” countries like Guatemala. 
Given the empirical failures of IPR enforcement efforts, business and legal 
scholars commonly blame “culture” for piracy’s continued proliferation. For example, 
marketing professors Robert Green and Tasman Smith write:  
Many of the countries where counterfeiting flourishes are highly collectivist in 
nature, as opposed to the more individualist West. [C]ollectivist societies place 
less value on the role of any individual person or company’s contribution and 
place a premium on the benefits to society. [There is] a significant relationship 
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between a country’s level of individualism and the extent to which intellectual 
property rights are protected. (2002:92-93) 
As exemplified in this quote, culture is used to stereotype various world regions as a 
means of advancing neoliberal market objectives and legitimizing uneven development 
(Ferguson 2006; Cooper and Stoler 1997). IPR scholarship frequently draws on 
reductionist portraits of “national cultures” (Husted 2000) that are “fixed, simple, and 
unambiguous” (Herzfeld 1992: 73) to construct a map of the world and a hierarchical 
ranking of supposedly “discontinuous spaces” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 33). Green 
and Smith’s dualistic view of the world, with its “given, reified categories, opposites 
paired in a structure of domination and subordination,” (Chakrabarty 2000: 27), begins 
with an inherent bias against developing regions and an assumption that all humans are, 
or ought to be, self-maximizing calculators (Zaloom 2006). 
The notion that private property rights are not a universal principle could 
provide a starting point for critical discussions within the legal and business literatures 
about the globalization of IPR frameworks (Hann 1998). As noted above, to the extent 
that “culture” and “traditional knowledge” have become keywords in development 
discourse, the WTO has instituted negotiations regarding alternative, sui generis 
property rights systems that purport to take communal forms of ownership and local 
relationships to knowledge and natural resources into account. When it comes to 
populations that participate in piracy and counterfeiting, however, cultural difference 
more often serves as evidence of moral shortcomings, as if “collectivist” and other 
approaches to property were indicative of a faulty ethics. Business professors Alexander 
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Nill and Clifford Shultz explain the benefits of educational campaigns against piracy and 
counterfeiting as follows: “People are made aware of the ethical issues involved; 
awareness is a prerequisite for ethical reasoning” (1996: 39). It is presumed that people 
who participate in piracy, characterized as deviant, aberrant, and criminal in the 
business literature (Albers-Miller 1999), can be reoriented toward a new culture and 
ethics if the law is clearly explained to them. To this end, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), the United Nations agency responsible for managing international 
intellectual property registration systems and promoting IPR adherence, leads 
“enforcement-related training and awareness-raising activities” targeted each year to 
countries with weak IPR regimes. In 2004, agency representatives spent two days in 
Guatemala City leading workshops for Guatemalan judges, federal prosecutors, and law 
professionals on the fundamentals of IPR law and its application. Cultural difference in 
places like Guatemala is deemed acceptable only if it can be managed as part of the 
expansion of an overarching set of Western understandings of property and rights 
(Mohanty 1988). Anyone who reads the law, it is assumed, will come to an identical 
conclusion about the problem of piracy, ethical behavior seems possible only in the 
context of formal legal governance, and respect for the law ought to be independent of 
socioeconomic status and other conditions of life or citizenship. As US Vice President Joe 
Biden stated in 2010 when announcing the release of the US Joint Strategic Plan on 
Intellectual Property Enforcement: “Piracy is theft. Clean and simple. It’s smash and 
grab. It ain’t no different than smashing a window at Tiffany’s” (Sandoval 2010, quoted 
in Karaganis 2011: 66).  
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But, in many places, the law is anything but clean and simple. Political scientist 
Rachel Sieder, writing of “the historical legacy of citizen mistrust of the law” in 
Guatemala, describes the postwar state judiciary as “bereft of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the majority of the population. Most Guatemalans rightly [tend] to see the law as 
something that operates to the benefit of powerful individuals and groups” (2003: 141). 
Given the lack of accountability related to wartime atrocities – the country’s internal 
armed conflict and state-led genocidal campaigns against the indigenous majority in the 
early 1980s left 200,000 people dead and over a million displaced (CEH 1999), and the 
peace process, concluded in 1996, granted amnesty to the perpetrators – the promotion 
of anti-piracy laws and the penal logics ensconced therein reflect a rather foreign 
concept, that crime is crime. Given rampant criminal impunity – Guatemala ranks fourth 
in per capita homicides globally (UNODC 2010), and less than two percent of homicides 
result in a conviction (Wilson 2009) – the idea that modern state sovereignty is defined 
by the punishment of crime seems misguided. A culturally peculiar criminology, 
premised on the notion that punitive law prevents crime and improves civic life and 
governmental and economic efficiencies (Pasquino 1991), shapes the ideological context 
in which arguments in favor of the expansion of IPR protections are often couched in 
terms of the spread of democracy, progress, and prosperity to nations that are seen as 
politically and culturally backward (Lippert 1999; Bettig 1996).17 
 
 
                                                           
17
 Rosemary Coombe (1993) and Keith Aoki (1998) note a synergy between such narratives and the 
discourses of “civilization” and “conversion” that underwrote colonialism. 
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The Sincerest Form of Flattery 
Although such moral refrains are commonplace in the law and business 
literatures on trademark piracy, there is some debate in those fields regarding the 
actual benefits of strict trademark protections. A number of scholars have recently 
suggested that piracy helps more than it hurts multinational corporations with strong 
brands, reporting that some economic benefit accrues to the authorized owners of 
trademarked brands when those brands are pirated. Marketing researchers find that the 
circulation of brand names within a given market contributes to “bandwagon effects” 
and “herding effects” (DeCastro et al. 2008) whether or not those goods are authorized. 
The more visible a brand name, the higher its symbolic value, and the more popular it 
becomes. Scholars thus describe a “virtuous circle in which sales of originals drive up 
sales of pirated products and vice versa” (DeCastro et al. 2008: 76; Balkin et al. 2004). 
The circulation of pirated goods may also allow authorized firms to charge more for 
their goods, a “snob premium” paid by elite consumers to distinguish themselves from 
people who buy obvious fakes (Barnett 2005: 1384). The anthropologist Simon Harrison, 
noting that some companies maintain archives of counterfeits and imitations of their 
products, explains that pirates pay the brands that they copy “a perverse form of 
homage.” Pirates, he suggests, participate in an “invisible partnership” with trademark 
owners, trading symbolic capital and esteem back and forth. Similar to the way in which 
a Polynesian chief’s sacred power is measured in the number of taboos surrounding 
him, Harrison continues, “The quantity of imitation which a corporation attracts is an 
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index – perhaps in some ways more reliable than its share price – of the prestige and 
commercial value of its trademarks” (2002: 217).   
Fashion companies recognize that the proliferation of a brand name increases its 
prestige. In fact, instead of tightening the grip on brand appropriation, limiting use, and 
intensifying exclusivity, the trend in fashion over the past several decades has been to 
expand product lines to reach out to new consumer segments, especially middle-class 
and bargain shoppers, and even licensing or franchising brand names to other 
corporations to boost awareness and increase market reach. Giorgio Armani, for 
example, has a high-fashion, couture collection; a premium ready-to-wear line marketed 
under the Giorgio Armani label; “bridge lines” marketed via the Armani Collezioni and 
Emporio Armani brands; and a “better clothing” line sold in shopping malls under the 
Armani Exchange label (Raustiala and Sprigman 2006: 1694). These are authorized 
Armani goods, but that in no way means that a single source is responsible for their 
production or marketing. Top fashion designer Vera Wang now markets a full line of 
couture fashion and bridal wear sold in Vera Wang boutiques in major US cities, but also 
bedding sold at Bloomingdale’s, eyewear sold by Kenmark Optical, perfume available at 
shopping malls, wedding stationary sold through William Arthur, wedding bouquets 
marketed by FTD, luggage sold by Hartmann, a mattress collection manufactured and 
marketed by Serta, shoes sold at a host of retail outlets, and a discount clothing line sold 
at Kohl’s stores.   
Attributes like quality, style, and price vary dramatically across such disparate 
portfolios.  Although a consumer might understand that she is not buying haute 
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couture, “she might have some expectation of an exclusivity that may not be there if the 
designer produces in high street volumes … Now the counterfeiter is the fashion house 
itself and the potentially damaged party is the buyer of the good” (Hilton et al. 2004: 
351). The likelihood of confusion is compounded when fashion firms enter the market 
for seconds, factory rejects, and overruns, as is the case with companies ranging from 
Nike to Ralph Lauren. “Such a marketing strategy gives credence to poorer quality 
counterfeits as they can claim to be ‘legitimate’ factory rejects” (Hilton et al. 2004: 351), 
not to mention the crossover between counterfeits and pirated copies, legitimate 
factory overruns, and “grey market” items – the “real” factory overruns that circulate 
illegally, that is, through unauthorized channels (Phau et al. 2001). All of this points to 
fashion companies participating in precisely the kinds of “brand dilution” that they 
litigate against in trademark infringement cases (Magid et al. 2006).  
The difference between genuine goods and knock-offs is often not so much a 
direct relationship between a trademark owner and the point of origin of an item, the 
level of quality suggested by a trademark and the quality of the product, or even who 
precisely is manufacturing the item. In Guatemala, for example, Maya people who labor 
in small-scale workshops where pirated goods are made might be former employees of 
the export factories where name-brand clothing is manufactured outside Guatemala 
City. The difference between “real” and “fake” is found, rather, in how ownership and 
authority is meted out under the law.   
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Guatemala’s “Pirate Culture” 
Regardless of burgeoning debates over the harms caused by trademark piracy, 
the economic and moral arguments against trademark infringement and the kind of 
hyperbole used to justify strict protections outlined above shape debates in 
international arenas and also pervade local settings where they are sometimes 
embraced and sometimes contested by those with something at stake in their 
application. In the Guatemalan media, piratas [pirates] who hawk unauthorized 
reproductions of copyright- and trademark-protected materials are portrayed as 
participants in an underground market that threatens the ostensibly more legitimate 
business interests of multinational corporations, the integrity of Guatemala’s economy, 
and the state’s modernist aspirations. Pirates are said to be antithetical to Guatemala’s 
legitimate participation in the international community, as defined according to an 
official globalized view of economic development and progress (Portes and Schauffler 
2004). Carlos Menocal (2005), a former journalist who served as one of President Álvaro 
Colom’s top security advisors before stepping into the role of Minister of the Interior in 
2010, writes in the Prensa Libre, one of Guatemala’s major dailies: “They don’t need to 
decipher maps or plunder ships to find the treasure that makes them millionaires.  We 
are talking about the modern pirates … who cost the Guatemalan state millions in lost 
taxes.” It is easy to blame pirates for a host of problems: to theorize the failures of 
government or, to take the long view, the world system, in terms of the problem of 
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piracy. Meanwhile, the landed postcolonial elite and multinational corporations do all 
they can to avoid paying taxes.18   
The criminalization of piracy converges in everyday conversation and media 
reports with ideologies of ethnicity, culture, and class in ways that make already 
marginalized populations available for new kinds of blame. Official, media, and popular 
explanations for rising levels of violence and insecurity in Guatemala often blame 
youthful delinquents, gangs, and organized crime, a discursive process that conflates 
structural problems having to do with neoliberal reforms and democratic shortcomings 
with the cultural problems of unsavory social figures (Benson et al. 2008). The social and 
spatial proximity of street vendors hawking pirated goods in Guatemala City to street 
crime (e.g., pick-pocketing, mugging and assault) leads to piracy being lumped into a 
generalized portrait of violence as an intractable part of urban life. The fact that street 
vendors generally belong to an urban underclass and are often indigenous (Offit 2011) 
also fits with stereotyped portraits of delinquency that blame poor, rural people who 
many non-indigenous Ladinos say are “corrupted,”  that is, drawn into a life of crime, 
when they move to the capital city (Camus 2011). This stereotype and ubiquitous “talk 
of crime” (Caldeira 2001) in Guatemala partially emerge out of brutal realities, especially 
the rising levels of violence that have thus far characterized the postwar period. And 
there is at least one noteworthy connection between organized crime, corruption, and 
piracy in Guatemala. Roberto López Villatoro, the ex-son-in-law of former military 
dictator Efraín Ríos-Montt (who carried out scorched earth campaigns in the Western 
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 Guatemala has one of the lowest tax rates in the hemisphere, with special concessions made to foreign 
investors in export production since the 1990s (Gupta 2007). 
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highlands in 1982 and 1983, the worst years of la violencia) is known in Guatemala as El 
Rey del Tenis (The Sneaker King). The shoe manufacturers Fila and Vans released public 
statements in 2000 claiming that one of his businesses served as a front for the 
importation and distribution of pirated athletic shoes. In recent years, López Villatoro 
has been at the center of corruption scandals involving the manipulation of federal 
judicial appointments and congressional votes and the channeling of state funds to his 
businesses through national anti-poverty programs. The United Nations Special 
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) produced evidence in 2009 
demonstrating that López Villatoro had purchased favors from Supreme Court and 
lower court appointees and congressional representatives and carried out behind-the-
scenes financial negotiations with the current president’s sister-in-law (Valenzuela 
2009). 
The US government promotes the idea that pirates are part of a criminal 
underground in Guatemala. A recent Associated Press story picked up by the 
Guatemalan media reported that the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency 
has determined that drug cartels operating in Mexico and Central America are financing 
their operations from the sale of pirated goods (Prensa Libre 2011a). This is a powerful 
line of argument in Guatemala, where Los Zetas (a Mexican cartel that has integrated 
dozens of Guatemalan ex-military personnel, especially special operations forces, into 
its ranks) are blamed for much of the violence in the capital city and El Petén, the 
remote northern department through which drugs are trafficked on their way to Mexico 
and the US (see Painter 2008; Johnson 2011).   
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Yet, sensational media accounts that conflate piracy with organized crime and 
violence belie the fact that crime is not a homogenous category and discourage 
sophisticated analysis of the factors that underpin political corruption as well as the 
physical insecurity that many Guatemalans currently face (Benson et al. 2008). Pirates 
do not always or even usually belong to the families of former dictators or to drug 
gangs, and piracy is a widely-accepted practice on the local level, indeed a staple of 
Guatemala’s marketplace. As much as 80 percent of software run by Guatemalan 
companies is pirated, despite dozens of court cases in which private businesses have 
been fined (Marroquín 2010). Pirated goods are sold openly in urban streets and 
highland market towns and, in large towns throughout Guatemala, retail shops feature 
pirated fashion brands. Contrary to representations of the piracy and counterfeit trade 
in legal and business scholarship, industry public relations, and the Guatemalan media, 
most knock-offs are not dangerous, nor are they intended to confuse or mislead 
consumers. In interviews with highland residents, I found that they know that the 
Lacoste shirts they buy in open-air markets are not the same products that wealthy 
Guatemalans purchase in urban malls or on shopping trips to Miami. That is the point. 
People buy knock-offs in Guatemala because they do not have the purchasing power to 
buy expensive originals. At the same time, the term “original” does not necessarily imply 
to Maya clothing producers or consumers the same kind of authenticity that fashion 
companies claim for their trademarked goods (see Chapter 4). 
The association of piracy with corruption and violence and its characterization as 
a social and economic threat have circulated steadily in the national media since 
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Guatemala’s implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in 2000, with a sharp spike in 
media coverage of IPR issues surrounding Guatemala’s entrance into the Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2006. In the aftermath of TRIPS, the US 
continued to push for even tougher IPR regulations and enforcement procedures 
through a series of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. Besides reducing 
tariffs and eliminating quotas for US exports to the region, CAFTA tightens patent 
restrictions for pharmaceutical drugs, a move that is in direct violation of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health approved by WTO member states in 2001 and a 
subsequent WTO decision in 2003 to allow the importation of generic drugs to countries 
with limited domestic manufacturing capacity (Fink 2005). CAFTA also extends copyright 
protections an additional 20 years (TRIPS set the limit at the author’s life plus 50 years) 
and requires tougher IPR enforcement protocols, such as the policing of not only 
imported goods, but also exports and transiting goods. Further, whereas TRIPS limited 
the imposition of fines to the monetary damage suffered by rights holders, CAFTA 
requires the imposition of fines irrespective of actual damages in the case of copyright 
or trademark piracy. Finally, the TRIPS Agreement did not include any specific 
obligations with regard to the allocation of state resources for IPR enforcement. CAFTA, 
on the other hand, spells out that “resource constraints cannot be invoked as an excuse 
for not complying with the agreements’ specific enforcement obligations” (Fink and 
Reichenmiller 2005: 296). In a country like Guatemala, where law enforcement 
resources are severely limited and already strained by efforts to combat violent crime 
and drug trafficking, this kind of provision has potentially serious consequences for 
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domestic policy decisions and public safety. Despite popular demonstrations against 
CAFTA across Central America in 2005 and 2006, concerns among US Representatives 
regarding its net impact on both the US economy and Central American states, and 
push-back by Guatemala’s then-President Oscar Berger regarding the limitations on 
generic drug importation, production, and sales built into the agreement, the Bush 
administration was successful in pushing the agreement through at home and in each of 
the five Central American states and the Dominican Republic.  
The Guatemalan state has demonstrated its commitment to IPR enforcement 
through various efforts, including the appointment of a special prosecutor for IPR in 
June 2001 (IIPA 2011) and a number of sporadic, well-reported crackdowns on piracy, in 
which police confiscate illegal compact discs, DVDs, and name-brand clothing sold in 
Guatemala City streets (Mauricio Martínez 2004; Larios 2011). The many street vendors 
I interviewed assured me that the underpaid police simply turn the corner from Sixth 
Avenue to Eighteenth Street and fence the stuff for their own gain.19  The government 
recently removed the majority of these vendors (and the clients who depend on their 
cheap goods) from the city sidewalks, part of a larger public-private partnership to 
convert the heart of Zone 1, the capital city’s historic center, into an upscale 
entertainment district. This is an urban renewal project similar to the Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs) developed in North American cities since the 1990s. The 
new La Sexta (as Sixth Avenue is called) features a cultural center, retail shopping, chic 
cafés, and, perhaps most importantly for the middle- and upper-class clientele the BID is 
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 On police corruption in Guatemala, see Little 2008, 2009; Camus 2011; and Sanford and Walsh-Hanley 
2010. 
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meant to attract, clean streets and uncluttered sidewalks. Despite a series of protests 
staged by the street vendors and hard-fought negotiations with city authorities, this 
public space, once a thriving home to the urban informal economy, has been remade for 
the more privatized, formal enjoyment of the city’s elite (Véliz 2006; Véliz and O’Neill 
2011). It is now common to hear university students and urban professionals say they 
are going “sexteando,” an evening spent strolling La Sexta, hopping among its new, 
fashionable bars. The informal street vendors have been relocated to an interior space 
in a multistory building on La Sexta, a move that makes product piracy a less 
conspicuous feature of the capital city’s urban landscape. The move ironically pushes 
pirates out of the open air and into the shadows, the kinds of “clandestine” spaces with 
which the Guatemalan media and international industry associations like to associate 
piracy (Mauricio Martínez 2004).  
The US continues to put pressure on the Guatemalan government to reign in 
piracy and counterfeiting. Guatemala has been on the US Trade Representative’s 
“Watch List” for IPR infringements since 2001 (IIPA 2011). The office’s latest report 
urges the Guatemalan government to “extend its efforts to pursue raids and 
prosecutions, not just against small-scale sellers, but also against manufacturers of 
pirated and counterfeit goods” (USTR 2010). In April 2011, eight people were detained 
in two separate raids on capital-area homes where millions of blank compact discs and 
dozens of computers, CD and DVD burners were confiscated (Prensa Libre 2011b). US 
trade associations such as the Business Software Alliance (BSA) regularly comment in 
the media on economic losses associated with the piracy trade (Marroquín 2010) and 
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have also participated in public roundtables in Guatemala City to discuss the “nature, 
causes, and consequences of piracy, and viable alternatives” (Prensa Libre 2011c, my 
translation).  
A representative of El Zeppelín, a large domestic clothing manufacturer based in 
Xela, estimated in 2011 that between forty and sixty percent of apparel sold in 
Guatemala is pirated, and was quoted in a national newspaper saying: “[Piracy] is bad, 
slows down economic growth, doesn’t pay taxes, robs market niches from the national 
textile industry and impedes its development. It sells at lower prices, but without the 
backing of a company and no quality, and the client can’t complain” (Prensa Libre 
2011c, my translation). He adds: “ … lo barato sale caro,” cheap stuff is expensive, a 
colloquial phrase meaning that one ends up paying more in the long run when buying 
inexpensive, low-quality goods that do not last. This company representative nicely 
sums up the attitude toward piracy that many formal business owners have adopted in 
the wake of so much attention to IPR protections over the past decade.  
Coombe and Herman (2004) suggest that the association between property and 
“proper” conduct has gained greater moral strength as well as legal force as neoliberal 
reforms in many parts of the world have emphasized state judiciary functions over other 
mechanisms for regulating market relations and market behavior. In Guatemala, a weak 
judiciary means that proper market behavior has been spelled out in the law, but has 
been more effectively promoted through moralizing discourses that circulate in the 
media, official commentaries, and in formal institutions such as the country’s 
universities and business associations (see Chapter 4). Perhaps the most serious threat 
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to piracy producers and the most troubling aspect of IPR legislation in Guatemala is the 
way that moral discourses about piracy feed into right-wing political campaigns that 
promote a return to militarization and state-sponsored violence as a response to drug 
trafficking, crime, and delinquency (Thomas et al. 2011), a trend to which I return in 
Chapter 5. Indigenous people in highland Guatemala who appropriate globally-popular 
brand names are caught on the wrong side of international legal frameworks and trade 
pacts that globalize a narrow understanding of property rights used by corporations in 
conjunction with nation-states to determine who can properly own, create, and produce 
fashion and its signifying marks. They are also on the wrong side of a moralizing 
discourse in a country where the criminalization and moral indictment of indigenous 
people and the poor serve dangerous political ends.   
 This does not mean, however, that the people labeled “pirates” in media reports 
see themselves as bad actors. The small-scale manufacturers and market vendors I got 
to know who are involved in piracy may be wary of increasing legal pressures, even 
concerned that crackdowns may hurt their businesses. In their individual dealings, 
however, most of them have not been affected by new state measures to address the 
“problem” of piracy. They do not even consider themselves “pirates.” They do not 
necessarily see themselves as engaging in criminal behavior or breaking the law. Nor do 
they view their activity as something that undermines the health of the economy. As 
discussed in subsequent chapters, a simple criminology of piracy overlooks the 
“profound moral – even righteous” (Bourgois 1996: 41) ethical codes that so often 
underlie criminalized behavior. 
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Chapter Two: Maya Workshops in the World System 
 
Rigoberto Cumez, a Kaqchikel Maya man in his late 40s, owns a garment 
workshop and screen-printing operation in Tecpán. He employs four young men at 
sewing machines and two others at a silk-screening press, an awkward contraption with 
four wooden arms reaching into the air, each suspending a screen smeared with red, 
blue, yellow, or black ink. Rigoberto travels each day to sell the finished t-shirts, printed 
with “marcas, equipos, lo de moda” (brands, sports teams, whatever is in style), as he 
puts it, in market towns around the highlands and wholesale districts in Zones 3 and 4 of 
Guatemala City. The tees display Puma and Converse logos, Nike swooshes, sports team 
logos (especially Guatemalan, Mexican, and Spanish soccer clubs), and images of 
Mexican luchadores and WWF wrestlers. The workshop is tucked away in his cinder-
block home on a dusty road leading out of town. Typical of house design in Tecpán, the 
front door, made of a simple wooden frame and sheets of metal, leads to a central 
courtyard with a pila (a concrete wash basin), clothes lines, and a few potted geraniums, 
edged by a cinder-block kitchen, two bedrooms, a sitting room, and the large work room 
that houses the fábrica. If you ask Rigoberto to recount how the house got to be the 
way it is – how it got built, the materials, the layout, the additions, and the renovation 
for the business – you will learn that this materiality not only symbolizes the emergent 
kind of middle-class living that I describe throughout this dissertation but also the social 
history of an industry. In the last five decades, in this “out of the way place” (Tsing 
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1993), a cottage industry grew, driven by the work of Tecpanecos and those coming 
from outlying hamlets, who have faced significant forms of structural violence. Due in 
large measure to its cool climate, Tecpán has become nationally known for the sweaters 
it produces. The local shorthand term for any garment workshop owner is suetero 
(sweater maker), and in the early stages of my fieldwork I was sometimes surprised to 
hear a manufacturer refer to himself or to a neighboring producer as a suetero, knowing 
that the person made children’s knitwear, the other major commodity, instead. Indeed, 
the range of products now manufactured and sold includes not only sweaters and 
children’s knitwear, but also t-shirts, sweatshirts, ball caps, jeans, pants, socks, jackets, 
school uniforms, and even sportswear such as cycling and soccer jerseys. 
As Guatemala’s relationship to the wider world changed profoundly in the Cold 
War-period, this cottage industry also changed along the way, and it is interesting to 
look at big themes in Guatemalan society – themes such as gender and indigeneity, 
social and state power, and the problems of economic development – from the 
standpoint of a subaltern industry that is linked up to the world economy and global 
culture in dynamic ways. In this chapter, I draw on oral histories of the growth of the 
trade, my work experience in the fábricas, and field observations to explore some of 
these themes and sketch out the connections, regional and global, that structure the 
local industry. Rigoberto downloads Internet images of fashion logos, professional 
wrestlers from the US, and soccer club insignias to make into stencils for the screen-
printing press. One of his preferences is Diesel, an Italian fashion company, and yet the 
logo and tagline that the workers are screen-printing onto t-shirts during one of my 
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visits isn’t quite right. The shirts read, “Diesel: For Successful Uving.” Two letters – L and 
I – inadvertently merge in the last word to produce a confused copy, but it’s a mistake 
that few highland consumers are likely to catch. Even as mistranslations like this seem 
to disclose significant geographical, linguistic, and cultural distance between Tecpán’s 
cottage industry and global centers of fashion production, it is more accurate to say that 
local producers occupy a culturally and economically ambivalent location within a world 
system in which they are nonetheless deeply enmeshed.  
Rigoberto buys fabric for manufacturing from distributors in Guatemala City and 
a town in the Western highlands, San Francisco El Alto, which hosts a vibrant wholesale 
garment market each week and has, along with Tecpán, one of the most active apparel 
manufacturing industries in the country. Rolls of cotton, acrylic, and polyester textiles 
flow into these markets from Mexico. Sometimes they are bought cheaply as imperfect 
stock or overages from maquiladoras in the region. Another reason Rigoberto makes a 
weekly trip to San Francisco El Alto – climbing higher in altitude in his microbus early in 
the morning, then back down as trading at the market begins to slow, usually around 
lunchtime – is to take advantage of the wholesale trade. Closer to the Mexican border 
with Guatemala and the astonishing movement of goods that goes on there (Galemba 
2010), San Francisco El Alto is a place where buyers are purchasing in bulk, especially in 
the dry season from October to April, when the rain has stopped and the weather 
greases the wheels of commerce in arid highland streets that undulate as wildly as those 
of another San Francisco.  
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Back at the workshop in Tecpán, Rigoberto’s teenage daughter has the role of 
manager, and the handful of young men she supervises assemble as many as 1,200 
garments per week. Sometimes the wholesalers want more, sometimes this is too 
much, an element of uncertainty that is part of how the sueteros are at the mercy of 
wider market forces, and also part of why they make regular trips and maintain a local 
knowledge of how and what is selling. That Rigoberto’s daughter is in charge of the 
workshop employees is rare in Tecpán’s trade, given the patrilineal composition of the 
apparel business. Women are sometimes employed in hand-work, finishing, or 
packaging, work that is said to be “más suave,” “samäj b’uyul” in Kaqchikel, both terms 
denoting that it is softer work, more delicate, a euphemism connoting gender ideology 
and social norms. Rigoberto describes Elena as “a son and daughter combined into one,” 
an obedient and kind-hearted girl who works hard and brings up good ideas related to 
the business. For example, she draws on conversations with her young female friends 
who work in the maquiladoras outside Guatemala City for design tips and “inside” 
information on fashion trends. At the same time as women’s participation in globalized 
apparel production has largely been limited to underpaid employment in such 
sweatshops, Elena says she struggles to get “respect” from the young men she oversees 
in her father’s fábrica. Local patterns of labor and power mean that young men migrate 
northward, own local businesses, or work in locally-owned and managed industries, and 
that they consume the material objects of cosmopolitanism and modernity. Elena, 
dressed in a printed tee and pirated-label blue jeans rather than the huipil and corte 
donned by her mother, represents changing dynamics of tradition and modernity in 
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Guatemala, but also contends with the difficult realities of gender discrimination 
evident in the international division of labor as in local patterns of labor, consumption, 
ownership, and authority.20 
When sueteros like Rigoberto talk about the economic circumstances of their 
trade, they often invoke an idiom, pervasive in Guatemala and, of course, around the 
world, following the collapse of US and some European credit markets and financial 
institutions, of “crisis.” “We are in crisis right now. We have really big economic 
problems,” Rigoberto tells me. By 2009, the full effects of the complex, global economic 
slowdown had reached rural Guatemala, where thousands of people depend on 
remittance payments from family members working in the US. Before the crisis, 
remittances from migrants amounted to ten percent of Guatemala’s gross national 
product (Cheikhrouhou et al. 2006). As business fell off, Rigoberto released his full-time 
employees and stopped production aside from occasionally filling screen-printing orders 
for other local workshops. Elena headed north: against the wishes of her family, in 
violation of gender conventions, but also perhaps because of them, and against the tide 
of migrants returning to Guatemala from El Norte. (The term for the United States in 
Kaqchikel means simply upward or north, so they say, “Xb’e pa jotöl, “She went north.”) 
She paid a coyote with her earnings from the workshop and additional family loans, 
eventually landing work on the night shift at a cookie factory in New Jersey, where there 
is already a network of Tecpanecos. 
                                                           
20
 As touched on in the Introduction and discussed further in Chapter 4, women “bear the burden” (Smith 
1995) of displaying the symbols of identity and tradition in Guatemala. See also Nelson 1999 and Warren 
1998.  
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This chapter examines Tecpán’s apparel trade in the context of diverse global 
connections. I am interested here in what June Nash calls the “ethnographic aspects of 
the world capitalist system” (Nash 1981). Highland manufacturers and the wider 
communities of which they are a part are implicated in regional networks of commerce 
and trade, and in a global economy structured by trade and legal agreements that 
privilege the interests of foreign capital over domestic manufacturers. Maya 
communities are deeply impacted by big market forces, which contribute to the 
conditions of volatility and insecurity that have become existential and social facts in 
this part of the world. In later chapters, I discuss how brand piracy figures into this 
picture of the scalar and social dimensions of economic and structural change. Piracy, I 
will argue, is induced by economic and legal globalization at the same time as it is 
criminalized and disparaged via the mechanisms of international law. For the moment, 
however, my focus is on detailing the growth of the local trade and the dynamics of a 
regional marketing system that “offers an important vantage point from which to 
examine the interaction of global and transnational trends with domestic conditions” 
(Bestor 2004: 34), including changing dynamics of gender, ethnicity, and work in 
highland Guatemala. 
 
The Wages of Development 
Despite Guatemala’s role as a “peripheral” state since the colonial period and 
the national economy’s orientation first toward export agricultural production and, 
since the 1980s, export industrial production, the rural peasantry has long been involved 
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in small-scale commerce (Smith 1984; McCreery 1994). Rural people from the Western 
highlands supplied essential goods such as food and clothing to workers on coffee, then 
cotton, plantations in response to market demand as well as the loss of their own 
traditional sources of livelihood, as communal land holdings were broken up by liberal 
regimes in the early and latter parts of the nineteenth century. As Carol Smith’s work 
(1978) demonstrates, rural marketing centers such as San Francisco El Alto gained 
enormous importance throughout the twentieth century, as manufacturing trades 
including traditional clothing production and tailoring became important sources of 
livelihood for indigenous Guatemalans. The growth of highland commercial sectors in 
clothing, textiles, agricultural commodities, and crafts such as pottery and basketry was 
also limited, however, by the plantation system, a national project built on the forced 
labor of indigenous peasants. Subsistence farming remained the norm in most 
indigenous communities given the subsistence-level wages paid in seasonal plantation 
work and the fact that Maya people had no access to credit sources, capital, or political 
power. Highland markets have historically been populated by small-scale traders, with 
commodity producers working out of their homes, the “penny capitalists” of Sol Tax’s 
(1953) ethnography of one highland town, Panajachel, in early cold war Guatemala.  
Although Tecpanecos did not move into commercial enterprise in significant 
numbers until the middle of the twentieth century, this transformation was precipitated 
by waves of integration linking Tecpán both politically and economically to the wider 
region. “From the earliest days of Spanish contact,” writes the anthropologist Edward 
Fischer, “Tecpán has been more closely integrated into the national economy” than 
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many other highland towns, making it an “important point of articulation between local 
producers and national markets” (2001: 217). In fact, Tecpán served as a political capital 
not once, but twice. Iximche’, the nearby archaeological park, marks the pre-Colombian 
capital of the Kaqchikel empire and the first colonial capital of Guatemala (at that time, 
the toponym for all Spanish territory between southern Mexico and Costa Rica). After 
independence in 1821 (and long after the administrative capital had relocated), and 
especially during the coffee boom of the late nineteenth century when anti-vagrancy 
laws compelled debt servitude (McCreery 1983), the town sent laborers to coastal 
plantations. The town also became a center of grain production and millwork, providing 
wheat for much of the country. Located less than ninety kilometers from Guatemala 
City, the town’s location ensured that as urban working classes expanded and displaced 
poor moved into the capital region in the twentieth century, Tecpán would be well-
positioned as a production and intermediary marketing site between Western markets 
and the capital city.  
Today, Tecpán has a diversified economy relative to other towns in the highland 
region insofar as commercial enterprise and wage labor comprise a large proportion of 
economic activity (Fischer 2001: 248). According to recent anthropological surveys, 
farming is the primary occupation of approximately fifty percent of male heads-of-
households in Tecpán, followed by nearly a quarter who identify as self-employed, a 
category that includes “commodity producers, merchants, tradesmen, or transportistas 
[bus or taxi drivers].” Another fifteen percent are involved in nontraditional agricultural 
export production, and the remaining quarter of surveyed males work as wage laborers 
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(Fischer 2001: 217). These survey results contrast strikingly with the dependence of the 
rural Western highlands on migrant labor to the US and the continued dependence of 
many central highland residents on seasonal plantation work. As recently as the early 
1990s, “almost all of the able-bodied men in the hamlet of Paquip, just outside Tecpán, 
migrated to coastal plantations. Now no one does” (Fischer and Benson 2005: 9). This 
shift is partly due to the rise of non-traditional export agriculture in and around Tecpán 
since the end of the armed conflict. Thousands of land owners and laborers are involved 
in the cultivation of export crops, including broccoli, snow peas, cauliflower, and 
cabbage, which are then marketed by regional cooperatives to US and European food 
companies. Export agriculture has economically benefited some Maya families looking 
to supplement subsistence milpa (corn and beans) farming with cash earnings while still 
permitting them control over the means of production (Fischer and Benson 2006), an 
important value among many Maya people (Fischer 2001; Watanabe 1992). Some Maya 
families have even purchased land from Ladinos, evidence of the transfer of some 
degree of wealth from the town’s non-indigenous population to its indigenous majority 
via international trade (Fischer 2001: 231). But export-led development is a risky 
venture that sometimes results in tremendous losses for vulnerable Guatemalans and 
increased levels of precariousness for Mayas in particular (Fischer and Benson 2006; 
O’Neill and Thomas 2011). This trend reflects a larger neoliberal program that, 
throughout Latin America, has involved the privatization of communal lands, the 
retraction of state functions, and the opening of agricultural markets to international 
trade. Guatemala’s domestic market for wheat all but collapsed in the mid-1990s when 
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WTO regulations required the elimination of tariffs on most agricultural commodities. 
Wheat and other grain crops, including corn (that historic staple of the Maya diet), are 
increasingly imported from the US. Under pressure from the World Bank and IMF, the 
Guatemalan state has reduced social service expenditures and lifted price controls on 
basic necessities. These changes have left many Guatemalans vulnerable to poverty and 
chronic underemployment, health insecurities, crime and violence (Chase-Dunn 2000; 
O’Neill and Thomas 2011).  
Attracted by the low wages, low rates of unionization, and lax regulation in 
Guatemala, maquiladoras expanded rapidly during the transitional period between the 
nation’s constitutional reforms of 1985 and the final peace accords signed in 1996 
(Petersen 1992; Goldín 2001). Fueled mainly by US and South Korean capital, the 
number of factories nearly doubled between 1992 and 1996. By the mid-1990s, 130,000 
Guatemalans were employed in almost 500 textile and garment factories, with ninety-
nine percent of their products exported to the US (Traub-Werner and Cravey 2002). By 
2005, Mexican and Central American maquiladoras supplied nearly twenty percent of all 
apparel sold in US stores (Abernathy et al. 2005).  Many highland residents affected by 
structural adjustment policies migrate to the capital and semi-urban centers in search of 
factory employment (Goldín 2001) in spite of the notoriously poor working conditions 
and labor abuses common to maquiladoras (Ross 1997). These abuses, and the 
gendered patterns of employment that underwrite them, are well-documented In 
Guatemala, where between 70 and 80 percent of maquila workers are young girls and 
unmarried women (Goldín 2001). Multinational garment companies capitalize on the 
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vulnerability of female workers to maximize productivity while keeping labor costs low 
(Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983). And, despite its rapid growth throughout the 1990s, 
factory employment is far from secure. By 2000, nearly 100 maquiladoras had closed 
and moved operations elsewhere (Goldín 2001). For these reasons, Tecpanecos have 
tried to avoid factory labor. “Maquiladora production is, like that of cut flowers, based 
on a model of outsourcing and contract production,” writes Fischer. “Employment in a 
maquiladora is viewed as an alternative of last resort, and even then only as a 
temporary necessity” (2001: 235). Maya women in Tecpán more often work in 
traditional weaving, as homemakers and child care providers, domestic servants, market 
vendors, tienda owners and operators, or in petty trades such as baking and tortilla-
making than in maquiladoras. 
Whereas the formal sector jobs created by neoliberal reforms involve 
heightened levels of risk, subordination, and disenfranchisement, formal sector 
employment (public and private) is also in decline. The vast majority of Guatemalans – 
about seventy percent (INE 2003) – eke out a living in informal economic activities and 
sectors. This participation cannot be explained away as a simple response to conditions 
of poverty or marginalization (Portes et al. 1989). Serial, institutionalized poverty linked 
to landlessness and a systemic lack of educational opportunities and other resources 
and rights, together with a largely ineffective and, from the perspective of many Mayas, 
highly suspicious state apparatus contribute to the rate of informal economic 
participation in Guatemala (CIEN 2006; Pérez Sáinz et al. 2004). In Tecpán, patterns of 
discrimination, structural inequalities, and even legal barriers, have long prevented 
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indigenous people from advancing their educations, owning formal businesses, and 
entering professional fields. Thus, although formal employment options may be more 
diverse than in other regions, they actually remain quite limited for indigenous men and 
women. One garment workshop owner estimated in an interview with me that about 
seventy-five percent of people living in Tecpán are Maya, but “ninety-nine point nine 
percent of the textileros (garment manufacturers) are Maya.” He continued, “The 
Ladinos have never worked in textiles. They work in other things,” he mentions 
education, medicine, and commercial enterprise. According to my surveys, the vast 
majority of professionals and even butchers and hardware store owners, animal feed 
distributors, gas station owners, and automobile salesmen in Tecpán are identified by 
others in town and/or self-identify as Ladino. There is a growing cohort of indigenous 
teachers, both male and female, in Tecpán’s primary and secondary schools, with 
women generally assigned to lower grade levels and men to upper ones. Several local 
factories that manufacture thread for artisanal weaving employ perhaps a hundred 
people, mostly indigenous men (Hendrickson 1995: 48; Fischer 2001: 218). But the 
apparel trade is a major source of employment in Tecpán, and, importantly, self-
employment for Mayas who are minor capitalists and who are more and more involved 
in a language and cultural style of business that is about professionalization. Apparel 
factory ownership and operation have permitted some Tecpanecos to purchase 
property, educate their children, and invest in other business ventures. The trade has 
been an “economic revolution for Tecpán,” as one producer put it.  
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The Apparel Trade 
Tecpán’s apparel trade began when a handful of Kaqchikel Maya families living in 
rural hamlets outside of town invested in semi-industrial knitting and sewing machines 
sold by distributors in Guatemala City and Antigua, sometime in the 1950s. The 
introduction of this new technology opened up a market for manufactured knitwear on 
which early producers quickly capitalized. In a pattern common to petty capitalism 
throughout the developing world, workshop owners relied on kin-based resources, 
including using their homes for production and acquiring capital through informal loans 
from family members (Smart and Smart 2005: 3). The industry has expanded largely 
through apprenticeship and kinship connections, which is a topic that I delve into in the 
next chapter, where I am concerned with a more detailed consideration of the 
relationship among family, ideals of community, and work. People who are already 
established in the trade help the next generation get started, teaching them the 
necessary skills and providing initial capital.  
Many of my conversations with older apparel producers amounted to an oral 
history of the trade as told by this aging generation, who look back on the early days 
with pride. Each tells his own version of precisely who the first suetero was, although 
there is a consensus that the first producers lived in Xepac and Xecoxol, two neighboring 
hamlets several kilometers from the town center. Why these men began making 
clothing and selling it, first to neighbors and then in the markets of the capital city and 
Western highlands, is often explained in terms of a comparison between the limitations 
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– economic and existential – of subsistence agriculture and the opportunities offered by 
commercial production and trade. As one aging suetero explained,  
Look, in Tecpán, the sweaters began around 1950. That is to say, we have been 
working in el tejido for sixty years! First, it began with a few people, because 
before that what one lived on was farming and nothing more. One planted 
wheat and milpa, and that was it. But when a person really wanted to get things 
started, he bought a machine, and it worked for him, and, just like that, others 
saw it and did the same. It’s like this. In commerce, there’s a little more. Families 
can do a little better in commerce. In farming, not as much. There is not much 
for you in farming. It’s just to sustain the family. You don’t have an income. But 
with sweaters, well, in Tecpán, what has helped the town’s development in 
Tecpán is the sweater. Later, there was agriculture, whole fields of lettuce and 
broccoli, but, first, there was the sweater.  
This man emphasizes that clothing production provided the basis for later commercial 
growth in export agriculture, giving historical but also symbolic primacy to his trade in 
the history of Tecpán’s “development,” as he terms it.  
He also uses the term el tejido, which means weaving, as a general referent for 
the kind of work that garment manufacturers do in Tecpán. Although weaving is closely 
associated with indigenous women in Guatemala, the same verb (tejer in Spanish, kemoj 
in Kaqchikel) is used for traditional weaving and for machine knitting. This linguistic 
convergence is symbolic of the material displacement of women from the work of 
clothing their families by industrial apparel production. Still, the possible slippage 
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between “women’s work” and “men’s work” evidenced in the double-meaning of tejer 
is carefully patrolled by men as they narrate the history of the cottage industry. Many of 
them begin their stories by talking about the historical roles of women in making 
clothing, going on to distinguish between the “domestic” work – that is, oriented toward 
the family – done by women who made clothes and the “industrial” work – that is, 
oriented toward the market – taken up later by men. According to some, women had 
even worked on “domestic” knitting and sewing machines, smaller in size and capacity, 
for some time before “industrial” production began. But, they emphasize, men were the 
ones who began to produce clothing in larger quantities and orient production toward 
commercial markets.21  
The first garment workshops in Tecpán produced knit hats for infants, knit sets 
for children, and sweaters for men and women, selling mostly in Guatemala City to the 
urban poor and working classes or in regional marketplaces such as San Francisco El 
Alto, which served the Western highlands; Escuintla, which served the coastal 
plantations; or Esquipulas, located near the Honduras and El Salvador borders and thus 
an important commercial center for the Central American Common Market.22 Many of 
                                                           
21
 In contrast to the displacement of women from clothing production in Tecpán, in San Pedro 
Sacatepéquez, a small town in the Western department of San Marcos, the introduction of new knitting 
and sewing technologies meant that women who had traditionally made clothing for their families 
transitioned to the business of making and selling sweaters for regional markets (Ehlers 2000: 136-142). 
Whereas the labor of women who work beside their husbands in the trade in Tecpán has been viewed 
generally by men as supplementary to their own management and sales work, women are recognized as 
the primary owners and decision-makers in San Pedro Sacatepéquez.  
 
22
 The Central American Common Market (CACM) was established in a 1960 treaty providing for reduced 
barriers to trade among Central American states and a common tariff on nearly all imports from non-
member states. The measure led to a two-fold increase in trade among Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rice by 1970, with more limited success in the following two decades, largely due to 
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the rural families who entered apparel production in the 1960s and 1970s soon moved 
to Tecpán’s semi-urban center to facilitate access to inputs and markets, either selling 
their agricultural plots in the hamlets to finance the move, taking out loans from kin, or 
slowly saving up from apparel sales to purchase a bit of land or rent a house in town. 
This move proved disastrous for many sueteros when a massive earthquake hit central 
Guatemala in 1976, leveling nearly every building in Tecpán, but leaving many of the 
remote hamlets outside of town unscathed. It would take years to re-establish 
production capacities and rebuild distribution networks between Tecpán and its 
markets.  
Those who survived the earthquake soon faced another danger. The country’s 
internal armed conflict intensified in the highlands in the late 1970s, with the threat to 
the indigenous population peaking during General Efraín Ríos-Montt’s scorched-earth 
campaign, carried out in 1982 and 1983. The United Nations-sponsored truth 
commission eventually characterized the atrocities of this period as an act of genocide 
against the Maya (CEH 1999). While whole villages were burned and their inhabitants 
massacred in some Western regions, the primary threat to Tecpanecos came in the form 
of focused kidnappings and killings. Common targets included indigenous professionals 
and community organizers (Fischer and Hendrickson 2003; Smith 1984). Business 
success in the apparel trade had allowed a growing number of Maya families to become 
involved in local government, regional cooperatives, and cultural associations. Many 
apparel producers were disappeared or fled to Chimaltenango, the department capital, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the armed conflicts that swept the region. The CACM’s relevance and effectiveness has been diminished 
by WTO stipulations regarding international trade and the tariff and quote restrictions included in CAFTA. 
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or Guatemala City after receiving death threats to themselves or their families. Some of 
them returned to Tecpán in the mid-1980s, but others continued their work in the cities 
where they sought refuge. Thus, the origins of Chimaltenango’s apparel trade can be 
traced back to Tecpán, as can several clothing manufacturers that continue to operate 
in Guatemala City.  
Apparel production in Tecpán experienced a boom in the late 1980s as the 
conflict subsided, part of a larger context of Maya resurgence following decades of 
intense political and military repression (Warren 1998; Fischer and Brown 1996). 
Indeed, continued constraints on employment and educational options for indigenous 
people mean that hundreds of men in Tecpán opened up workshops throughout the 
1990s. Fischer estimated in 2001 that there were “between seventy-five and one 
hundred small sweater factories that employ between one and twenty workers” (2001: 
218). Based on my own counts and input from local producers, I estimate that there are 
now one hundred workshops in Tecpán’s semi-urban core and as many as two hundred 
in the colonias on the outskirts of town and the hamlets that are part of the 
municipality.23 A local yarn and thread distributor reported to me that he has around 
400 clients, although this number included workshops throughout the department of 
Chimaltenango (there are a few dozen just in the department capital) and some in the 
nearby departments of El Quiché and Sololá whose owners travel to Tecpán to buy their 
inputs. Still, he estimated that about 80 percent of his clients are from Tecpán, putting 
                                                           
23
 This number is lower than the estimates I heard from informants during preliminary field research. 
People commonly claimed that there were around 500 workshops, which likely reflected the sense of 
intense local competition that producers commonly feel and also an air of pride in the size and 
importance of the trade. 
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the number above three hundred. Tecpán has become as important to the domestic 
apparel trade as more traditional centers of tailoring such as San Francisco El Alto and 
Guatemala City (Smith 1984; Goldín 2009). Nearly every family in Tecpán has a 
connection to the apparel trade in some respect, and entire families are sometimes 
employed in the workshops. The growth of apparel manufacturing has also led to the 
establishment of a slew of textile and thread suppliers around town as well as 
machinery importers and embroidery and screen-printing shops. 
The majority of workshops are small-scale, like that of Oswaldo Cuxil, who lives 
in one of the colonias constructed over the past several decades to support the growing 
urban population. Oswaldo attended primary school off and on for a few years, but 
spent most of his childhood farming with his father. At age fourteen, he began cutting 
and packaging garments for a workshop owner, who later helped him start his own 
shop. Now nearly forty-years-old, Oswaldo’s business occupies one room built onto his 
home. It sits hidden behind thin sheets of metal that stand in for a wall, hidden from the 
chilly mountain air, from authorities snooping around for pirated goods, and, especially, 
government tax collectors. A piece of poster board hung on the wall reads: “Dios 
bendiga este negocio, mini-fábrica ‘de Cuxil’ [God bless this business, ‘Cuxil’s’ little 
factory],” penned in black marker, with Oswaldo’s surname in quotation marks, 
indicating that the business takes its name from him.  
Oswaldo employs three young men, one of them his nephew. Two are occupied 
at manual knitting machines, a ubiquitous model traded under the brand name Brother. 
Only slightly more sophisticated than the machines purchased by the first sueteros in 
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the 1960s, Brothers consist of a metal carriage housed in a rectangular plastic case, 
mounted on two legs so that the employees stand up to operate them. Grasping a pair 
of handles, they move from side to side, rhythmically swaying in perfect time to move 
the carriage back and forth over a row of industrial needles. The carriage bears the warp 
threads; the needles bear the weft, so that each pass completes a row of knitted 
material. Employers who rely on this type of loom look for operators with strength, 
endurance, and, in particular, the ability to maintain smooth movements and a steady 
pace, all crucial to producing a flawless length of sweater knit. The best operators are 
also agile learners with a quick hand, since the design of the sweater and the color 
combinations result from manual changes to the machine settings, ideally made without 
upsetting the rhythm of the carriage. I never encountered a woman operating a manual 
knitting machine in any of the workshops I visited, and employers insisted that women 
did not have the upper body strength the work necessitated. Nonetheless, these are the 
same kind of machines that women sometimes operate in San Pedro Sacatepéquez, and 
I worked for several weeks at one in another workshop in Tecpán, albeit trading off with 
a male employee in half-hour shifts for the sake of meeting production schedules.  
The Brother knitting machine was an important catalyst in the rapid expansion of 
the apparel industry in the early 1990s. Cheap and relatively easy to operate –workshop 
owners and apprentices could learn design techniques and invent new styles simply 
through trial and error using the punch-card programming and manual controls – an 
individual working at one of these machines could produce up to eight sweaters per 
day, roughly four dozen sweaters per week. If the person charged fifty quetzales per 
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sweater at the market, with a profit of eight to ten quetzales per sweater, he could earn 
close to 500 quetzales (approximately US$70) per week, much more than an agricultural 
worker who might earn 150 quetzales per week or a public school teacher whose 
starting salary would be around 250 quetzales per week, and about the same as a bus 
driver who might earn as much as 2500 quetzales each month. Machines often changed 
hands several times as people came and went in the business, and employers commonly 
passed an older unit onto a young apprentice, who might then work for four or five 
hours at home each night to supplement his daytime earnings.  
Manufacturers who got their start before la violencia, as the worst years of the 
armed conflict are commonly termed, and had capital to invest once the conflict 
subsided, purchased slews of Brothers as business picked up after the war, some 
employing thirty or forty men to each operate one machine. In 1995, the Japanese 
company that manufactured Brothers developed a new line of computerized machines, 
and in 2003, the company stopped manufacturing knitting machines altogether. Parts 
for the manual models are now difficult to find. Besides, a new generation of machines 
came to Guatemala in the mid-1990s. As textile factories in the US and Europe closed 
down with the expansion of free trade and the globalization of manufacturing and 
moved operations to places like Guatemala, used machinery, including automatic, 
rectilinear models that cut down on production time and labor costs became available 
to Guatemalan importers, a case of “last generation technology” ending up in less 
developed regions (Fischer 2001: 236). Workshops that have not been able to amass the 
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capital to invest in these technologies are marked by the distinctive and steadily-paced 
noise of the Brothers, which carries out into the streets of town.    
Oswaldo’s employees occasionally shout to one another between the carriages’ 
passes, making brief conversation, telling jokes, or passing along orders as they move 
sweater knit from the looms to the cutting table. Once the material is trimmed to size 
with heavy scissors following crude patterns cut from cardboard, it goes to one of the 
various other machines scattered about the wooden tables that line the walls. 
Oswaldo’s third employee mans these devices: a Juki sewing machine, an overlook 
machine used for finishing the garments’ edges, and a Singer 20U used for zig-zag 
stitching and primitive embroidery work. As is common to most workshops in Tecpán, 
there is a radio on one of the tables, the music barely audible above the mechanical 
noise. There are a couple of dozen cassette tapes scattered around, all of them Christian 
music, a clear indication of Oswaldo’s Protestant faith, since evangelical pastors 
encourage the combination of worship with work in ways that Tecpán’s Catholic padres 
do not. There are still the usual workplace diversions reflective of the industry’s male 
hegemony, however: posters of championship soccer teams tacked to the walls, a fold-
out spread from a daily newspaper featuring a national beauty queen, and a cell phone 
advertisement starring light-skinned, long-legged, and scantily-clad models.  
I worked in a small operation much like Oswaldo’s for several months during my 
fieldwork. Owned by Alberto Ixim, the workshop consisted of two rooms on the second 
floor of Alberto’s uncle’s house. One room housed three manual knitting machines and 
the two workers who operated them (one worker moved between a machine 
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specifically used to produce shirt collars and another programmed to produce sweater 
knit). These workers taught me the basics of how to operate the manual equipment and 
allowed me to assist them for several weeks, with great amusement not only at the 
desire of a woman and a gringa to learn the work of a tejedor (knitting machine 
operator), but also at how quickly I seemed to forget the intricate gear and lever 
changes they had just showed me that were necessary for producing whatever pattern 
we were working on that day. The second room was used for cutting, assembly, and 
packaging. There, I ran an industrial sewing machine putting together children’s 
clothing. I sat in a row of three seamsters, each of us looking up from our work only to 
see the back of another’s head. The chair and desk on which the sewing machines were 
mounted were barely large enough to accommodate my tall frame. Guiding the sweater 
knit or fleece material through the machine with both hands, I sat hunched over and 
cramped into my personal workspace, keeping a careful eye on the seam rapidly 
emerging beneath my gaze. The regular employees in this room included two other 
costureros (seamsters), one of them a greasy-haired fifteen-year-old who had briefly 
worked at one other workshop before coming to this one, the other a twenty-eight-
year-old who had worked at a number of clothing shops since age fourteen, now trying 
to support his wife and two children. There was a cortador (cutter) named José, whom 
everyone called Pájaro in Spanish or Tz’ikin in Kaqchikel, both meaning bird and, 
especially in Kaqchikel, carrying a coarse slang connotation.24 
                                                           
24
 Code-switching between Spanish and Kaqchikel was common in all the workshops in which I either 
worked or spent time as an observer. The predominant language often depended on how much Kaqchikel 
the various employees spoke. In Alberto’s workshop, for instance, one costurero spoke very little of the 
 93 
 
José was known as a flirt and reveled in telling sexual jokes in the workshop and 
slinging cat calls out the second-story window – usually open because of the intense 
heat generated by the afternoon sunlight that poured in through the opaque plastic roof 
– at the young girls passing on the street below. The other employees encouraged his 
machista behavior with their laughter, although one of the costureros performed his 
Evangelical faith by cautioning José when he felt he had gone too far with the jokes and 
innuendo. José’s high energy, eagerness, and wit had garnered him a fictive kin 
relationship with Alberto and his family. The sincerity that had drawn Alberto to José 
was illustrated to me by the difficulties my introduction into the workplace environment 
posed for José. It was a full week before he felt comfortable enough to cajole passing 
school girls in my presence, and he struggled for much longer to determine what 
pronoun to use to address me in Spanish – at first using the very proper usted form, but 
with constant slippage into the less commonly-used but also less proper tu form. After 
two weeks, he finally settled on the vos form, which is used among peers, including co-
workers, and family members in Guatemala.25 José’s family lived in a rural hamlet 
several kilometers from Tecpán, and, in order to avoid the hour-long commute (a bus 
ride on dirt roads followed by a long walk through agricultural fields) to his family’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
indigenous language, so banter was often in Spanish. Kaqchikel terms were used for particular emphasis 
or to impart specific meanings that escaped translation into Spanish, as was the case with José’s 
nickname. Kaqchikel is an intimate language in Tecpán, by which I mean that it is often the language of 
the home as opposed to the workplace, and of close friends rather than strangers or mere acquaintances 
– and this has a great deal to do with the context of ethnic discrimination, which pushes Kaqchikel into 
the privacy of homes and close relationships, and also the fact that people cannot assume that other 
indigenous people speak the language since its use is on the wane in semi-urban towns like Tecpán. José 
and Alberto spoke to one another in Kaqchikel, a sign of their close friendship in spite of the employer-
employee dynamic at its base.  
 
25
 There was less confusion about how to address one another in Kaqchikel, since there is only one 
second-person singular pronoun: rat.   
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home during the workweek, he took his meals with Alberto’s family (paying a few 
quetzales per week out of his wages for the food) and slept in the workroom on an old 
mattress that was propped up against the wall during the day. He had worked for 
Alberto for three years, and Alberto explained to me that he was actively grooming José 
in management and marketing with the aim of setting him up with his own business 
when he married. Our orders for the day often passed from Alberto to the rest of us 
through José.  
Despite this young man’s status with Alberto, the real manager in the workroom 
was another costurero who operated the overlook machine. With his work station 
strategically positioned to face the row of seamsters, Germán kept track of how quickly 
each of us worked, the spacing and quality of our stitching, and the work flow among 
the cutter, seamsters, and himself, often advising José when we were running low on 
material, notions, or assignments. Giovanni had only worked with Alberto for six months 
when I began at the shop, and his quiet reserve was not as appealing to Alberto as 
José’s gregariousness, which meant that José curried a level of favor and expectations of 
reciprocity that Germán did not. Germán’s father, who had worked construction jobs, 
passed away from alcoholism when his son was nine-years-old. The fourth of five 
surviving children, Germán began working in garment factories when he was 15, after 
finishing the eighth grade. A large portion of his wages goes to his mother, who sells 
orange juice on the street corner near their home, and his two unmarried sisters. When 
I asked Germán in an interview if he hoped to have his own workshop some day, he was 
pessimistic. “All the workshops I know are having a hard time, and I don’t see how I 
 95 
 
could do any better.” The old Brother loom that one of his former employers passed 
along to him is gathering dust, he says, because he is too tired at the end of the day to 
make anything either for himself or for the market.  
Workshops like that of both Alberto and Oswaldo are not always hospitable work 
environments. Temperature control is often a problem, with workers suffering the chill 
of the morning air and the heat of the afternoon sun, both amplified by metal or plastic 
roofing and the dearth of windows in the cinder-block workshops. When one costurero 
in Alberto’s shop complained about the heat on a sunny day at the end of the rainy 
season, another replied simply, “Somos trabajadores (We’re workers),” implying that 
garment workers should expect such unpleasant conditions. Overlook and sewing 
machines produce a lot of lint, which fills the air and the lungs of workers, who 
frequently exhibit coughing, congestion, and other upper respiratory symptoms. In 
some workshops, employees wear masks to prevent irritation, but these are rarely 
supplied by employers and often discouraged by teenage co-workers who say that 
wearing a mask is a sign of frailty or weakness. Work days are long, usually from six 
o’clock in the morning until six in the evening with a short break at ten o’clock for the 
ubiquitous refa (see the Introduction) and a one-hour break for lunch. In Alberto’s shop, 
employee’s schedules were sometimes staggered so that some started at six, others at 
seven or eight, depending largely on the workload for the week. All of the employees 
with whom I spoke preferred to work as many hours per day as possible, however, since 
they were paid either by the hour or by the piece. At both of the workshops where I 
volunteered my time, employers allowed extended breaks on special occasions, as when 
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a national cycling competition chose Tecpán for the race’s finish line. Workers and 
workshop owners joined everyone else in town out in the streets to wave the cyclists 
down the home stretch and enjoy the musical acts performing in the central plaza.  
 
Debt and Dependency 
Whereas Alberto rarely worked at the machines in his workshop, preferring to 
do accounting work or spend time on the road with clients, Oswaldo works at one of the 
knitting or sewing machines in his workshop several days per week to save on labor 
costs. Both of these workshop owners purchase yarn and other raw materials from the 
major distributors in town: San Fernando, Distexma, and Matex, the latter two 
establishments owned by brothers who moved to Tecpán from another commercial 
town, Chichicastenango, in the mid-1980s. Since that time, they have nearly 
monopolized the yarn, thread, and notion business. To sell his finished products, 
Oswaldo takes the bus to San Francisco El Alto every Wednesday and travels less 
frequently to La Terminal, a wholesale clothing and household goods market in 
Guatemala City. He complains about selling there; he has been robbed and assaulted 
outside La Terminal, which is widely reputed as one of the most dangerous places in the 
country because of thieves who steal merchandise and money from the merchants 
going in and out.  
Oswaldo also complains about the credit system that structures the informal 
wholesale market for clothing in Guatemala. “The market works like this,” he told me,  
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You go to San Francisco on Wednesday and maybe you take 5,000 quetzales in 
merchandise to deliver to your client. He says, ‘Come back on Friday, and I will 
pay you for it.’ So, you gave him 5,000 in credit for two days. But when you go 
back on Friday, he says he can only give you 2,000 out of what he owes you, 
because that’s all he sold. But he promises you, ‘I’ll give you the rest next week if 
you bring me another order.’ The next week, he only gives you 2,000 again, so 
then he owes you 6,000 already. Once he has built up a big debt, he will only ask 
you to bring a little merchandise each week, and over time, he will pay you, but 
it might take a year or more! You are left covering the difference until he can pay 
you the total amount, and this is the same with every mayorista (wholesaler). 
They are not used to letting go of the money in their pockets. And you can’t keep 
working like that. After a while they order from someone else, when they have a 
big enough debt with you. Last year, a few of them stopped paying, so we had 
very little cash, and you can’t keep going if you run out of cash. 
What Oswaldo describes is the pyramid-like structure of the consignment system that 
underlies the wholesale garment market. Buyers in market towns like San Francisco El 
Alto, Antigua, Totonicapán, Salcajá, Xela, and Esquipulas purchase merchandise on 
credit from producers, then resell the garments at smaller quantities to minoristas 
(retailers and market vendors) who then sell to individual consumers. This chain breaks 
down, however, if consumers slow down their purchasing. If the merchandise doesn’t 
sell, the manufacturer never gets paid. This is precisely what Rigoberto, who had to shut 
down his screen-printing and t-shirt assembly shop, claimed had happened as a result of 
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the global “crisis.” He had delivered large orders of merchandise to mayoristas, and 
when they did not sell, Rigoberto could not recoup his capital investment in those goods 
or find new cash sources to continue production. 
 Almost all the manufacturers I interviewed expressed similar frustrations. Many 
of them were owed several thousand quetzales for merchandise they had turned over 
to mayoristas, and some had little hope that they would ever see that money. This is 
one reason manufacturers constantly look for trends in the marketplace and regularly 
offer new styles. It is crucial to their businesses that their products sell quickly. Indeed, 
one former employee at Rigoberto’s workshop claimed that the screen-printing 
business’s failure had less to do with the global economy than with Rigoberto’s slow 
response to new trends in highland fashion. When the particular colors and brand 
names that he was producing were losing popularity to new styles, Rigoberto had not 
responded fast enough, the worker explained.  
The consignment system leads to a significant degree of turnover in the apparel 
trade, as small purveyors run out of money and close down their shops, with new ones 
opening up to take their places. Often, workshop owners will close down just for a brief 
period – the agricultural harvest season, for instance, so they can work their fields and 
save the money that would have gone to a day laborer, or a few months during the 
apparel trade’s low season, during which they drive a taxi or a minibus to earn extra 
cash. When they have made enough to buy materia prima, pay the electricity bill and 
employee wages, they return to the workshop floor. Well-established manufacturers 
may sometimes take out bank loans to finance their participation in the consignment 
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market and keep production levels constant. For many, however, bank loans are not a 
realistic option since the banks charge interest, an expense that cannot be passed on to 
mayoristas.  
Despite the anxieties and financial burdens associated with the consignment 
system, manufacturers often develop close ties with their regular clients. They sell to 
the same handful of buyers week after week, sometimes for several years. The markets 
are lively, even raucous places that producers look forward to visiting, and a business 
transaction with a mayorista often begins with small talk about the weather, a tax strike 
by truck drivers or campesinos on the Pan-American Highway, or sales trends. 
Mayoristas may be looking over a new bundle of merchandise the producer is offering 
that day throughout this chit-chat, with the producer strategically keeping the 
conversation light and positive while slipping in short comments on the quality and 
stylishness of his products: “This shade of brown is really popular among the youth right 
now.” “These t-shirts are selling very fast in Antigua.” The mayorista may agree with the 
producer or push back: “That brown was selling good two weeks ago, but now, nobody 
wants it.” It is also common for mayoristas to suggest design changes and even show a 
producer another style that is selling well and ask if he can copy it. In this way, market 
demand emerges as a complex set of interactions and inputs, determined not simply by 
consumers, but also by the minoristas and mayoristas who interpret market trends, 
relay information on consumer taste up the chain to producers, and sometimes dictate 
new fashion directions. When mayoristas ask producers to copy particular trends that 
they see taking off in the marketplace, they are also proliferating acts of imitation, 
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instigating price wars over who can make certain styles for the lowest price, and, 
therefore, sometimes also encouraging the kinds of social conflict that can accompany 
practices of copying (see Chapter 3). The small talk between mayoristas and producers 
ends when the buyer has had time to look over the offerings and is ready to discuss how 
much he or she wants and at what price. There is always haggling over the final price 
per dozen. Finally, the producer carefully records the quantity and price of the 
consigned goods in a hard cover notebook and shows the mayorista what he has written 
so that there is no question about it later on when the producer tries to collect the debt 
for those items.   
Maya women exercise a great deal of control in highland municipal markets. The 
overwhelming majority of handicraft vendors in tourist towns such as Panajachel and 
Antigua are women, and women often oversee production cooperatives for traditional 
woven goods and other crafts (Little 2004: 147).26 In the nontraditional apparel trade, 
both men and women work as mayoristas. It is not uncommon for a woman to own and 
operate a market stall, perhaps traveling to several different markets during the week, 
while her husband tends agricultural plots back home. Upon arrival in a market town, 
some male garment manufacturers will throw off their otherwise demure demeanor 
and flirt a bit with female buyers in the hopes of encouraging a bigger purchase. 
Markets are set apart culturally from home and family and are commonly seen as places 
                                                           
26
 In his study of Kaqchikel Maya handicraft vendors, Walter Little notes, “Although more women than 
men trade in the marketplace, few have access to products and volumes that would net them better 
financial returns” (2004: 149). In the nontraditional garment trade, I found that women trade at all levels 
of quality and quantity in the informal municipal markets like that of San Francisco El Alto. Female 
teachers or school principals are often in charge of uniform orders as well. Formal distribution networks, 
including state and NGO contracts, retail orders, and the wholesale trade along La Bolívar are most often 
controlled by men.  
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where businessmen can let loose a bit. They frequently spend the entire day at the 
market, even though they need only an hour or so in the morning to offer their products 
to clients and a small amount of time in the afternoon to collect debts from these same 
buyers, in the hopes that the mayoristas have resold some of the merchandise to over 
the course of the day. The rest of the time is spent in idle talk with other producers, 
gambling at cards, playing soccer against other producers on a local field, or drinking in 
the cantinas.  
 
Big Business 
While small workshops like that of Oswaldo and Alberto depend exclusively on 
the informal market system, there are other options available to larger, more formalized 
operations. Indeed, the size and degree of formalization of a given workshop structures 
how the business interfaces with regional markets, global flows of materials, machinery, 
and competing merchandise, and the Guatemalan government. Some larger workshops 
are registered with the state tax and business administrations and regularly contribute 
to local and national coffers. For the vast majority of manufacturers, however, localized 
modes of reasoning about justice, rights, and ethical business practices hold sway, as 
discussed in subsequent chapters, but state law and regulation are not matters of great 
concern. The government seems distant to manufacturers, and when it does get close, it 
appears threatening, as when police patrols on the Pan-American Highway extort bribes 
from manufacturers carrying merchandise to market. Throughout the trade, labor 
practices are not generally in compliance with state guidelines having to do with work 
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hours, vacations, or employer contributions to social security. This kind of 
noncompliance, informality, and irregularity is common throughout Guatemala, saying 
more about the state of the state than about the intentions or dispositions of apparel 
producers, and is part of the context of piracy that will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters. Most workshops also rely to some extent on household labor, even if they 
employ a dozen or more non-household wage workers.  
If Oswaldo and Alberto’s workshops represent the small end of the production 
scale, the fábrica owned by Miguel Tecúm in which I worked for several months during 
my field research typifies big business in Tecpán. Miguel is well-educated by local 
standards. He grew up cutting fabric and packaging finished garments in his father’s 
workshop, one of the first in town. After graduating from high school in Chimaltenango, 
he attended the public university in Guatemala City for two years before his father 
passed away in 1994. With his father’s death, Miguel’s hopes for earning an engineering 
degree were quickly dashed. As the eldest son, it was his responsibility to provide for his 
grieving mother and four younger siblings, so he returned home to continue his father’s 
work making men’s and women’s sweaters. His father had already purchased one 
Italian-made rectilinear knitting machine before his death, and Miguel invested in more 
of these models to save on both time and labor. One rectilinear machine puts out 
twenty-four sweaters per day, and a single employee can monitor three of the 
automatic machines simultaneously. With each employee earning between 40 and 70 
quetzales per day, that amounts to around 700 quetzales in labor savings alone per 
week. In 2009, Miguel had five rectilinear looms, a couple of Brothers still sitting in the 
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doorway with “se vende (for sale)” signs on them, two motorized cutting machines, an 
industrial steam press to smooth and stretch the sweater knit, three sewing machines, 
two overlooks, one machine for button holes, another for affixing buttons, and two 
remalladoras, large machines specially-designed for attaching sweater collars. He 
employed ten workers, including a couple of older men who had been hired by his 
father, and two young women, cordoned off from the men in a separate part of the 
home-workshop, occupied at the remalladoras. In a discourse reminiscent of how 
garment assembly work is feminized within the maquiladora industry (Cravey 1998), 
Miguel told me that the remalladoras required “delicacy” since each tiny loop in the 
sweater knit had to be matched up to a loop in the collar, and men generally do not 
have the patience for such “fine” tasks. Miguel had just constructed a high metal roof 
over one section of the family’s patio to house a circular knitting machine and was 
training a young male employee to operate the sophisticated, computerized equipment.  
When a local manufacturer entered the machinery import business and began 
bringing Spanish-made circulares to Tecpán in 2000, competition among Tecpán’s 
apparel manufacturers based on economies of scale greatly intensified. Circular 
machines put out up to 100 sweaters or children’s knit sets per day, making the labor 
cost per unit negligible, although it is difficult to find machinery operators in Tecpán 
who are already trained in how to use the equipment. The man who sells circulares has 
employees on his payroll, however, who can be hired out to provide training. Each 
machine costs between 300,000 and 500,000 quetzales, plus training costs, making it an 
investment that few can afford. One workshop owner immigrated to the US for three 
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years, working as a dishwasher in Los Angeles-area restaurants to save money for a 
down payment on a circular machine in order to ensure his competitiveness in the 
children’s clothing market. Producers such as Miguel, well-established in the business 
and with sufficient collateral, take out bank loans to finance the upgrade. Others stick 
with rectilinear machines and say that they are better able to contend with market ups-
and-downs because they do not have capital tied up in expensive equipment. And not 
everyone runs knitting machines. Some factories deal exclusively in t-shirts or cotton 
sweatshirts, ball caps or sweatpants, and their capacity depends solely on the number of 
sewing machines and seamsters they employ. The set-up of these operations closely 
resembles the much larger maquiladoras along the highway, with rows of small desks 
lined up in warehouse-style rooms.  
Miguel’s workshop is registered with the state tax and business administrations 
under the name Textiles Naomi S.A. His father incorporated the business when he 
moved from a rural hamlet to the town center, and chose “Naomi” because it sounded 
to him “like a famous brand.” Other workshops that opened in the 1960s and 70s also 
took names that had a certain ring of cosmopolitanism and stylishness: Metropolitano, 
Tejidos Dany, and Rams. One workshop owner named his sweater workshop Frankish, 
which he explained to me was an English word meaning “in style.” Others simply used 
one of their surnames. Miguel and his family rarely use Naomi as a brand name for their 
products, and instead favor the tags and labels they buy in Guatemala City that come 
from maquiladoras. The men’s sweaters he makes feature brand names such as 
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Cherokee or Tommy Hilfiger, while the women’s styles have tags such as White Stag or 
NASCAR Women.  
I asked several garment producers why older manufacturers had incorporated 
their businesses and traded under brand names, while the younger generation deals 
mainly in informality and piracy. People offered varied, sometimes nostalgic, responses, 
explaining that the older generation complied with the law and paid taxes because they 
felt a sense of duty to “cumplió con sus compromisos (meet their obligations),” as one 
producer explained. Today, in contrast, they see the government as corrupt, the 
politicians as scoundrels. Another producer told me that the small workshops never 
register with the state because, in order to do so, you have to complete “un montón de 
trámites” (a lot of paperwork). Most of the producers talked about the use of a 
company name in terms of legality and compliance, and not as a marketing strategy. A 
few local workshops, however, have built up reputations for quality and style based on 
the use of their company names as brands. When I asked specifically why more 
workshops do not use their own names on garment labels, a second-generation suetero 
told me that it used to make sense as a way to promote your workshop. “After a long 
time, everyone knew the name and paid more for your products. But most people don’t 
put their name on the products now because it is expensive, and no one knows the 
name anyway. The consumidor final [end user] does not care if something says, ‘Hecho 
en Tecpán’.” This producer senses that the proliferation and popularity of so many 
global brand names in the Guatemalan marketplace makes it difficult for local brands to 
yield any market advantage for the producer, in spite of the fact that traditional woven 
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goods made by “authentic” Maya men and women have tremendous appeal 
internationally (Nash 1993). Another medium-sized producer told me that using your 
own workshop name entails certain risks, since the brand might inadvertently draw 
attention to your business from the tax administration, eager to audit your sales records 
and tax receipts. In contrast to some members of the older generation and the several 
young workshop owners who are incorporating their businesses today (see Chapter 4), 
most sueteros view conformity with state law and tax codes as an unnecessary burden, 
something to be avoided.  
Miguel uses sales receipts to keep track of revenue and pays a business tax to 
the federal government three times per year as well as local taxes assessed annually. 
Simply registering with the state does not mean, however, that a business abides by all 
state laws and regulations. Miguel is selective in terms of when he issues a receipt and 
when he does not. For example, if he delivers an order to a mayorista in San Francisco El 
Alto, it is unlikely that he will provide a receipt, which effectively relieves both him and 
his client from the obligation of paying taxes on that transaction. This is the kind of tax 
evasion that the national “¡Pide su factura!” (Ask for your receipt!) campaign launched 
by President Álvaro Colom in 2009 – just the latest of many postwar attempts to reform 
the tax system and increase state revenues from private enterprise – attempted to root 
out. Tax administration officials distributed signs to businesses around the country to 
display on their front doors as a reminder to customers, television and radio 
advertisements encouraged compliance, and posters proclaiming the importance of 
facturas greeted tourists and business travelers arriving at the airport.  
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Although some large workshops trade exclusively in the informal wholesale 
markets, selling hundreds of graphic tees, sweatshirts, or infant knit sets each week, 
there are other markets available to them as well. For example, Miguel pays a part-time 
salesman to visit primary and secondary schools throughout the Western highlands to 
secure contracts for student uniforms. These potentially lucrative deals ensure fixed 
orders for the months of January and July, when the academic semesters begin. He uses 
receipts for these orders, since schools have to report expenditures to the government. 
Uniforms are popular among parents at both public and private schools throughout 
Guatemala. The outfits usually consist of a soft-collared, cotton-knit shirt, a sweater vest 
or sweater embroidered with the school insignia, skirts for the girls and long pants for 
the boys, socks, and perhaps an embroidered jacket. Most schools allow indigenous girls 
to pair the shirt and sweater with a corte, a hard-won right to native dress for which 
Maya students in Chimaltenango protested in the 1970s, and which is now guaranteed 
in the national constitution. The institutional colors displayed in uniforms result in daily 
parades of school pride that are also walking advertisements for particular schools as 
children walk to and from the schoolhouses each day.  
President Colom’s administration curbed the uniform business in 2009. 
Presented to the public as “liberation” from unnecessary financial obligations and a 
“defense” of indigenous rights (Quinto 2008) since most schools still required the use of 
collared shirts in place of huipiles, the federal decree prohibited schools from requesting 
money for any school supplies from parents. In previous years, money had been 
solicited by teachers and administrators for everything from uniforms to text books and 
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afternoon snacks, with little recourse when fees varied dramatically from school to 
school or became excessive, as they often did for poor families. Now, the Ministry of 
Education was to cover all public education expenses, not to include uniforms. A parent 
whose son attended one of the public primary schools in Tecpán supported the new 
law, explaining,  
This is the first year that public schools are actually free. Before, the teachers 
asked for maybe 150 quetzales from each student. There are maybe 1,400 
students [attending primary school in Tecpán], so that is more than 200,000 
quetzales. That’s 30,000 dollars! What are they doing with all that money? The 
government pays the teachers’ salaries and maintains the building. Some people 
say they use the money for birthday parties. And the uniforms – the teachers 
make money from that, too. They tell the students where to buy each piece [of 
clothing], so the teachers must be making something from that deal [trato]. It’s 
like the mafia! A lot of parents think that the students have to wear uniforms so 
that you can’t tell who is poor and who is not. I think it’s very militaristic, a 
recuerdo [souvenir, reminder] from la violencia.   
Many parents with whom I spoke had a positive view regarding uniforms, however, and 
felt it was important for students to wear them. Some noted that uniforms help to 
distinguish the “real students” from the “delincuentes” who might show up on campus 
to make trouble. Others worried that if students did not dress properly at school, they 
would lose respect for the rules of proper behavior and turn into gang members. 
Teachers with whom I spoke took offense to the idea that they had been charging 
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unnecessary fees, and, at the start of the school year, were quick to complain when 
federal monies arrived late, or sometimes not at all. “So, we are supposed to run a 
school without enough desks for the students? Without a broom to sweep the 
classroom? Without food for the children?,” a sixth-grade teacher at one of Tecpán’s 
primary schools complained to me. Reflecting a widely-shared suspicion of the national 
government’s understanding of local conditions and concern for the population’s needs, 
she continued, “The government would rather see the children starve than let us ask a 
parent for one single quetzalito.”  
The uniform business slowed down considerably due to the new policy, but the 
parents’ organizations at many public schools throughout the highlands insisted that 
their children continue to wear uniforms. At the same time, Miguel and other workshop 
owners pursued private school contracts more aggressively. Workshops in Tecpán also 
seek out government contracts for public employee uniforms, contracts with 
international NGOs like World Vision and Christian Children’s Fund to make clothing for 
sponsored children living in rural Guatemala, and deals with formal retail shops in 
Guatemala City for regular orders of branded (sometimes authorized, sometimes 
pirated) or generic merchandise. Contractual arrangements with agencies and retailers 
specify the quantities to be delivered on fixed dates. If a producer does not meet quality 
standards and other contractual obligations, he may lose the business. But schools, 
government agencies, and NGOs pay on delivery or in scheduled installments as 
opposed the long-term credit arrangements favored by mayoristas in highland markets 
that place the burden of debt on producers. At the same time, not everyone can go 
 110 
 
after contract work because of the formalization requirements and the level of capital 
investment needed to fill large orders. Whereas wholesalers are willing to buy in 
relatively small quantities, a producer has to put up a great deal of his own capital to 
produce thousands of sweaters or t-shirts for a school or NGO who pays only after the 
products have been delivered.  
Some producers, in fact, see little difference between the informal consignment 
system and the pay-on-delivery arrangements that contracts generally specify. One 
producer who worked for several months supplying t-shirts and socks to Pais, the 
national discount retailer and supermarket chain owned since 2005 by Walmart, 
explained to me that contract work also puts the manufacturer at a disadvantage. The 
management at Pais often asked for him to bring additional quantities of particular sizes 
and colors every week or two, but always on credit, which made it difficult for him to 
keep up with their demands. He said,  
Every time you make a delivery, you are leaving them with products that you will 
not get paid for until sixty days have passed. They are working with plata de 
proveedor (the producer’s money) just like the mayoristas. You go into those 
supermarkets and think, “Wow, you can buy this stuff so cheap and there is so 
much of it.” You wonder how they do it. Well, they do it by making us work on 
credit. This is everyone’s situation. Everyone has the same problems. Maybe 
someone says to you, “Oh, everything is fine here. We have no problems with 
credit, and we have plenty of money to run this fábrica.” They are not telling the 
truth. 
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Several producers in Tecpán who had secured contract work with Pais and even export 
contracts with US apparel distributors claimed to have “given up” those deals because 
the quality or quantity demands were too difficult to meet. Structural disadvantages 
such as limited access to credit and lack of formal educational opportunities that are 
common across the local industry tend to make cash flow a perpetual problem and limit 
the abilities of producers to comply with the kinds of professional standards that go 
hand-in-hand with multinational contract work. Nonetheless, formal, extra-local 
relationships are becoming more important within Tecpán’s apparel trade, as markets 
and market relationships are recomposed to favor both technological and social 
efficiency. More and more, innovation is aimed at volume and speed rather than design 
or the local values related to presentación described in Chapter 4 (with notable 
exceptions, also discussed in that later chapter).  
 
Second Hand in the Third World 
Apparel producers in Tecpán are not only deeply affected by global economic 
fluctuations, international trade arrangements that encourage the dumping of last-
generation technology in developing countries, and national educational policy having 
to do with indigenous rights and student fees. They also contend with intense 
competition with a range of imported goods. For example, producers in Tecpán 
commonly lament the low price and widespread availability of second-hand clothing 
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from the US, which began pouring into Guatemala at a stunning rate in the 1990s.27 As 
the anthropologist Tracy Ehlers (2000) shows in her study of another sweater-producing 
town, the influx of paca, as second-hand clothing is called because of the thousand-
pound bales in which it arrives to Guatemala City importers, has put many sueteros out 
of business. It has also contributed to declines in the number of indigenous women 
wearing traditional huipiles and cortes. Whereas a woven huipil costs anywhere from 
several hundred to several thousand quetzales, and a sweater made in either San Pedro 
Sacatepéquez (where Ehlers carried out her research) or Tecpán runs from 40 to 150 
quetzales, it is easy to find a second-hand blouse or sweater for five or ten quetzales. In 
addition to the used-clothing retail stores in Guatemala City and other urban areas with 
names like Megapaca, vendors and shopkeepers throughout the highlands buy bundles 
of paca from capital city distributors to break open on market days. Brand-name jackets, 
sweatshirts, sweaters, jeans, and shirts that are in good condition are sorted by size or 
style, hung up, and displayed on racks in shops and on sidewalks. Lower-quality paca, 
including used socks, old t-shirts, and worn-out pants or shirts are piled on tarps in the 
middle of the street and often sell for a single quetzal. 
New imports also pose a problem for the domestic apparel trade. Mexico and 
China are Guatemala’s two largest trading partners, after the US and the Central 
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 The worldwide trade in second-hand clothing grew from US$207 million to nearly US$1.5 billion 
between 1980 and 2001. The US is the world’s largest exporter and the largest exporter to Guatemala, 
and between 1990 and 1997, US exports more than doubled from US$174 million to US$309 million 
(Hansen 2004). In 1997, Guatemala ranked tenth in the world in the amount spent in the used clothing 
trade (US$1.5 million) and fifth in the world in metric tons of clothes imported (Ehlers 2000). Countries 
including India, Indonesia, and the Philippines have banned the importation of used garments because of 
what are viewed as adverse affects on domestic textile and apparel industries (Hansen 2004).   
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American Common Market countries. Mexico supplies approximately 11 percent of 
Guatemala’s imports; China supplies more than 7 percent. While clothing has been 
entering Guatemala from Mexico for a long time, producers say that the quantity and 
quality of clothing from other countries began to impinge on their own businesses in the 
late 1980s. Free trade agreements signed with Mexico in 2000 and Taiwan in 1997 and 
2005 ensure that textiles and apparel continue to be significant imports to Guatemala 
from these regions. Between 2004 and 2008, imports to Guatemala from China 
increased by more than 500 percent, with more than US$1.3 billion worth of products 
arriving in 2008 (7Economy 2011). Highland markets, city streets, and retail shops are 
full of Mexican sweaters and East Asian casual clothing, some of it featuring unique 
brands such as Victoria (from Mexico), Vanessa (from Korea), and Gardenr (from 
Taiwan), and some of it with pirated brands such as Levi’s, Diesel, and Nike. Chinese and 
Korean immigrants are also active in the wholesale garment markets in Guatemala City, 
where they deal primarily in imported goods. Immigrants from various Middle Eastern 
countries operate wholesale clothing businesses in the capital and often trade in East 
Asian imports brought to Guatemala from the free trade zone in Colón, Panama. 
Tecpanecos say that imported garments are of variable quality and price, but many 
agree that Chinese and Taiwanese imports, for example, are constructed of better-
quality material than what is available in Guatemala but sell for lower prices than 
domestic goods. Mexican sweaters, which are very popular among Maya women who 
match them by color and style with their huipiles and cortes, are generally more 
expensive than their locally-made counterparts and are commonly said by both 
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producers and consumers to be more stylish, especially the plush acrylic styles valued 
both for their softness and warmth and the brilliance of the yarn colors. Tecpán’s 
manufacturers simply do not have access to these same yarns, but nonetheless try to 
replicate the look and feel of the Mexican styles.  
 The relationship between the domestic apparel trade and the mostly South 
Korean- and US-owned maquiladoras between Guatemala City and Tecpán is multi-
sided. Imperfect cloth from the factories sells cheaply in highland markets and retail 
stores in Guatemala City, comprising an important source of inputs for many highland 
manufacturers. Producers in Tecpán also use tags and labels from the export factories, 
examples of what economists call a “grey market” trade between authorized firms and 
informal and illicit sectors (Phau et al. 2001). But when imperfect garments or overruns 
of finished goods make their way into the domestic marketplace, like the Pepé brand 
jeans on sale in one retail shop in Tecpán that the owner had bought from a 
maquiladora in Honduras, producers say that their own businesses suffer. Francisco Toc, 
the owner of a large workshop in Chimaltenango that produces school uniforms and 
also t-shirts and polo-style shirts with pirated brands for the informal markets, 
commented to me that the maquiladoras were causing a lot of difficulty for local 
manufacturers.  
The business is not as good this year as it was in the past. I am struggling to earn 
a profit. The problem is this: the Koreans come to Guatemala and now there are 
five or six maquiladoras right here [around Chimaltenango]. They pay no taxes. 
Everything is handed to them because they are foreigners [extranjeros]. When 
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they have saldo [overruns] or when something comes out wrong, they sell it for 
pennies. I mean, they sell something for ten quetzales that it costs me forty to 
make.  
At the same time as the maquiladoras interface negatively with the domestic market in 
this way, Francisco goes on to explain the reality of Guatemala’s growing dependence 
on export-led development programs. Maquiladoras provide employment for a large 
number of people in the Central highlands who are also his potential customers.  
This year has been really bad because some of the maquiladoras have closed. 
Let’s say there are five of them and each has 3,000 employees. The Koreans are 
very bad employers; they do not even let the workers go to the bathroom. But 
they pay. Maybe these employees are making 1,500 quetzales per month. That is 
a guaranteed salary, and if 15,000 people are out of work, that is millions of 
quetzales that are not circulating in our country. Fíjese, those people can’t buy 
shirts, they can’t buy pants. They can’t even buy food.  
In his view, the problem is not so much with the maquiladoras closing down, however, 
as with the fact that Guatemala makes all kinds of concessions to attract foreign 
investment, only to have those investors move elsewhere when another country offers 
cheaper labor and a more attractive regulatory environment. Francisco, a one-time 
guerrillero who had to flee Tecpán during la violencia due to death threats against his 
family, takes a political stance on the issue. “Los extranjeros ya llevan tiempo de hacer 
estragos aquí en Guatemala (Foreigners have been messing things up in Guatemala for a 
long time),” he sighs, offering a subtle reference to our previous conversations about 
 116 
 
the US role in the 1954 coup that unseated Guatemala’s first democratically-elected 
president and ushered in the conflict era. This strategic reference indicates that he 
views export manufacturing as one more instant in what he described to me as a “long 
chain” of foreign interests influencing the lives and livelihoods of Maya people, often to 
the detriment, in his view, of their self-determination and well-being.  
   Some manufacturers in Tecpán say that they still hold certain advantages over 
imports, grey market goods, and second-hand clothing. Much of the paca that arrives in 
Guatemala, they say, is simply too big for Maya men and women, whereas local 
producers size their garments according to the height and weight of Guatemalan 
consumers. Some producers commented that East Asian imports and maquila overruns 
are often considered very stylish, but the color palettes are not appealing to highland 
customers. This presents an opportunity for some Tecpanecos to copy the styles of the 
imports and grey market garments but adjust the colors and other particular features in 
order to appeal directly to local tastes. Even so, the globalization of the Guatemalan 
apparel market means downward pressure on prices as well as the proliferation of 
branded goods that are often viewed as more fashionable and desirable than locally-
made garments. As a few dozen workshops “break” or “go under” (se vine pa abajo) 
each season due to competition and other factors, there is much speculation among 
garment manufacturers about how others manage to stay afloat, a subject explored in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three: The Ethics of Imitation 
 
At the end of a long workday, Guillermo Ordoñez has loaded his Mazda microbus 
with garbage bags full of finished garments, carefully folded, stacked, and bundled by 
the dozen. Along with dozens of other producers from Tecpán, he will leave at four the 
next morning for San Francisco El Alto. Guillermo and I sit in his kitchen for a cup of 
coffee, and he complains about rising levels of competition among these producers over 
styles and pricing, competition that he says is unfair and disrespectful to one’s 
neighbors. “The apparel business has made people in Tecpán muy individualistas. 
People are envious and only watch out for themselves,” he says. “So, you have to watch 
out for yourself.” He contrasts Tecpán with neighboring towns – San Juan Comalapa’s 
artisanal traditions in weaving and painting, Patzicia’s broader agricultural base – whose 
residents have apparently been able to maintain a sturdier sense of cooperation and 
solidarity. In giving this analysis he is clearly nostalgic about what he feels has been lost 
in Tecpán, where envy and individualism seem to be thriving.  
In this chapter, I examine what garment manufacturers such as Guillermo mean 
when they commonly say that people have become envious and individualist. Processes 
of economic and legal globalization shape a changing “context of accountability” 
(Douglas 1992) in Tecpán’s garment trade, with its differently positioned participants 
and its ambivalent relationships to the past and to the nation. I analyze what 
accusations of envy among garment manufacturers and within the wider community 
reveal about two aspects of the social field: first, the changing economic and social 
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conditions in highland Guatemala following the armed conflict and waves of neoliberal 
reform and, second, the nonlinear reproduction of historical identities and forms of 
moral and legal reckoning at the margins of the global economy. I focus particular 
attention on kin relationships based on ideals of reciprocity that encourage the sharing 
of knowledge and resources among workshop owners, relatives, and employees, a 
major factor in the industry’s rapid expansion in recent years. I also look at how 
competitive behavior among workshop owners is evaluated locally in light of ideologies 
of race and nation that encourage class-based solidarity among Maya people. My 
findings emerge from extended conversations with manufacturers about what is right 
and wrong in business, about the concept of economic development, and about the law. 
The normative models and business practices evident among garment producers 
parochialize official portraits of progress and models of business ethics and 
development promoted in neoliberal policy agendas and international law.  
In the apparel trade, accusations of envy often emerge alongside moral 
evaluations of pervasive practices of copying and imitation. Practices of sharing, 
appropriation, and copying – some of which qualify as piracy under national and 
international law – have a lengthy history in Guatemala. Maya garment manufacturers 
have long borrowed from and imitated one another, in addition to copying global 
trends. Certain acts of imitation have also been disparaged by manufacturers (as 
manifestations of envy, for example) even prior to IPR formalization. At the same time, 
trademark law in Guatemala has been largely ineffective. A decade after the legislation 
of strict protections, practices of brand piracy continue apace and norms I describe here 
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remain the dominant model for thinking about imitation and ownership. A few clothing 
producers, generally with higher educational status, have developed their own brands 
and talk about piracy as a potential threat to their business interests (see Chapter 4). 
Yet, even these manufacturers pirate global brands when it affords a market 
opportunity. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, most highland manufacturers are 
concerned about the legality and formality of their businesses only to the extent 
necessary to avoid interference by tax authorities. In discussions about law and crime, 
their primary concern is with the state’s failure to address the country’s rising violent 
crime rates and rampant impunity for violent crime, not their own possible legal 
transgressions.   
  
The Rumor Mill 
A successful but greedy local businessman possessed a strongbox full of gold 
that, no matter how much was spent, always remained full; anyone other than 
its owner who looked inside, however, would see only a tangled mass of black 
snakes, a clear sign of its nefarious origins. (Fischer 2001: 38) 
This story, recounted by anthropologist Edward Fischer, is but one of the more 
colorful rumors that circulate in Tecpán linking wealth and witchcraft. Assumed to be 
motivated by envy, envidia in Spanish, wealthy people are often suspected of 
accumulating their wealth through occult, unethical, or illicit means. The term combines 
meanings of coveting and jealousy as well as greed. Envy is understood as a dangerous 
affective disposition, a malicious personality, and is associated with mal de ojo, the evil 
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eye. Falling under the stare of an envious person results in your bewitching, bringing 
illness or other misfortune, a common belief across many peasant and petty capitalist 
societies (Foster 1972; Dow 1981). Talk of envy has a long history in the highland region 
(Tax 1957) and is a dominant discourse used to express and evaluate the moral hazards 
that have accompanied rapid industrial change and transformations in Tecpán’s social 
organization in recent decades. 
Closely associated with material accumulation and processes of class 
stratification, envy is often regarded in the anthropological literature as a negative 
mechanism for the maintenance of egalitarian social and economic relations. George 
Foster’s (1965) seminal work on envy explains its ubiquity and power in terms of a 
worldview shared among Latin American peasants founded upon the “Image of the 
Limited Good.” Peasants regard resources such as wealth and prestige as finite and 
scarce, creating a “zero-sum game” in which people who accumulate more than is 
customary are seen as taking away from other people (Taussig 1980: 15). Emphasis on 
class and ethnic solidarity among a subordinated population has been theorized by a 
long line of anthropologists working in the Maya region (Vogt 1961, 1969; Annis 1987) 
as evidence of what Richard Wilk calls a “fierce egalitarian ethos” (1983: 103), enjoining 
the distribution of material resources across indigenous families through well-organized 
political and religious institutions, such as the fraternal cofradía system (Wolf 1957; 
Warren 1978; Brintnall 1979). With this scholarship as a backdrop, I am interested in the 
politics of fairness and equality in changing Maya communities, understanding 
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egalitarianism not as a static trait but as a contested norm, a fraught reality, and a 
normalizing discourse. 
The accumulation and concentration of wealth yields accusations of envy in 
Tecpán, where relatively well-to-do manufacturers are accused of obtaining their wealth 
by nefarious means and violating a loose property regime – what the political scientist 
James Scott (1976) might call a “moral economy” – that allows for certain forms of 
sharing, copying, and imitation. Cooperation among kin and neighbors has been an 
economic resource for Tecpanecos since the trade’s inception in the early 1960s. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, apparel manufacturing offered new opportunities for Tecpán’s 
indigenous population, whose traditional household economy, based in subsistence 
agriculture, has been increasingly threatened by land privatization and a growing 
population. Unlike labor on plantations or in maquiladoras, garment manufacturing 
allowed Tecpanecos control over the means of production, an important cultural and 
moral value among Maya peoples (Fischer 2001; Watanabe 1992). Manufacturers need 
no formal education, important since only half of the Maya children in the department 
of Chimaltenango (where Tecpán is located) who enroll in school complete their 
education through the sixth grade (MINEDUC 2008). Also, the cottage industry requires 
minimal capital investment. A used, manual knitting machine costs around a thousand 
quetzales (US$125) and thread, yarn, and cloth distributors regularly sell on credit. The 
industry has expanded largely through apprenticeship and kinship connections. People 
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who are already established in the trade help the next generation get started, teaching 
them the necessary skills and providing capital gifts and loans.28  
Kinship patterns in Tecpán are patrilineal, favoring the father’s line (Fischer and 
Hendrickson 2003: 46). A new bride commonly goes to live with her husband and his 
family. It is customary for the new couple to remain with the husband’s family until a 
proper home has been prepared for them on the family’s land, the plots getting smaller 
with each successive generation, or, more commonly in Tecpán’s semi-urban center, a 
few more rooms can be constructed on the family’s house. The husband’s patrimony 
often includes the means to make a living as well. If the family could not afford to send 
him to high school or university for professional training, he may take up his father’s 
trade. This is common among apparel manufacturers, whose sons work beside them 
from a young age and are often given machinery and cash as capital when they marry, 
part of a constant, informal flow of gifts and loans among parents and children in 
Tecpán (Fischer 2001: 174). From an early age, male children are expected to “pay back” 
their parents’ “life-giving generosity” through household labor, and in adulthood, 
demonstrate “filial piety in the form of gifts,” including money (Fischer 2001: 144). This 
set of expectations has implications for how personhood and property are configured in 
Tecpán, since “contributions to procreation … create entitlements that are realized in 
the form of limited claims on one’s offspring and what they produce” (Kirsch 2004: 25; 
see Chapter 1).  Reciprocity may reach beyond consanguines. If a new husband’s work 
prospects are viewed as paltry by the bride’s family, her parents or other kinsfolk 
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 Ortez (2004) documents a similar pattern in the apparel trade’s expansion in the Western department 
of Totonicapán.  
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intervene to provide training and capital to get the couple started. Mutual aid 
relationships also extend to employees. Workshops generally employ young men of 
meager means and little education from the town center and especially surrounding 
hamlets. Employers often teach what they know about operating and repairing 
machinery, crafting designs, and marketing to these teenagers, many of whom leave 
these factories to start out on their own, sometimes taking along a rusty machine and a 
capital loan. 
I sat down with Manuel Chicoy, one of the earliest apparel producers in Tecpán, 
to talk with him about the former employees, including two sons, who left his workshop 
over the years to start their own businesses. Manuel specializes in women’s sweaters. 
About seventy-years-old, he now divides his time between overseeing the garment 
workshop, where his youngest son manages day-to-day operations, and the two-story 
hotel near the center of town built with his profits from the apparel trade. As we talked 
in the hotel office, I asked Manuel about the growth of the cottage industry. His reply 
reflects a style of Spanish that is common in indigenous towns such as Tecpán, where, 
for most people of Manuel’s generation, Spanish is a second language. Sentences are 
often short, and due to the influence of both Christianity and traditional Maya 
spirituality, ordinary conversation often involves parable and a moral lesson. He says, 
It’s like this. You encounter a man in the street, and he says, “I don’t have work. 
My family is hungry and I don’t know what to do.” So, you say to him, “Come 
with me. I’ll give you work.” Years later, he says that he wants to start his own 
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workshop. You say, “Very good, here’s your capital, buy what you need.” That is 
what we have to do – help each other, help our neighbors.   
Cleanly-shaven and neatly-dressed in tailored pants and a collared shirt, Manuel sits 
across from me at the table in his otherwise bare office and relates this story to me with 
great intensity and conviction. Knowing from previous conversations with workshop 
owners and town residents that moral tales generally convey an ideal rather than report 
a factual state of affairs, I press him on the question of whether or not more workshops 
in town would mean greater competition, and whether or not that might challenge the 
sustainability of his own business.  
Manuel does not give my inquiries much thought before he continues: “I think it 
is development [un desarrollo] for everyone. The more production we have, the more 
business, the products just get better and better. I don’t see it as competition. It’s a way 
for all of us to better ourselves. That’s the kind of development we should pursue.” 
This genre of talk about neighborly kindness and mutual obligation echoes 
religious themes that circulate globally and manifest in particular ways among 
Guatemalan Catholics and a booming neo-Pentecostal movement (O’Neill 2009). 
Protestant pastors advocate “participation in the new community of ‘brothers and 
sisters’ who work towards the common goal of self-betterment” and promote a “new 
ideology [that] emphasizes individualism, competition, personal improvement, and 
social and economic progress” as positive values (Goldín and Metz 1991: 334). Both 
Protestants and Catholics involved in commercial enterprise increasingly embrace these 
values (Goldín 1992), though not without protest. Many garment manufacturers 
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bemoan a generalized ethical shift away from solidarity toward individualism. A 
medium-sized producer complained in an interview, “We in Tecpán are very 
individualistic. We dedicate ourselves to our work, to our own affairs, our own 
commitments … everything that has to do with our family and our business, and that’s 
it.” He blamed individualism for many problems, from fights among neighbors and 
family members to delincuencia, a general term for disrespectful or criminal behavior 
perpetrated by town youth. The integration of commercial enterprise with social 
institutions such as religion, family, and economy is never simple. At the same time, 
anthropologists note that the discourse of competition and self-betterment promoted 
within Protestantism and now widespread among highland Maya people is often 
grounded in appeals to “fundamental Maya values associated with community 
solidarity, support, and guidance” (Goldín and Metz 1991: 334). This kind of hybridity is 
readily apparent among apparel manufacturers, whose livelihoods are grounded in 
competitive market behavior but who are nonetheless expected to integrate themselves 
into networks of reciprocity and, in a model reminiscent of the older cofradía system, 
support the success of neighbors and kin through financial as well as spiritual and moral 
assistance. There are similarities here to Sylvia Yanagisako’s work on family textile firms 
in Italy, where she found that kinship and the sharing of resources within a bounded 
social context have been as important to that industry as individual ambition and 
market competition. She writes,  
The Como silk industry is the result of a continuous generation and regeneration 
of family capitalism by people whose desires for capital accumulation have been 
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incited by sentiments of family unity and communalism, but also by sentiments 
of individualism, independence, and competition. … As sentiments in play at 
different moments in the developmental histories of family firms, trust and 
betrayal shape the character of technological diffusion, firm competition, and 
the creation of new firms. They are, on the one hand, products of the workings 
of Italian family capitalism. On the other hand, they operate as forces of 
production of Italian family capitalism. (Yanagisako 2002: 11) 
Similar dynamics of trust and betrayal, cooperation and competition, animate Tecpán’s 
cottage industry. And as the uncertainties of capitalist enterprise put a strain on 
communal ties and induce further competition, producers sometimes grow nostalgic 
about lost values of solidarity and egalitarianism, sentiments that are, in turn, 
interpreted in ethnological accounts as evidence of a sullied past.  
Manuel cautions against the destructive nature of competition, even as he extols 
commercial enterprise as a source of self-improvement and community development. 
One day, I climb the tiled stairway with him from the hotel lobby to the second-story 
rooftop. Looking out over the neighboring houses, Manuel points out the home-
workshops of other manufacturers he had trained or assisted over the years. He returns 
to his earlier point about the importance of helping one another, then adds,  
Not everyone understands it as development. Instead, they take it as envy, as 
competition. But if someone asks you for something, you give it to them. People 
come into town and ask me where a different workshop is because they want to 
buy something there, and I tell them. If I were to say that I don’t know where it 
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is, just because I don’t want them to buy from a different workshop, that’s pure 
envy. 
At least in part, Manuel is positioning and politicking. Helping your neighbors and 
sharing your resources are common refrains among Tecpanecos, who are constantly 
negotiating their standing given that garment manufacturing has led to some 
socioeconomic stratification (Thomas 2009). Don Manuel literally sits above most of his 
neighbors in his two-story home and workshop, not to mention the adjacent hotel. 
Manuel and others who got their start before la violencia (as the bloodiest years of the 
conflict are known) capitalized on the new markets opened up by apparel 
manufacturing and, in relative terms, amassed small fortunes, enough to build a large 
house, buy a car, send a child to college in the capital city, or open a second business.  
Constraints on employment and educational options for indigenous people mean 
that scores of men in Tecpán opened up workshops after the conflict subsided in the 
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The kinship and apprenticeship model of social 
reproduction has enabled growth despite the seeming contradictions between its 
emphasis on reciprocity and solidarity and the neoliberal model of entrepreneurship 
promoted on a global level. Yet, the rate at which new workshops have opened, 
together with the market pressures impelled by structural adjustment policies, 
contributes to intense feelings of competition among neighbors. The crowded 
marketplace makes it difficult for anyone to earn a “minimum income” (Scott 1976), the 
level of economic security that petty capitalists seek to maintain amid market pressures 
and given sentiments of community solidarity. Neighbors look at the wealth that older 
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manufacturers like Manuel display in multistory houses and late-model cars and wonder 
how anyone could achieve that level of success without dealing in the occult or engaging 
in unscrupulous behavior.29 When it comes to how Mayas see upward mobility, there is 
often suspicion about assimilation to non-indigenous culture. Racial, class, and cultural 
divisions have separated Guatemalans into two groups since the early nineteenth 
century, when a “complicated colonial racial scheme” collapsed into a dualistic division 
between indigenous people and Ladinos (Grandin 2000: 83-85). As anthropologist Linda 
Green notes, economically successful Mayas are sometimes accused of “acting as 
agents” of racism and oppression (2003: 56), which anthropologist Liliana Goldín 
attributes to the fact that Ladinos are “thought to be wealthy (or wealthier than Indians) 
from the exploitation of poor Indians” (1992: 112). As for Manuel, he appeals to 
neighborly ethics at a time when the “regional class system” (Smith 1984: 194) is 
undergoing new and different changes and when the specter of conspiracy and neo-
colonialism hovers over some houses and workshops more than others.  
Ethnic classificatory schemes in Guatemala are flexible; indigenous people often 
“pass” as Ladino outside their home communities, for example, to avoid discrimination 
(Warren 1998: 10-11). Carol Hendrickson writes of “relative ethnicity” in Tecpán, by 
which she means that people are often said to “act like” a Maya or a Ladino “in certain 
contexts and for particular reasons” (1995: 33). The more successful manufacturers in 
Tecpán are referred to, somewhat jokingly, by other manufacturers and town residents 
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 There are similarities here to the occult economies and suspicions regarding capitalist accumulation in 
post-apartheid South Africa, as described by Jean and John Comaroff (1999), and in Bolivia and Colombia, 
as described by June Nash (1979) and Michael Taussig (1980).  
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as “medio-Ladino,” implying an aspiration to associate with, and adopt the public 
markers of distinction that set apart, an economically and politically more powerful 
group. The label sometimes also connotes a sense of ethnic betrayal. The adoption of a 
non-indigenous “cultural style” (Ferguson 1999), variously defined according to more 
extravagant consumption habits, wearing less formal or more expensive clothing, an air 
of conceit in relation to indigenous peers, even use of an indoor shower rather than the 
traditional tuj, or sweat bath, is often interpreted as a loss or rejection of traditional 
values. In short, to say that someone is acting “Ladino” generally means that person 
behaves selfishly, takes advantage of people, and thinks himself above or better than his 
indigenous peers (Hendrickson 1995: 18). This haughtiness might be comical, since he is 
unmistakably indigenous to local people because of family ties, a Kaqchikel surname, or 
physical features socially inscribed as indigenous traits. One producer commented that 
another man was becoming “like the Ladinos” because the man was consumed by 
greed, had built a fancy house with an ostentatious brick façade, and grown out his curly 
hair, an unusual style among indigenous men. Another producer referred to a 
neighboring manufacturer as “medio-Ladino,” explaining that he had two cars, including 
a late model SUV, and was wearing “original” clothing, more expensive styles purchased 
in formal retail shops. If ethnic boundaries are somewhat flexible in Guatemala, it is also 
the case that there are well-defined modes of policing those boundaries and latent 
assumptions and anxieties about who belongs where and how ethnicity is related to 
morality, propriety, and social class.  
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Murmurings about whether one is becoming too much like the Ladinos can 
sometimes fold over into questions about one’s very status as an indigenous person. 
One well-to-do manufacturer is the subject of a popular rumor about with his blood 
lines. The man belongs to the first generation of garment manufacturers and now owns 
a great deal of land in and around the town center. Originally from one of the more 
remote aldeas, it is alleged that he is the illegitimate son of a Maya woman and the 
German planter who employed her as a servant in his home. Such a scandalous union is 
cited as the origin of his unusual physical features – a tall, stocky build, light complexion, 
and grayish eyes – which seem incongruent with the fact that he speaks Kaqchikel and 
that his wife and daughters wear traditional dress. The rumor also serves as something 
of an explanation for his exceptional business acumen, and people suggested to me that 
he has been treated well by the Ladinos in the banks and the suppliers in Guatemala 
City because they are “tricked” (engañados) by his appearance, thinking that he is “one 
of them.” Stories about this producer strikingly illustrate the complicated “ideologies of 
blood, culture, the body, sexuality, and social power” that “combine to produce 
contradictory, ever changing notions of racial identity” in highland Guatemala (Grandin 
2000: 230).   
Talk of envy has genres. One frequent invocation of envy is to explain the tragic 
and unfair collapse of collective ventures, especially economic ones. For example, a 
group of garment manufacturers formed a cooperative in the late 1980s to more 
efficiently source raw materials. After some initial success, the cooperative began to 
struggle and was eventually dissolved. I talked with dozens of manufacturers about why 
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the cooperative failed. They told me about a national thread and textile firm opening a 
retail outlet in Tecpán, basically eliminating the need for the cooperative. Many people 
then added that the real problem was envidia. They alleged that the cooperative’s 
directors were envious. They paradoxically did not like seeing the members benefit from 
its services, so they ran it into the ground. Some even stole money from its accounts. 
There are dozens of stories like this in my field notes; a situation ostensibly caused by 
structural dynamics is also explained in terms of morality. One young apparel producer 
complained to me that another manufacturer had beaten him out of several lucrative 
production contracts to make school uniforms. In contrast to the vagaries and crediting 
demands of the wholesale and municipal market trades, these contracts guarantee the 
sale of a specified quantity and promise full payment within a month or two of delivery. 
The producer who had lost several contracts described his competitor,  
This man has a workshop in one of the colonias on the edge of town. Not just a 
workshop, it’s a media-maquila. He wins contracts because he deals in prices 
that are much lower than what we can offer. The truth is, I think he’s a 
narcotraficante. He walks around with a pistol, and that’s why I say, maybe he’s 
a drug trafficker, and he has this maquila in order to throw people off his trail 
(para despistar), because he sells everything at prices that are way too low to 
make a profit.  
In a contemporary twist, it is not the devil with whom this entrepreneur has allegedly 
made his pact (Nash 1979; Taussig 1980), but the murderous drug gangs who today 
wreck havoc on Guatemala’s capital city and Northern provinces. The fact that he is 
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known to have significant advantages of scale does not prevent speculation that his 
pricing is simply too low for a legitimate, profit-earning enterprise. Fantastical tales 
about his shady dealings are facilitated by spatialized moral codes (see Chapter 5) since 
he lives “on the edge of town,” has no known family connections in Tecpán, and 
seemingly appeared out of nowhere just a few years back. 
One of the wealthiest, best known factory owners in town is also a frequent 
target, rumors circulating that he cheats neighbors for personal gain, and is ultimately 
motivated by envidia. He was one of the first producers to invest in high-capacity 
knitting machines, thus one of the first to increase the scale of production. Many 
workshop owners in town say that he is the main reason for declining prices, increased 
competition, and all kinds of economic hardship. The most egregious acts he is rumored 
to have committed relate to the armed conflict, however. It is said that this man led 
guerilla fighters and received money from the government as part of the peace 
settlement. Instead of disbursing the funds among his troops, he reportedly pocketed 
the total amount, using it to establish himself in the apparel business. Among many 
other meanings, this rumor reflects a sense of uneasiness about the peace process and 
concerns about who benefited and how the promises made regarding assistance for 
indigenous communities affected by violence have or have not been kept. This man’s 
success is marred by suspicions of theft and betrayal.  
The impersonal workings of the market economy, the mastery that some 
entrepreneurs develop over the skills and dispositions necessary to accumulate capital, 
and the structural forces that make it difficult for many to do so become ordinary or 
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eventful in the idiom of envy. This sociology of symptoms and suspects is itself 
symptomatic of the touch of various cultural frames and historical burdens. The military 
strategically targeted indigenous professionals and business owners during the armed 
conflict, fueling rumors that people turned one another over to the state out of envy 
(Fischer and Hendrickson 2003; Sanford 2003). More than petty gossip, rumor has 
emerged in the post-conflict era as a key medium used by national and local officials to 
generate uncertainty about who precisely is to blame for the shortcomings of 
Guatemala’s peace process while localizing blame onto amorphous troublemakers who 
are said to be responsible for disrupting community life (Benson 2004). Rumors about 
envy and accusations of individualism fold in a great deal of suspicion related to “that 
odd fusion of … hope and hopelessness, of utility and futility, of promise and its 
perversions” that characterizes millennial capitalism in general (Comaroff and Comaroff 
1999: 283) and postwar national development policy in Guatemala in particular. 
Entrepreneurship, promoted by international institutions, national officials, and non-
governmental organizations as the key to ending poverty and achieving first-world 
modernity, does not always or even usually lead to economic security and also entails 
moral and legal hazards. Tecpanecos sometimes respond to the competitive market 
situation in which they find themselves by drawing on moral discourses that help to 
make sense of the promises of entrepreneurial success, on the one hand, and the 
difficult realities of postwar social life and economic struggle, on the other.   
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The Ethics of Imitation 
There has been an explosion in foreign goods coming into Guatemala since the 
armed conflict ended. Mexican-manufactured clothing, Chinese and Taiwanese imports 
(much of it featuring pirated brands), and second-hand clothing from the US spill out 
from the brightly-painted concrete block shops onto the sidewalks in the wholesale 
garment district along La Bolívar, one of Guatemala City’s major avenues. The influx of 
these products puts downward pressure on prices; imports may be of higher quality but 
are often cheaper than Guatemalan-made goods. The globalization of the Guatemalan 
clothing markets also means access to new designs, styles, and brand names for 
highland manufacturers. Imitation is the most basic and ubiquitous mechanism through 
which they develop their product lines, sometimes imitating imitations, since 
Guatemalan manufacturers frequently copy pirated apparel from China. This is true 
across the international fashion industry, as historian Mary Lynn Stewart (2005) notes.  
Even in the world of haute couture, designers and manufacturers draw inspiration from 
other garments and develop skills and techniques by trying to replicate them. 
Alberto Ixim was born in Xenimajuyu’, a tiny hamlet outside of town. His mother 
moved the family to Tecpán in 1982 after Alberto’s father, an early purveyor of 
children’s clothing, was killed by the Guatemalan army. Alberto often invited me to his 
house for afternoon coffee after I had worked a long day beside the tejedores or 
seamsters. One day, he complained to me that wholesalers had lost interest in the 
children’s clothing styles he produces. He was embroidering Winnie the Pooh and 
Spiderman figures on the little shirts and pants, but many manufacturers use these 
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same popular cartoon characters on their garments. So, he wanted to set himself apart 
from the competition. Alberto reached into the back seat to grab a small fleece shirt and 
said, “This is what I want to do.” I asked if the garment was a muestra, a sample he was 
working on to show potential buyers. He replied that it was a Mexican import that he 
bought a few days before on La Bolívar. Alberto explained: “When I go to the capital 
city, I look at what the Mexicans are doing. I prefer to copy the Mexicans or the Chinese. 
A lot of people just copy what their neighbors are doing. But you make enemies that 
way.”  
Alberto sells to wholesalers on La Bolívar every Friday morning. One Friday, we 
arrived very early, before some of the shops had opened. He said that he hoped to get 
there before anyone else from Tecpán.  
When everyone is walking around at the same time, people see your newest 
designs. They see how many bundles you’re delivering, how much you’re selling. 
They might be envious. Some will come along right behind you and ask the 
wholesaler how much you charged him. And they’ll say, ‘I can make that for less.’ 
That’s how the copiones work.” 
The term copión, which means a copycat in the classroom, is commonly used to 
disparage garment manufacturers who copy other producers in ways said to be 
unethical. For example, if you do not make some kind of change, introduce some 
creative element when you copy someone else, you are called a copión.  
There are similarities here to the norms related to copying and imitation among 
handicraft vendors and traditional weavers in highland Guatemala. The anthropologist 
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Walter Little writes, “[Handicraft] vendors try to give tourists the impression that they 
are not in competition with each other.” Yet, Little continues,  
Unsuccessful vendors are jealous of successful vendors and say derogatory 
things among themselves about those who consistently have high sales, and they 
try to copy successful designs. … Showing jealousy, trying to steal customers and 
otherwise attempting to demean competing vendors in front of tourists is 
considered to be not only poor taste but wrong.” (Little 2004: 120) 
Here, outward displays of ethnic solidarity emerge as an economic strategy since foreign 
tourists often go looking for “Indians,” people who belong to a presumably homogenous 
and harmonious group defined “in relation to both tourists and to Ladinos” (Little 2004: 
119). Feelings of “jealousy,” what I gloss in this article with the term envy, challenge 
vendors’ abilities to live up to globally-circulating stereotypes about the “perceived 
steadfastness” of traditional communities (Dudley 1996: 47), since these feelings inspire 
what is perceived to be unethical behavior, including the direct copying of competitors’ 
designs.  
Likewise, Carol Hendrickson’s (1995) work on Mayan weaving shows that it is a 
matter of pride for weavers to know what designs to imitate, but also to add some 
creative inflection that demonstrates their particular skills. This mode of imitation 
indicates respect for past generations as well as the weaver’s participation in a 
community-based form of production. Edward Fischer (2001) notes that the 
consumption of huipiles and cortes also participates in this kind of borrowing and 
appropriation. As an indigenous rights movement gained strength in the 1990s during 
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the peace negotiations, activists began to rally around a “broader concept of Maya-
ness” rather than community-based or linguistic affiliations. Traditional dress became an 
important source of expression for emerging identities and ethnic politics, such that 
“Maya women are mixing and matching huipiles and cortes from various communities 
into a single ensemble, creating new aesthetic conventions that incorporate the beauty 
of other styles while subtly underlining notions of pan-Maya unity.” Fischer adds that 
one master weaver [in fact, my former teacher] was conducting research at the Museo 
Ixil de Traje Indígena in Guatemala City “to record patterns in older textiles that have 
fallen out of use. She uses these older, more ‘authentic’ designs and colors in her own 
work” (Fischer 2001: 119). 
Garment manufacturers are what economists and economic anthropologists 
might call “adaptive entrepreneurs” or “imitative followers” who, as Alan and Josephine 
Smart (2005) explain, “adopt rather than develop technology and products.” In the 
formal economy, adaptive firms are often hired as subcontractors to produce goods that 
will be marketed by other companies, “sold under another company’s brand” (Smart 
and Smart 2005: 10). As participants in the informal economy, they are dubbed pirates. 
Yet, just as with handicraft vendors and weavers, garment manufacturers take pride in 
creativity, improvising on styles they see in malls, online, and at the markets and shops 
where they sell. For example, Alberto might take a fleece romper design that he sees on 
the Baby Gap website and substitute sweater knit for the bodice – partly because he can 
make sweater knit with his machinery, so it is cheaper for him, and partly because this 
improvisation will be a selling point for him in the market. In an interview with a young 
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manufacturer from another apparel-producing town, he notes proudly that his family 
deals in “imitaciones.” “We copy it, but we make it better,” he says, explaining that they 
start with popular youth styles they see on websites and in upscale commercial centers 
and tailor them to the local market, producing something that suits their clientele in 
terms of price, but also in terms of color palette and overall design. It is common for 
highland producers to mimic certain elements of a neighbor’s design as well, but they 
are expected to make changes that will set their garments apart in a meaningful way. A 
producer might copy the cut and brand of a cotton t-shirt that his neighbor is 
manufacturing, for instance, but change the color scheme and also screen-print rather 
than sew on the logo. This is seen as a legitimate form of borrowing and appropriation. 
Although directly copying a neighbor’s design is admittedly easier, it takes advantage of 
an already open system, where producers acknowledge the economic and moral 
legitimacy of limited kinds of copying and imitation.  
In fact, one young manufacturer I got to know rejected the discourse of the 
copión on the grounds that everyone copies, although some people are better at it than 
others. Having apprenticed in his grandfather’s sweater workshop for many years, Jorge 
Costop started his own business when he married at age twenty and, four years later, 
produces sweatshirts and polo shirts in the latest youth styles. He employs three young 
men at sewing machines and two others at manual knitting machines, all crowded into a 
single room constructed out of wooden planks and sheet metal. “You have to know why 
you like something,” he explains to me as we look over the hooded Hollister sweatshirts 
he is packaging up for market.  
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Maybe it is the color, maybe a combination of colors or the pattern, or 
something else. For example, that shirt you are wearing [pointing to my striped 
cotton tee], if I like that shirt and I want to copy it, I would have to ask myself, 
what do I like about it? Is it the cut, the colors, the combination of the colors, or 
the order they are in? Then I would use what I like to make my own design.  
Jorge talks about copying as a skill he honed through his work for his grandfather and as 
the designer for his own workshop. When I ask him about copying among neighbors, he 
relates how he and other young manufacturers who are his friends share ideas back and 
forth regularly with the understanding that they will each make those ideas their own in 
accordance with the norms described above. He then adds,  
Many people think that copying is a problem. The reality is that no one is “the 
first” [no hay primero]. When a product comes on the market, the whole world is 
copying it. Let’s say it starts with a style that comes from Spain or Paris or the 
United States. It arrives in Guatemala and we like it, so we copy it. But the ideas 
are our own [son nuestras]. It is pure egoísmo [selfishness, self-centeredness] if 
people are complaining about others copying their styles. If a style is popular and 
a lot of people are making it, there will only be more demand for it. People are 
just envious of each other if they say that copying is a problem.   
Jorge points to the global nature of the design process, the connections to an 
international trade that are part of his experience as a fashion producer, even in a 
marginal place like Tecpán. His comments take on an air of defensiveness when he talks 
about how people might be critical of his role in the process, as someone who draws 
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inspiration and ideas from others. As part of this defensive stance, he turns accusations 
of envy commonly leveraged against those labeled copiones back on potential accusers 
to suggest that it might actually be people who are successful copiers – that is, people 
who are skilled at copying in ways that result in popular designs – who are the targets of 
envious stares. 
Most often, however, people are called copiones not just because they copy 
exactly what someone else is selling. They also sell the product for less than what the 
other manufacturer is charging. That is what Alberto was trying to evade during our 
early-morning visit to La Bolívar. “It is a normal reaction,” one producer explains, “for 
people to get angry with one another, especially when you are offering the same 
product at a lower price to the same buyer. That is when people get really upset.” 
Another producer tells me that he has begun travelling to more distant markets to avoid 
meeting up with other manufacturers who might steal his designs. Already part of a 
“shadow” economy (Nordstrom 2004) in an out-of-the-way place, he refers to his 
strategy as “selling undercover.” “Yo vendo escondido,” he says. “If not, they will copy 
what I am selling and then come back and offer it to my buyers at a lower price. It 
always depends on what kind of machinery you have and your talents, but everyone 
tries to copy everyone else.” Alberto and many other garment manufacturers interpret 
price-based competition, a predictable and rather ordinary market strategy in 
neoclassical economics, as both unfair, since everyone suffers when prices go down, and 
morally problematic, evidence of envidia.  
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Part of why the pirating of global fashion brands is socially acceptable 
throughout much of Guatemala is because the expensive products sold by international 
fashion firms are beyond the reach of most Guatemalan consumers. There is also the 
idea that foreign manufacturers do not know what the people want to buy, so it is up to 
local workshop owners to tailor styles to local tastes. Copying an imported garment or a 
style made popular by a foreign company is seen as part of the business, a good way to 
avoid the problems of local competition, and an intelligent business strategy. As one 
producer admonished, “If you don’t have any creativity, copy the good stuff,” by which 
he meant the high quality “originales” sold in formal retail shops and marketed in the 
media. People who resort to directly copying neighbors are seen, from his perspective, 
as unskilled, indiscriminate, and unsavvy. Meanwhile, foreign corporations and 
manufacturers seem distant. Driving through Tecpán at the close of another work day, 
Alberto and I passed by a clothing shop with several Abercrombie sweatshirts displayed 
on clothes hangers in the entryway. He commented, “You see a lot of clothing that says 
Abercrombie on it. Abercrombie is not here.” Then he began to laugh. At once a critique 
of Guatemala’s position in the world system, as a place from which globally-popular 
things like Abercrombie simply do not originate, Alberto was also making a joke out of 
the fact that the Abercrombie name and logo are indeed everywhere in Tecpán and in 
Guatemala more generally.  
“Do you mean that Abercrombie is not from Guatemala?” I asked to make sure I 
got the joke, and he laughed even harder. “It is definitely not from Guatemala, and 
definitely not from Tecpán,” he replied.  
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Legal and business scholars often assume that people are ignorant of how their 
participation in piracy markets affects rights-holding corporations and thus promote 
educational campaigns and other consciousness-raising programs as one mechanism for 
deterring piracy production and consumption (see Chapter 1). Among the Maya 
entrepreneurs I got to know, however, it is simply not the case that they are unaware of 
how they are connected to international markets. Producers like Alberto are all too 
aware of how market dynamics, from the importation of cheap garments to the 
subsidization of multinational manufacturers rather than domestic producers, challenge 
the sustainability of their local industry. Producers tend to respond to these conditions 
in ways that seem ethical given their obligations to kin and community. A normative 
order that privileges the proximate is evidence that values other than those assumed to 
be natural or superior within the international development agenda exist even in places 
that have a longstanding relationship to it.   
Once we got to know one another, manufacturers did not try to hide from me 
the fact that they participated in brand piracy. The use of brand names and logos was 
simply one aspect of garment design and a routine part of the trade. Yet, despite a lot of 
talk about copying, the term “piracy” rarely surfaced in our conversations. In an 
interview with one small-scale producer, he suggested that the copiones are just like the 
piratas (pirates) he had read about in the newspaper who sell CDs and DVDs in the 
capital city streets. “The people who make the original discs complain because they 
can’t sell them for the price they want,” he explained. This producer, who traded in 
pirated brand names himself, interpreted the criminalized problem of piracy in line with 
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the localized ethics of copying, as a problem of pricing and fairness rather than 
ownership.  
Even though a consolidated discourse regarding piracy has yet to take hold in 
Tecpán, the discourse of the copión does reinforce some of the same goals as 
intellectual property laws that cover trademarks and fashion design. Those who 
complain about copycats seek to protect an investment they have made in crafting what 
they consider to be a new or unique design so that they can reap reasonable profits 
from their work. This sometimes leads manufacturers to adopt defensive strategies such 
as selling in more distant markets or selling at odd hours of the day in order to protect 
their designs from would-be copycats. It can also lead to more direct claims of 
ownership. For example, Pedro Serech, a Maya man who owns an embroidery shop in 
Tecpán, explained to me that some of the characters, figures, and logos he stitches onto 
clients’ garments have “owners.” Pedro bought a used, eight-head embroidery machine 
from a dealer in Guatemala City in 2004 with loans from the bank, his father, and a 
sister who works as a secretary in Guatemala City. Almost all of the embroidery designs 
he uses come from compact discs loaded with pirated digital images of cartoon 
characters, popular fashion logos, and sports team logos (especially soccer clubs). Pedro 
can customize one of these images on his desktop computer and then reproduce it 
simultaneously on eight garments by loading it onto the computerized embroidery 
machine.  
As we looked through the images stored on Pedro’s computer, he showed me 
how he organizes the files into folders, and explained, “There are folders for each one of 
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our clients. For example, if someone wants embroidery for a [school] uniform and we 
made it for them before, I have it right here. And in this folder,” he said, pointing to the 
screen, “I have everything that is of general use for baby clothing. And here [pointing to 
another folder], I keep everything that doesn’t have an owner.” He double-clicked the 
mouse and opened the folder to show me these “un-owned” images, which included 
everything from Mickey Mouse characters to Reebok logos. “These are the ones that I 
can sell to anyone. They aren’t exclusive designs. For example, here are some that 
belong to Alberto Ixim.” Knowing that I helped out in Alberto’s workshop, Pedro felt 
comfortable using him to illustrate the point, and he showed me several digital images 
that I recognized from Alberto’s garments. There were teddy bear and flower designs 
that Pedro said he and Alberto worked on together, starting with just a pencil-and-paper 
sketch or a generic clip art file. Some were trademarked cartoon characters. “So, this is 
just for him [sólo es de él],” he declared. 
“You wouldn’t sell them to other people if they asked for them?” I inquired, 
trying to understand how this kind of protection works given the seeming ease with 
which people copy one another.  
“No, I don’t want to sell these to other people. So, I have all these others that I 
can give to whoever wants them. I maintain, I try to maintain that difference, because 
you can’t trust other people, because the competition is always like this. At any time, 
they can copy you. So we, at least, try to help out our clients.”  
In the embroidery business, providing a measure of intellectual property 
protection has emerged as a way for Pedro to differentiate himself from his 
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competitors. He tries to “help out” his clients by protecting them against the copiones. 
In a subsequent conversation, Alberto explained to me that he usually asks Pedro to 
hold a particular design in reserve, just for him, for a period of two or three months. 
After that length of time, either the design is no longer in demand or, if it has been 
successful, people have noticed and begun copying it, regardless of Pedro’s 
safeguarding (it is easy to have another embroiderer reproduce the image), and it is 
time to move onto another idea. Pedro’s respect for individual ownership over designs 
provides at least some measure of protection for his clients, even it if is short-lived. And 
he, like Alberto, attributes the need for this kind of protection to the moral dispositions 
of apparel manufacturers, “because you can’t trust other people.” This shortcoming is 
explained, in turn, as part of what competition means: “the competition is always like 
this.” 
The parallel between producers’ attitudes and some of the principles that 
underlie IPR law apparent in such cases “emerges from the context … and from the kind 
of work that they do – from the labor process,” as anthropologist Kathleen Gordon 
argues regarding the convergence of market vendors’ strategies and neoliberal ideology 
in highland Bolivia. Gordon writes, “Vendors, because they rely on their own resources 
and face competition in the marketplace, must be entrepreneurial and competitive” 
(2011: 37). Her point is that indigenous people in developing countries often adopt 
strategies that seem to confirm liberal assumptions about human nature. And yet, if we 
situate these people’s economic behavior within the historical and ethnographic 
context, we find layers of interplay among social structures, cultural meanings, and 
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market realities that influence the kind of work that people do and the strategies they 
adopt to make ends meet. From the perspective of many Tecpanecos, as Pedro’s 
comments illustrate, moral failures go hand-in-hand with market competition, which 
both inspires envious stares and unethical behavior, and heats up precisely because of 
such behavior. Many apparel producers view competition as a vicious cycle in which 
people must protect themselves – not only their market position, but also their personal 
well-being and moral integrity – from the dangerous forms of individualism and envy 
that are part and parcel of the social field that market participation so often elaborates. 
 
Development and Its Imposters 
Apparel producers are not the only copycats in Guatemala. That the post-war 
nation-state is copying other countries and, to some extent, following orders in forging a 
path to development is not lost on Maya people in Tecpán. Although implicated in the 
drive toward capitalist industrialization, some apparel producers are nonetheless critical 
of the future directions that Guatemala has set out for itself based on foreign models, 
anxious perhaps about the “authenticity of the copy” (Ferguson 2006: 16), but also 
concerned about what have so far been the outcomes of international development 
approaches. Highland Guatemalans have an especially fraught relationship to images of 
development and modernity that they see as originating in the US, not least because of 
the long and bloody conflict that many of them blame on American interventionism and 
business interests.   
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 One producer talked with me at length about the problem of copying US 
development models. Mario Güitz ended his engineering studies at the public university 
after only one year when his father died suddenly of a heart attack in the early 1990s. 
He now operates a medium-sized workshop in the center of town. On a morning drive 
to Guatemala City to sell men’s sweaters in the wholesale markets, Mario began to 
complain about the copiones. As soon as a new design hits the market, he lamented, 
they copy it and push the price down. “They are too much like the Americans and the 
Chinese,” he said, and then launched into a critique of the cheap, plastic goods that 
have flooded into Guatemala in recent years: plastic kitchenware made in China and 
sold in retail chains owned by Walmart, plastic toys made in China and given out to 
children in McDonald’s Happy Meals. “It’s all chafa,” he said, a slang term that literally 
means cheap, poorly made stuff, but which also implies that the stuff is a badly-
rendered copy of an original. Among youth in the capital city, the term is used to mean 
knock-offs. Mario contrasted chafa with the artisanal goods that filled the homes of his 
parents and grandparents: clay pots, metal cookware, cotton textiles. He commented, 
“We think that if we use plastic, we’ll be modern like the estadounidenses.” Mario and I 
had made this trip to Guatemala City several times and spent a great deal of time talking 
in his workshop. I knew that he liked to take jabs at the US in order to see my reaction. 
But as a budding environmentalist – he had told me that if he could change careers, he 
would work for an NGO to promote conservation programs and environmental 
awareness in Maya communities – he was also expressing genuine concern that these 
new, disposable goods would end up as pollutants.  “Why do we want to be like the 
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Americans? You end up with a lot of chafa. It’s no good. I heard a few days ago that the 
plastic toys from China are dangerous,” he notes, referring to news reports that had 
surfaced that month about another case of high toxin levels in Chinese-made children’s 
products. “It’s the same with the copiones,” he continued. “They think that the more 
chafa they produce, the more money they will make. But in the long run, it’s bad for 
everyone.” 
Talk about copiones, which at times seems a property-based position, is here a 
critique of industrialized hyper-capitalism, the throw away culture of forced 
obsolescence, and the kind of cut-throat competition induced by international trade and 
taken for granted in IPR protections. It is a critique of the commodity form, pure chafa, 
which has no pride or craftsmanship invested in its creation or production, and thus also 
implicates a class of producers who are said to be unskilled and unprofessional in their 
work.30 Finally, it is wrapped up with critical sensibilities regarding the state’s 
misadventures in copying American-style development models. 
During another visit to Mario’s workshop, he told me about Taiwan. As one of 
the top exporters to Guatemala, along with China and Mexico, Taiwan often came up in 
conversations with garment producers about rising competition. In this case, however, 
                                                           
30
 The idea implicit in Mario’s use of the term “chafa” is that the products made by people whose work is 
based on imitation rather than creativity are useless and disposable. Mario’s argument brings to mind 
Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s concept of the “culture industry” (1997), which, briefly stated, 
charges that capitalism creates its own consumer demand, defines popular needs in terms of capitalism’s 
drive for profit, and discourages creative investment in “high” art or even skilled forms of production. 
Mario’s statement also disavows his and all other local garment producers’ participation, however, in 
practices of copying and imitation, at least at some level, and participates in a cultural pattern of localizing 
blame onto those who occupy the bottom rungs of the economic order – in this case, producers who lack 
the capital, skills, or education to manufacture higher quality goods or successfully market designs that 
others will consider innovative.   
 149 
 
Mario was holding up Taiwan as a case study in development policy. He ushered me into 
the sala of the home he shares with his widowed mother, his wife, and their two young 
children. It is typical of Tecpán’s living rooms, with an old couch and a small table 
bearing a vase of flowers and a few candles, all situated beneath a giant portrait of the 
Virgin of Guadalupe. There is also a computer Mario bought second-hand from an 
internet café in town, which he uses for email, surfing the internet, and maintaining the 
workshop’s accounting on Excel spreadsheets. And on top of a tall armoire across from 
the computer desk sits a TV set and a VCR. He reaches up to pop a video tape into the 
player and explains that he came across this tape while visiting the office of the local 
cable television provider. It is about agriculture in Taiwan, he says.   
The Taiwanese do things the right way. You’ll see in the video. Taiwan is a lot like 
Guatemala. It’s green and very fertile. They have good soil and a good climate for 
growing a variety of crops, just like here. But in Taiwan, the government started 
a program to first help the people grow their own food and sell their own crops 
for the national market. They, they looked for ways to export. The people have 
work and can supply everything they need for themselves. They took advantage 
of the specific characteristics of their country. Taiwan is just a small island, but 
they grow things that are not found in other countries, just like Guatemala. 
We’re a small country, but we have so many natural resources that are wasted. 
The food we grow here is not even eaten by our own people. It’s sold to other 
countries. Even the food that is grown for export is not always sold because it is 
not good enough for foreigners. So, at the end of the day [al final de cuentas], no 
 150 
 
one is making money and the people stay poor, all because our government 
doesn’t know how to do things the right way.  
The video has started playing. Shiny fruits and waxy vegetables pass across the screen 
accompanied by traditional lute and zither music. There are shots of Taiwanese farmers 
harvesting ripe fruit in lush fields and panoramic vistas highlighting the island’s special 
landscape. These images are overlaid with a voice track (subtitled in Spanish) describing 
Taiwan’s rich agricultural diversity, with an emphasis on farm-to-market timetables, 
high-tech breeding practices, and quality control. A highly-produced and stylized 
publicity video for Taiwan’s export program, the tape also provides just enough 
emphasis on the importance of native foods to local culture to give the viewer a sense 
of the exotic elegance of the place and its people.   
 I am thrown a bit by the contrast between Mario’s interpretation of the film and 
my own experience of it. The video’s narrative says little about the government and 
even less about programs that prioritize national market access to fresh produce. It 
seems to me a polished marketing tool that encourages the very export-led 
development strategies that Guatemala has followed in recent decades, policies that 
have brought Taiwanese and Guatemalan clothing manufacturers (and vegetable 
farmers) into direct competition with one another. What Mario sees in the images of 
smiling, healthy Taiwanese farmers amidst rich landscapes of productive fields, 
however, is an alternative. The images signal the possibility of a development program 
that might make such lush fields and contended farmers possible, a program that might 
value Guatemala’s natural and human features over and above the profits reaped by a 
 151 
 
few intermediaries through international trade. When the video finishes, Mario looks at 
me and says, “If we could imitate what Taiwan did, we would have a strong economic 
base and the people would be working. We would have something to build on for the 
future.”  Contrast his enthusiasm for Taiwan’s produce industry with his disdain for the 
kind of careless consumerism that he perceives as originating in the US. “If it comes 
from the US, then we want it, too,” he had noted at the conclusion of our conversation 
about chafa. “We haven’t learned.  It doesn’t make sense for us to copy what the 
Americans are doing. We should be looking for our own way, what is better for us.”  
Mario is not so much concerned that Guatemala is imitating development 
models from other places, but that it is imitating the wrong ones, just like the copiones 
who imitate local products rather than “the good stuff,” as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Many apparel producers shared his sense that Guatemala is inundated with 
chafa, useless things, worn-out things, the leftovers of other places. They frequently 
complained that it was impossible to compete against foreign manufacturers when the 
machinery available in Guatemala is worn out and out-dated. While explaining to me 
the various knit patterns – calado, tricot, intercalado, multicolor – that his machinery 
can produce, one sweater manufacturer picked up a yellowed operating manual for a 
knitting machine to show me some illustrations. He then asked me if I could read the 
manual to him. It was in German. He said that he and his family members look at the 
pictures of the designs and the corresponding diagrams illustrating the needle 
movements and have, in this way, figured out many of the patterns by trial and error. 
He shows me another handbook of knitting patterns, this one in English, and just as 
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indecipherable to him. This book, he explains, came with some used machinery that he 
purchased in the mid-1980s that is now so out-dated that he can’t find replacement 
parts. The Japanese factory that manufactured that line closed in the early 1990s, and, 
indeed, there are dozens of these same machines in various states of disrepair around 
Tecpán, many of them with a “se vende” (for sale) sign taped to them in case another 
manufacturer is interested. This producer adds that it is not much better with the newer 
machines because they arrive second- or third-hand from European and US factories.  
“Everything that arrives in Guatemala is muy atrazado,” he laments.  Everything is 
backwards and out-of-date.  
The anthropologist James Ferguson quotes a Zambian mineworker who 
expressed similar frustrations with his surroundings: “This place is not up to date!” 
(2006: 185). There is a key tension in “developing” nations like Zambia and Guatemala 
with regard to the promises of modernity and the lived realities of economic 
development programs and capitalist production.  Many apparel producers express 
dissatisfaction with regard to Guatemala’s place in the world system, and their own 
particular positions within a globalized industry. Operating at the margins of industrial 
production and fashion design, outside of the mainstream commodity chains that move 
materials and machinery, and far away from the concentrated consumer surpluses that 
allow the international fashion industry to thrive, Maya manufacturers often must grasp 
and grapple for chafa, the leftovers of the “real” economy and “real” development (cf. 
Ferguson 2006, Chapter 2). Yet, they are equally dissatisfied with models of progress 
and development that continue to insist on international trade agreements and formal 
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market participation as the answer to the inequalities and lack that they see around 
them. The idea that market-based competition and exclusive forms of ownership are 
the key drivers of economic growth (Maskus 2000) does not fit with either the 
normative schema expressed by apparel manufacturers in Tecpán or the ethnographic 
evidence. 
Maya producers nonetheless participate in moralizing discourses that localize 
blame for difficult market conditions. The “geography of blame” (Farmer 1992) in 
Tecpán’s apparel trade traces the “articulation of different layers in a multilayered 
system” (Smith 1984: 194), from the discourses that circulate in national media reports 
on piracy to indigenous people’s suspicions about state power and jurisprudence to the 
social embedding of senses of moral worth and accountability in a changing industry. 
The tendency among many of Tecpán manufacturers to blame development failures and 
intense competition on envy intersects with international framings that posit 
“underdevelopment” as a result of character flaws revealed in the backwardness and 
ineptitude of a national or sub-national ethnic population, a framing that is often 
interpolated by citizens of “underdeveloped” nations (Gupta 1998). As with Mario’s 
commentary on chafa and the unprofessional manufacturers who produce it, talk about 
envy on the one hand and respect for obligations to kin and neighbors on the other 
emphasizes issues of moral behavior rather than structural conditions including 
international trade and legal frameworks that confound all kinds of development 
efforts. And, as the next chapter highlights, these structural arrangements have begun 
to engender new expectations of legality and legitimacy in a place where accusations 
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and suspicions of illegitimacy so often orient people’s relationships to each other, to the 
state, and to the wider world.   
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Chapter Four: Piracy and the Politics of Branding  
 
 
 While the use and regulation of trademarks to designate a product’s source 
began in the seventeenth-century European guild system, the origins of modern 
trademark law are found in the mid-nineteenth century (Schechter 1927). With the rise 
of mass markets and the expansion of corporate influence over consumption habits as 
well as public policy, the United States and Great Britain were the first to institutionalize 
trademark protections in their current form. The trademark was intended to serve as an 
index of the product’s provenance, giving producers a way to set themselves apart 
within the marketplace, guaranteeing the origin and a standard of quality to consumers, 
and helping buyers to differentiate among mass-produced commodities. By the 1920s, 
trademarks had undergone a significant transformation. No longer simply a stand-in for 
the producer’s quality guarantee, the mark itself had become endowed with social and 
economic value. This shift was inevitable, notes Constantine Nakassis (n.d.), because the 
very reason for protecting trademarks was that consumers had no face-to-face 
connection with producers. It was always implicit in trademark law that the material 
sign would generate an immaterial value – a reputation or goodwill among consumers 
(Bone 2006).   
These are the basic conditions for the emergence of the brand form. Today, 
brands are ubiquitous and amorphous. The term has been used traditionally to connote 
all of the social meanings associated with a product, its trademarks, package design, and 
marketing and promotion, including a host of ephemeral qualities that have to do with 
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“brand image” and status (Nakassis n.d.). As advertising executive David Ogilvy put it in 
1955, the brand is the “intangible sum of a product’s attributes, its name, packaging, 
and price, its history, reputation, and the way it is advertised” (cited in Wang 2008: 23-
24). These ways of thinking about brands  assume a material commodity to which the 
brand refers; yet, as Paul Manning notes, brands today have left behind the “dull, 
passive, generic, inert utility and materiality of the product entirely” (2010: 36). Brands 
have “dematerialized,” he claims, and the range of “products” that can be branded now 
extends beyond material commodities to encompass “experiences, selves, nations, 
political programs, and revolutions” (Manning 2010: 34).31 Brands are better 
understood as bundles of affect, experience, practices, and associations that may or 
may not find be grounded in their linkage with a tangible product, such that “the sign 
increasingly replaces the product itself as the site of fetishism” (Coombe 1993: 421). 
Corporations work to construct, direct, feed, and control their brands, but 
branding – that is, the production of these affects and associations – depends a great 
deal on the work of consumers (Foster 2007). Since the 1980s, marketing professionals 
have attempted to place brands at the center of modern social life. Event sponsorships 
and co-marketing programs, the incorporation of new media forms into branding 
efforts, “lifestyle” advertising, and the turn to grassroots and “integrative marketing” 
that depend on consumers to spread the word about product experiences and brand 
associations, all of these corporate strategies promote the brand as something more 
than a signifier (Carducci 2003). “Brands want to have relationships, to allay your 
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 See also Moore 2003; Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2006; Hearn 2008; Jansen 2008; Manning 2009; Graan n.d. 
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consumer cynicism, to be the bedrock and context of your community and even make 
love with you” (Nakassis n.d.).32 The “consumptive labor” (Foster 2005) or “affective 
labor” (Hardt 1999) that produces the social meaning surrounding brands is central to 
marketing efforts and constitutive of the contemporary brand form.   
This back-and-forth between corporations and consumers (or, more broadly, 
brand owners and brand participants) necessarily entails some slippage in the meanings 
and associations that build up. Indeed, the gap between the control exercised over 
trademarked brands by their owners and the unpredictability of brands making their 
way through the social world, being redirected and picked up and reproduced by 
ordinary people who come into contact with a more or less consolidated “image” being 
promoted by the owner, is a site of extraordinary productive potential. The value of 
immaterial labor for the corporation ends at the threshold of deviant appropriation, 
where piracy, counterfeiting, and other sorts of improper brand behavior begin 
(Nakassis n.d.).33 Control over brands, the work of delimiting proper and improper 
consumptive work, is most powerfully and forcefully exercised through the language 
and institutional apparatus of trademark law. For all its immateriality, then, brands are 
treated by corporations and others with something at stake in their constitution and 
meaning as something that ultimately congeals around particular signs (Beebe 2004). 
This chapter explores how brands get picked up and appropriated in Guatemala, 
examining practices of piracy among Tecpaneco garment producers who are also 
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 See Fournier 1998; Holt 2003; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; and Foster 2005, 2007 for specific examples. 
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 At least, this is the claim made by corporations seeking to protect their trademarked brands from 
unauthorized appropriations.  As discussed in Chapter 1, however, some business scholars argue that 
piracy and counterfeiting actually benefit trademark owners.  
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necessarily consumers of global brands. I find that their relationships to trademarks, 
that is, the legal entity that consolidates the brand form, is shaped by a local context in 
which brands, products, and consumption take on special meanings in terms of class 
and ethnic affiliations and by an international context in which fashion firms struggle to 
consolidate control over trademarked brands in novel ways, with sometimes paradoxical 
effects. 
 
Original Gaps 
Anthropologists have recently examined the sociocultural context within which 
the consumption of pirated goods becomes ordinary practice. One important finding is 
that, for consumers, what counts as authentic or original is often ambiguous or 
significantly different from the definitions offered in IPR frameworks. Elizabeth Vann’s 
(2006) study of consumer markets in Ho Chi Minh City offers a prime example. Rather 
than distinguishing “real” goods from “fake” goods in the way that trademark law 
differentiates authorized and illegitimate copies, Vietnamese shoppers talk about 
“model goods,” which, in turn, provide a sort of template for “mimic goods.”   
Shoppers in HCMC do not imagine the consumer market—which they experience 
in the form of thousands of local shops, street vendors, and markets—as being 
made up primarily of “authentic” goods interspersed occasionally with 
“counterfeits.” Mimic goods are a part of everyday shopping in Vietnam. … And 
they consider the proliferation of goods that “mimic” world famous products an 
inevitable and quintessentially capitalist process. Product mimicking, they say, is 
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a logical and necessary outcome of a competitive and hierarchical market in 
which a few companies and products serve as models for others. (Vann 2006: 
290) 
Mimic goods, which generally feature trademarked brand names, are judged on how 
well they conform to the models set forth by more expensive, higher quality goods. 
They only become a problem when they are misrepresented as models. For instance, if a 
vendor charges a higher price than a mimic good should command, it may mislead some 
consumers into thinking that the product is also of higher quality than it really is. But the 
simple fact of a popular logo appearing on the good does not determine whether it is a 
“model” or a “mimic” in any kind of mechanistic way.   
Another important distinction described by Vann is between mimic goods and 
“fakes.”  Rather than equate the latter term with an unauthorized reproduction of a 
genuine product, however, Vietnamese consumers call goods “fake” when they are 
“essentially nongoods that are useless to the people who buy them,” as with a 
“shampoo bottle filled with used cooking oil” (2006: 293). Fake goods are deceptive, not 
because they deceitfully purport to come from authorized sources.  Rather, they are 
something altogether different from what they represent themselves to be and are 
intended to mislead the consumer into purchasing something that will, in the end, be 
completely useless in practical as well as cultural (i.e., status) terms.      
Maya garment manufacturers in highland Guatemala readily acknowledge that 
the garments they make are imitaciones (imitations), not originales (originals). As noted 
in Chapter 1, consumers in highland Guatemala also know that the clothing they buy on 
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city streets and informal markets is different than what wealthy Guatemalans buy in 
expensive boutiques and shopping malls. The difference between formal legal 
understandings of what it means for something to be an authorized original and the 
local evaluative scheme common to the Guatemalan highlands was made particularly 
clear on a trip I made with Victor Xuya.   
I met Victor at a birthday celebration for his young godson. He later invited me 
to the saint’s day celebration hosted by him and other members of the cofradía of San 
Antonio. I was soon making regular visits to his garment workshop, where his teenage 
son and six other young men worked amidst the clutter of fabric scraps and second-
hand machinery. I also traveled with Victor to municipal markets in highland towns and 
street markets in Guatemala City to sell the sweaters and sweatshirts he produced. On 
one occasion, we rode the bus a half-hour to Chimaltenango, the capital of the 
department in which Tecpán is located. We delivered several bundles of clothing to his 
regular customers, market vendors who set up and take down their temporary wooden 
stalls each market day. We then set out to visit Chimaltenango’s retail stores and 
modern commercial center to scope out new design ideas. Stores with names like La 
Nueva Moda (The New Fashion) and El Estreno (Debut) that line a main street through 
town seem a bit ironic since these shops, like the informal market stalls where Victor 
sells, also deal in pirated brands. The clothes are made in highland workshops or 
purchased from wholesalers in Guatemala City who distribute Chinese imports. A 
spatialized hierarchy means that these fixed retail locations sell youth styles of slightly 
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higher quality at higher prices than what one finds in the market, which caters to lower 
socioeconomic classes.   
Our next stop was La Pradera, a mall built in 2006 with plenty of parking, a fried-
chicken restaurant, Taco Bell, Maxi Bodega discount department store, and Bulock’s, a 
national retailer with sixty stores selling clothing priced just above what is sold in 
municipal markets and smaller clothing shops. Victor tells me with an air of pride that he 
sometimes buys clothing there for his two younger children. Many of the sweatshirt and 
t-shirt styles feature logos that read Arthur & Campie, Holistar, and Hollinger, obvious 
imitations of the popular global brands Abercrombie & Fitch and Hollister. Taking 
advantage of variable judicial interpretations of the “likelihood of confusion” test in 
international trademark law, slightly altering a brand name is a common strategy used 
by brand pirates worldwide to avert successful prosecution for trademark infringement 
(Marroletti 1999). Bulock’s also sells clothing under the Basic Editions label, a discount 
line available in Sears and Kmart stores in the US. These garments are made in 
maquiladoras in Guatemala and Honduras and likely were destined for export at one 
point. But overruns and imperfect items often find their way out of the maquiladoras 
and into retail stores and street markets in Central America.   
At the other end of the mall, we stopped in front of a store that I immediately 
recognized. The sign hanging above the doorway featured the dark blue square and slim 
Arial lettering of the ubiquitous US clothing chain, Gap. A second look revealed that the 
sign actually read “GAPPS,” as if this iteration of the store were a postscript to the 
American version. Victor was hesitant to enter the store, stressing to me that the 
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clothing was very expensive, but perhaps also concerned about not being welcomed 
there, since long-standing structures of discrimination discourage Maya men and 
women from entering spaces that are seen to belong more appropriately to well-to-do, 
non-indigenous Guatemalans (Nelson 1999: 249-250). The merchandise was indeed 
expensive: jeans priced at Q299 (about $35) as compared to Q49 ($7) at Bulock’s. The 
styles were similar to what one might expect to find at a Gap store in the US, the quality 
of the fabric and the stitching was relatively high, and the Gap logo appeared on all the 
merchandise. But Gap does not have stores in Guatemala or any other Latin American 
country. When we left the store, I could not resist pointing this out to Victor. “It’s not 
real,” I said. “That store is an imitation of the real Gap stores in the US.” Victor was 
unfazed. “Those clothes are originals,” he remarked. “Didn’t you see how expensive 
they were?”  
Local understandings of what makes a garment original disclose a disjuncture, a 
gap, between international legal frameworks and how Maya people in Guatemala 
experience the apparel marketplace and brand environment. Yi-Chieh Jessica Lin notes 
that counterfeiting in China “represents and reinforces the popularity of mainstream 
culture and class identity” and the “worship” of the “original source” (2009: 98). In 
highland Guatemala, the complex relationship between “originals” and “imitations” 
does not reveal the same kind of fetishization of originality or authenticity. In the local 
context, the term imitation indicates that the garment is a copy, a more or less faithful 
reproduction of an original, and implies inferiority in terms of quality and desirability. 
But the term original does not reference an authorized and formal relationship to a 
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fashion firm. Rather, originality is an index of the garment’s exclusivity, meaning the 
garment’s position in the marketplace as a function of the context in which it is sold – its 
price, quality, and spatial location in relation to other goods – and thus who can and 
cannot consume it.   
Spatial imaginaries, class structures, and institutionalized practices of 
discrimination in Guatemala have historically linked urban space, non-indigenous 
Ladinos, and “modernity” on the one hand and rural space, indigenous people, and 
“tradition” on the other (Thomas 2009: 8; see also Fischer and Brown 1996: 10-11), 
exemplified in the case of a Maya woman who was denied entry to a Guatemala City 
restaurant in 2002 for wearing traditional clothing.34  In sum, merchandise sold in urban 
retail shops and commercial centers is considered more original, more prestigious, and 
perhaps more fashionable than what most Maya men and women buy in informal 
highland markets because the politics of difference in Guatemala makes those spaces 
more difficult to traverse and makes authorized goods too expensive for most Maya 
people to afford. Boundaries that determine who can and cannot consume original 
fashion at the national level mirror global divides that structure access to fashion 
brands. As anthropologists and critical legal scholars note, IPR law consolidates the 
international division of labor that positions Northern countries as innovators, owners, 
and authorized consumers, while saddling Southern countries with the burden of 
protecting rights-holders from piracy and counterfeiting (Correa 2000: 5; Coombe 2003). 
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 This type of discrimination is common and only came to national attention because this particular Maya 
woman – Irma Alicia Velásquez Nimatuj, who holds a doctoral degree in anthropology from the University 
of Texas – filed formal charges against the establishment, publicized the case in the national media, and 
inspired international outcry against such institutionalized forms of discrimination (IIDH 2006). 
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Trademark law participates in the production of what Michael Herzfeld calls the 
“global hierarchy of value,” a system of ethics and aesthetics that, although “a more 
subtle kind of globalization than that of company logos and fast food,” comes to 
pervade local common sense in places like highland Guatemala. A defining feature of 
the global hierarchy of value is the way that “certain places, ideas, and cultural groups 
appear as marginal to the grand design. … [T]he more they protest its domination, the 
more they seem to confirm their own marginality” (Herzfeld 2004: 4). The gap between 
official frameworks and diverse local forms of moral and legal understanding is usually 
taken by legal and business scholars as an opportunity for educating local populations 
who are thought to be ignorant of the law, backwards, and uneducated. Such 
approaches ignore the ways that local understandings of what brands mean and local 
practices of appropriation are already shaped by international IPR regimes and the 
global market system. Brand names occupy a hegemonic place in the global hierarchy of 
value.  The world system premised on IPR protections is productive of piracy insofar as 
Maya people are structurally disadvantaged by neoliberal reforms but also implicated in 
the circulation of globally-popular styles and the meanings associated with them. Even 
so, in the Guatemalan highlands, the market value and cultural capital attached to 
fashion brands is read not through the lens of Western property rights that guarantee 
corporations monopoly ownership over particular words and images. The positive 
valuation of authorized goods and goods that closely approximate them – both captured 
by the term original – is understood as a function of more socially-relevant gaps of class 
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and ethnicity and spatial divides that designate who is authorized to enter formal spaces 
and who is not.   
 
The Look of Piracy 
Each time before we left Martín Cua’s garment workshop to sell his goods in 
highland markets, the ritual was the same. Martín, who is in his late thirties, operates a 
workshop housed on the second floor of a building owned by his uncle, who runs a 
tienda on the first floor and his own garment workshop in his home next door. Martín 
sells mostly to wholesalers in San Francisco El Alto. Before loading the garments into his 
beat-up Toyota sedan each Wednesday and Thursday, he would carefully inspect the 
stacks of folded sweatshirts that had been individually packaged in clear plastic bags, 
bundled by the dozen, and tied with a strip of fabric. This way of preparing the garments 
for market is ubiquitous and considered essential to what manufacturers in Tecpán call 
presentación, the way the garments will look to the market vendors and wholesalers 
who are Martín’s clients, and ultimately, to consumers. Presentación also entails the 
inclusion of a label sewn into the collar of a shirt or the waistband of pants.  These labels 
generally feature trademarked brands of multinational fashion companies, although 
there is often little regard for which brand name is used. Sometimes, producers source 
labels from print or embroidery shops. Other times, labels and even tags have been 
smuggled out of maquiladoras. Here, piracy enters the picture as a grey market trade. 
Whereas IPR law frames piracy as willful deception and bad faith (Green and Smith 
2002), the use of labels is part of the cultural practice of presentación, a local business 
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ethic where the formal and professional presentation of goods is also about the self-
presentation of the producer as a moral person who cares about his work.   
The use of pirated labels, though technically illegal, is also strategic because of 
the intense global competition that producers like Martín face from several angles. 
There are the overruns and imperfect garments coming out of the maquiladoras, 
imports from Mexico, China, and Taiwan, which often feature pirated brands, and also 
the glut of name-brand, second-hand clothing from the US that ends up in Guatemala.35 
In this environment, it is difficult to sell a garment without a label, and, more 
specifically, a label that affords some competitive advantage in a marketplace 
dominated by global brand names. It is a political economy that poses a serious problem 
for an IPR framework that essentially asks poor people in the developing world to 
privilege the property of foreign companies over their own need to make a living.   
In addition to labels and tags, most garments made in Tecpán include a pirated 
logo.  Garment manufacturers in Tecpán do not see trademarked logos the way that IPR 
law does, as signatures of authenticity or corporate ownership. They view brand names 
and logos as design elements, similar to a stripe or color combination. Brand names are 
not add-ons, but are integral to the constitution of a particular look. This is an important 
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 In spite of these authentic labels and logos, the status of second-hand clothing as original is contentious 
since many Maya people say that used clothing is dirty, perhaps even dangerous because it could be a 
vector for infectious diseases. In interviews, I found that some Maya residents of Tecpán have similar 
concerns about donated food items that arrive from the US via non-governmental organizations. These 
worries are understandable given a long history of often violent US interventions in the region, and 
especially in light of recent revelations regarding research studies conducted by the US Public Health 
Service in the 1940s in which Guatemalan prisoners and mental health patients were intentionally 
infected with sexually-transmitted diseases (Reverby 2011). 
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distinction and poses a fundamental challenge to the formulation of international 
trademark law.   
  Maya garment producers use the Kaqchikel word ruwäch, a polysemous term 
that here means “the look” of the garment, to talk about design.36 This term is also used 
in Mayan weaving. For instance, the word ruwäch refers to each design element in a 
huipil. The zig-zag and diamond designs and the stripes in the warp of a traditional huipil 
from Tecpán would each be referred to as ruwäch. The term also refers to how each of 
these elements combines to make the overall design. As noted in Chapter 3, Carol 
Hendrickson (1995) writes about the processes of borrowing and appropriation that 
characterize traditional weaving. For example, a weaver may be well-known for novel 
color combinations or using cross-stitch instead of satin-stitch embroidery for flowers 
around the necks of huipiles she makes. Other weavers might take one element of her 
improvisation and incorporate it into their own designs. What is carried over from 
traditional weaving to garment manufacturing is a sense of design practice as a work of 
combination and innovation, as well as the conceptual interdependence of the part (a 
particular design element) and the whole (the overall garment design).  Both are 
captured in a single term, ruwäch, which indexes linguistically what cannot be separated 
practically. 
 One of Martín’s staple products during my field work was a hooded sweatshirt 
cut from fleece material, featuring a zipper, pockets, and the word Hollister (an 
                                                           
36
 The term ruwäch translates literally as “her or his face,” but is commonly used to refer to both the front 
side of a textile (or other object) and its appearance. Although the term etz’abäl translates literally as 
adornment and is also used among weavers and garment manufacturers to refer to design elements, 
ruwäch is used colloquially in Tecpán. For example, it is common for weavers and garment producers to 
ask, “Achike ruwäch?” meaning “What is the textile’s design?” or “What will the garment look like?” 
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American brand name) spelled out across the chest in felt letters sewn on with an 
embroidery machine. When I asked Martín why he used the brand name Hollister on 
these garments, he replied, “Lleva menos letras que Abercrómbie [It has fewer letters 
than Abercrombie].” At a basic level, pirated logos are used by garment manufacturers 
in Tecpán because consumers, and producers, want to participate in a cosmopolitan 
trade and they are buying and selling in a transnational marketplace. When producers 
decide which logo to include, however, there are many considerations, such as current 
trends, the difficulty involved in replicating a given logo, and the cost of materials. If a 
brand name has fewer letters, for instance, it means lower costs for the manufacturer.   
In my analysis, however, the most important factor is the need to conform to a 
recognizable style. For Martín, it was either Abercrombie or Hollister because those are 
the companies that took the generic hooded sweatshirt, made it baroque and graphic, 
and popularized that look among young people worldwide. If he were making polo 
shirts, he would use a Ralph Lauren pony, because that company made the polo shirt 
embossed with an animal figure popular. IPR law protects trademarks, but what fashion 
companies actually sell is design, a combinatory “look and feel” (Bharathi 1996: 1668). 
In contemporary, globalized youth fashion, the trademarked logo is a part, a necessary 
part, of the construction of stylish designs that have recognizable currency. 
There is a great deal of contestation in IP law about the relationship between 
trademarked logos and fashion design (Hemphill and Suk 2009). Western governments 
have been reluctant to legally protect fashion works in the way that industrial designs 
 169 
 
and artistic creations are protected.37 Clothing has historically been treated as a “useful 
article” rather than an artistic one in US law, for instance, making it difficult to apply 
patent or copyright protections (Raustiala and Sprigman 2006). It is clear that Ralph 
Lauren owns the trademarked polo pony logo, but who owns the polo-style shirt? Who 
owns the particular stripe design or color combination that Ralph Lauren puts together 
for a particular polo shirt? The fashion industry is an ideal case for looking at a central 
problem in IPR debates: the question of whether an innovator owns the part or the 
whole if her innovation obviously builds on preexisting work, design, and materials 
(Dutfield 2003).  
Louis Vuitton, the French accessory maker, was the first to make the logo a 
fashion focus. In the late nineteenth century, the company explicitly incorporated the LV 
logo into the design of its leather goods to make counterfeiting more difficult (Carvajal 
2006). In the 1980s, as design piracy began to escalate largely due to the global 
integration of markets, firms like Tommy Hilfiger and Ralph Lauren followed suit by 
making their trademarked logos much more prominent features of their apparel 
designs. The small pony embroidered on the left breast of a polo shirt has transformed, 
in many Ralph Lauren designs, into a large horse emblazoned across the entire left side 
of the garment. This transformation is no accident, nor is it purely aesthetic.  If the polo 
shirt features a small figure, then the style might be copied in a way that evades the law. 
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 Western European nations have extended limited IP protections to fashion design, and the European 
Union recently harmonized these protections (Scafidi 2006: 126). Still, fashion companies rarely pursue 
litigation against copiers. This suggests to some legal scholars that a “low-IP” environment is, in fact, ideal 
for fashion since rapid and widespread availability of a particular design across market segments 
encourages the kind of forced obsolescence that, at least in part, drives fashion consumption (Raustiala 
and Sprigman 2006). 
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Using a different animal, for instance, does not infringe upon the trademark and yet 
permits the replication of the garment style. When companies integrate their logos into 
the overall design in these more pronounced ways, however, the trademarked logo is, in 
effect, the style. Pirates cannot copy the style without also pilfering the logo, which 
extends the fashion company’s authorship and ownership to include the design (Scafidi 
2006). Fashion firms have argued, with some success, that the logo becomes part of the 
garment’s “trade dress,” a legal category within trademark law that companies have 
been pushing to expand in order to protect not just the brand form but also the 
product’s overall appearance, using the argument that the product itself is “arbitrary” 
and “aesthetic,” not merely functional (Dinwoodie 1997; Bharathi 1996). This 
movement in the fashion world is not only impelled by the legal framing of trademark 
protections, but also by “modernist aesthetic ideologies among designers, who seek to 
blur those same boundaries between form and function” (Manning 2010: 41-42).   
The integration of branding and design strengthens the force of trademark 
protections.  It also, paradoxically, encourages trademark piracy when what producers 
in marginalized settings like Tecpán are trying to replicate is ruwäch, the globally-
marketed fashion design. IPR law thus reflects a misunderstanding of what is happening 
in places like Tecpán. When people in out-of-the-way places participate in “piracy,” 
stitching Hollister across a sweatshirt, they are not simply attempting to capture, steal, 
or pilfer the value of a trademarked logo. When consumers purchase that sweatshirt, 
they do not buy it just because it says Hollister. What is being bought and sold in 
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informal markets are more holistically-conceived styles, what the Maya call “a look,” 
which is to say, fashion. 
 
Indigenous Brands 
Alongside increasing levels of foreign competition and the reclassification of the 
local apparel trade as criminal, a new set of marketing strategies is emerging in Tecpán. 
A few younger garment manufacturers have recently developed their own unique 
brands based on Kaqchikel terms like b’alam [jaguar] and kem [woven textile]. 
Bernardo, a twenty-five-year-old Maya man, is looking to launch a new brand of youth 
styles called Saqkar, which means white fish in Kaqchikel. He is also considering the 
name Xarkar, meaning blue fish, because its pronunciation reminds him of the English 
word “shark,” and he wants to use a shark for the logo. Bernardo developed the logo, 
tagline, a marketing plan, a financial profile, organizational flow charts for production 
and management, and design samples, all for a business course he was taking at a 
university in Guatemala City. His father started in the garment business before the 
armed conflict and has done just well enough to help Bernardo attend weekend and 
evening courses, when he is not needed at the family workshop.   
Bernardo wants to do business under a brand name that highlights his Kaqchikel 
identity. He is active in a local political party called Qawinäq, “our people” in Kaqchikel, 
referring to indigenous tecpanecos. He identifies with an older generation of indigenous 
leaders who comprised the pan-Maya movement, a loose affiliation of activists and non-
governmental organizations that helped to shape national policy toward indigenous 
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people in the aftermath of the armed conflict (Fischer 2001; Fischer and Brown 1996). 
Using Kaqchikel terms as brands is a political move for Bernardo, who sincerely hopes 
that his clothing line will help bolster a sense of pride and affiliation among Maya youth 
who wear it. It is also a strategic business decision. Bernardo’s pursuits reflect the kind 
of multicultural politics and identity-based enterprise that John and Jean Comaroff 
describe in Ethnicity, Inc (2009). Difference, they show, is everywhere today being 
commodified by corporations and incorporated by ethnic groups. Bernardo 
commodifies Maya identity in order to capitalize on what differentiates his clothing line 
from imported garments and the clothing made by his neighbors.   
As Marilyn Strathern and Eric Hirsch note, “ownership claims emerge within a 
world of owners.” Their work in Melanesia illustrates the point. “Contemporary notions 
of ownership in Papua New Guinea are stimulated by ventures such as mining and 
logging, which bring new perceptions of assets and proprietorship over them, as does 
tourism, displays of tradition and perceptions of loss, for instance the kinds of know-
how displaced by schooling” (2004: 3). Similar processes are taking place in Guatemala. 
Land and resource rights have lately become a hotly-contested, sometimes violently-
contested, cultural issue, as Maya communities throughout the Western highlands and 
Northern lowlands stage oppositions to mining and biofuel interests attempting to set 
up or expand operations (Imai et al. 2007; Rights Action 2011a; Rights Action 2011b). 
Land and resource claims, but also claims to “heritage” and “culture” are increasingly 
posed in the language of ownership and property (Nelson 1999: 24) at the same time as 
expanding intellectual property protections have “released the notion of property from 
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its moorings in material objects” (Strathern and Hirsch 2004: 2-3). For example, pan-
Mayan activists invoke the language of cultural property in opposition to the 
Guatemalan state’s commodification of indigenous dress and language for tourism 
promotions (Warren 1998) at the same time as indigenous people themselves objectify 
and promote Maya culture in the context of international tourism and activist politics. 
Although the discourse of cultural property objectifies indigenous identity and ways of 
life in accordance with the logics of Western property regimes (Winthrop 2002), 
scholars and indigenous activists alike tend to justify this approach in terms of strategic 
essentialism (Fischer 1999).   
In a similar vein, and with a great deal of success, pan-Maya activists have 
encouraged indigenous people to use the term “Maya” rather than more local 
designations such as the name of their town or the particular Mayan language they 
speak as a source of self-identification (Fischer 2001: 247; Nelson 1999: 21). As the 
Comaroffs write, “ethnic incorporation rides on a process of homogenization and 
abstraction: the Zulu (or the Tswana or the San), for all their internal divisions, become 
one … This may not undermine ethnic identification … to the contrary, it may underline 
its importance as an object of both possibility and political struggle” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2009: 12). Performative labels such as “Maya” and “pueblo indígena” 
encourage a sense of belonging and common purpose, but also distill a remarkable 
panoply of cultural, historical, linguistic, and geographical diversity into a single signifier 
that presumably references some essential quality shared by all the people it claims to 
describe. Thus representing a unified constituency that includes over half of the 
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Guatemalan population, the term Maya serves as a kind of brand that indigenous 
activists can use to garner support from international agencies and promote a rights 
agenda on national and international levels. 
Bernardo’s attempt to capture indigeneity in the form of a brand builds on these 
foundations laid by the movement. Indeed, Bernardo is not the first to use markers of 
Maya identity to craft a brand. Apart from the use of Maya symbolism in the tourism 
industry, the Maya-owned and operated publishing company Cholsamaj and bookstores 
Nawal Wuj and Nuk’samaj in Guatemala City are just a few examples of enterprises that 
use terms from Mayan languages and Classic Maya hieroglyphs in their company names 
and logos. The proprietors of these businesses are affiliated with the pan-Maya 
movement, and their services – especially the dissemination of Mayan literature and 
information on Maya culture – are integral to the promotion of indigenous politics.  
Here, I want to raise questions about the cultural and political implications of the 
kinds of ethno-branding that are part of cultural activism in Guatemala, and especially 
the private-label branding in which Bernardo is involved. My point is certainly not to 
fault pan-Maya activists for their use of Maya symbols and signs to rally a disparate 
indigenous population around common goals. It is certainly not to blame indigenous 
leaders for deploying a unified ethnic identity to political ends and attempting to 
congeal a social movement following decades (if not centuries) of suffering and 
oppression and during a peace process that held a great deal of hope for indigenous 
Guatemalans. I am critical, however, of the ways that claims about suffering and 
assertions of political rights are channeled into particularly limiting and limited forms in 
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the back-and-forth between indigenous peoples, nation-states, and the international 
community. I am also wary of the neoliberal economic programs that have privileged 
market forces over other modes of political or economic engagement, leaving 
indigenous people with little alternative than to pitch themselves as both marketable 
commodities and business-savvy entrepreneurs.   
Rosemary Coombe (1996) contends that signs of social and cultural difference 
are transformed when used as trademarks. They are, in effect, taken out of the cultural 
commons (Brush 1999) and return to the public sphere as “jealously-guarded” signs of 
commercial distinction (Coombe 1996: 203). Bernardo told me in interviews that if 
someone else were to use his brand, it would be unethical and illegal. It would be 
piratería [piracy], he suggested, employing the politically-charged etic term rather than 
the more colloquial designations discussed in Chapter 3. Using a unique brand and 
formally incorporating his business are ways for him to avoid the threat of crackdowns 
that informal producers face, but also set him apart from them in terms of class, a 
formal relationship to the state, and a business model informed by the latest marketing 
research. When Bernardo organized a group of Tecpán’s garment manufacturers to 
attend informational meetings in Guatemala City on CAFTA in 2007, hoping to hear 
about export opportunities for domestic clothing producers, he invited only those who 
are also on a path to formal market participation. When they organized a production 
and marketing cooperative to vie for export contracts and secured a meeting with a US 
distributor, they were told their samples did not meet the requisite quality standards 
and were poked fun at for naming the cooperative “Koton” (the Kaqchikel term for 
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sweater, which was interpreted by the US businessmen as an ignorant misspelling of 
“cotton”). In response, Bernardo and others in the group complained among themselves 
and to me about the rampant informality and low degree of professionalism that they 
say characterize Tecpán’s apparel trade, blaming their fellow producers, and especially 
the ubiquitous “copiones,” for not having the knowledge and skills to manufacture an 
export-quality product. Among a certain class of educated, relatively well-to-do young 
men in Tecpán, registering their businesses and brands with the state, paying taxes, 
planning their work according to technical principles in manufacturing and marketing 
sciences, and not pirating, these are now viewed as both business strategies, part of 
what it means to be a businessman, and moral obligations, part of what it means to be a 
good citizen.   
Manufacturers who do not have access to a university education have a 
particular vocabulary for talking about the informal training they receive in the course of 
participating in the apparel trade. I often heard producers say they were doing 
“investigaciones” or “estudios” in order to understand the market and make informed 
decisions about what products to offer and at what prices. Many contend that operating 
a workshop requires “análisis” of the competition and consumer tastes. This research 
and analysis involves watching what others are doing and taking careful note of trends, 
but also learning from your mistakes and finding out what works and what does not by 
trial and error. Manufacturers characterize their method of investigation as “empirical,” 
a term that highlights that they have gained an understanding of how things work based 
on experience. They specifically contrast empirical knowledge with academic forms of 
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learning based on theory and abstraction. “We do not have schools to learn how to 
make clothing,” said one manufacturer. “Maybe in Italy or Spain they have institutes just 
for learning about the textile industry. But, here, we do things empiricamente.” Talk 
about empirical knowledge sometimes serves as a defensive commentary on the 
perseverance and aptitude of indigenous people who have largely been denied access 
to formal educational institutions. With similarities to the artisanal context explored by 
Michael Herzfeld (2004) in Crete, academic instruction is also viewed by producers as a 
poor mode of preparation for the informal marketplace where most of them earn their 
livings and where interpersonal skills and reputation matter more than book learning. 
In Bernardo’s university training, he learns Western economic concepts and 
business and marketing models that appear to him as more modern, technical and 
scientific, than the “empirical” knowledge that his fellow Tecpanecos claim based on 
experience. He even sees his own university education as a threat to the learn-by-doing 
model asserted by his father and other older garment producers. When Bernardo was 
developing his business plan, he kept his ideas a secret from family members until the 
entire project was complete, in part because he did not want to prematurely alarm his 
father and older brother, who have been the primary decision-makers for the business, 
about his plans to assert a leadership role for himself that runs counter to local norms 
privileging birth order, age, and experience. Bernardo said this about the presentation 
he finally made to his father and brothers: “For my dad, at least, it hit him hard. It was a 
lot for him – all that we needed to do, all of the changes. And what happens is that, 
since we’re not accustomed to this way of thinking, my dad says to me, ‘But how are we 
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going to do this?’ That’s the question.” In anticipation of his father’s uneasiness about 
the changes Bernardo was proposing – complete formalization and legal compliance; 
heavy investment in the development and marketing of a brand name; new roles for 
Bernardo, his older brother and younger brothers within the organization; the hiring and 
training of new employees – Bernardo had broken the plan into phases that he felt 
would be more easily digestible and had already secured a line of credit at one of the 
banks in town in his own name (a loan that depended as much on his ideas as on his 
wife’s steady work at a government office in Guatemala City). Though his plan met with 
less resistance than he had feared, Bernardo saw his ideas as directly contradicting the 
“way of thinking” that has defined his father’s approach to business. 
At the same time, Bernardo is protective of “empirical” knowledge, finding new 
value in a form of “know-how” (Strathern and Hirsch 2004: 3) now threatened by his 
own formal schooling. During dinner with Bernardo and his wife one evening in Tecpán, 
he complained about the fact that many of his professors have no real-world 
experience. They teach theories and tell the students how to run a business, he 
protested, but have never owned or managed a firm themselves. He expressed 
resentment toward the upper-class Ladino men who claim to know how to do things 
better than, say, Bernardo’s father and other family members who have lived the day-
to-day struggles of the apparel trade. There was a marked tension evident in his 
insistence that work has to be “sistematizado” (systematized) and his disdain for the 
forms of knowledge claimed by the university faculty. Sistematización is a key word in 
his courses and one that he often used in our conversations to describe the process of 
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organizing his family’s workshop in accordance with the principles of rational 
management espoused in his textbooks.  Over dinner, at least, he found resolution in 
stating that the theories become useful for him when he can test them empirically and 
tailor them to the specific context of practice in which he and his family work. Although 
Bernardo is far from claiming that “empirical” knowledge needs to be protected as a 
kind of cultural property, it is a meaningful heritage for him, one that he is careful not to 
discount or disparage outright. Talk about the value of empirical knowledge also 
provides him a discursive context for coming to terms with the spatial, class, and ethnic 
divides that privilege business theory and business professors over the learning that 
takes place in the workshop setting where he has spent most of his life. 
Beyond his plans for launching an indigenous fashion brand, Bernardo told me 
that he wants a “technical” degree in business administration or finance to prepare him 
for a career in politics. He hopes his involvement with the local political party will lead to 
a municipal office, and, perhaps eventually, to a national appointment. Since the war 
ended, Bernardo explained, Maya people have filled an increasing number of 
government positions, but these posts are almost always in the Ministry of Culture, as if 
that is the only department where Mayas can do the job, as if “culture” is all that Maya 
people know and represent. Bernardo reckons that if Maya people are trained in 
“technical fields,” they will be accepted in other departments, such as the Ministry of 
Finance, where they can have greater impact on national policy and serve as more than 
figure-heads for the multicultural nation-state. Because it is not that Maya people can’t 
do those jobs, he explains, it is just that they don’t know the proper terminology. You 
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have to know the language of finance, how to talk about budgets and currency and 
international trade, he figures, in order to be appointed to a serious government 
position. If business has become the privileged site and medium for generating and 
leveraging political power (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009: 50), Bernardo reasons that the 
best way into politics is to know business. 
Bernardo’s fetishization of the language of business and finance, his 
objectification of its terms and narratives as something he can utilize in order to 
advance his own career and achieve broader political goals fits squarely with the 
portrait of the “Maya-hacker” drawn by Diane Nelson. She writes, “Ladino identity is 
defined as modern in terms of technology and lifeways”; therefore, “any indigenous 
person who speaks Spanish, has earned an academic degree, or holds a desk job has 
historically been redefined as Ladino.” In the context of the pan-Maya movement, 
however, many indigenous people moved into cultural and political spaces traditionally 
carved out for Ladinos, but refused to relinquish their indigenous identity. These people 
are what she calls Maya-hackers. “Like computer hackers, who do not control the 
systems they work in but intimately understand their technologies and codes, the Maya 
are appropriating so-called modern technologies and knowledges while refusing to be 
appropriated into the Ladino nation” (Nelson 1999: 249). Nelson’s laudatory description 
of the older generation of pan-Maya activists applies equally well to Bernardo and his 
own activist pursuits. Yet, Bernardo’s appropriation of the modern technology of the 
brand form raises questions about the true potential for hacker politics in contemporary 
Guatemala.   
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If knowledge and technology are the stuff of modern social movements, they are 
also the currency of modern capitalism. Bernardo’s burgeoning commitment to 
intellectual property rights reveals a distinctive gap between his ideals and the political 
economy and hegemonic cultural forms that structure the “systems” in which he works. 
Is Bernardo hacking into the codes of finance and management, the “Ladino” realms of 
academia and urban space, and the mainframe of globalized intellectual property in 
order to disrupt or perhaps even revolutionize the system? Or is he caught up in a world 
wide web that promotes the commodification of culture and knowledge and a privatized 
model of capitalist enterprise as answers to the poverty and discrimination that Maya 
people in Guatemala continue to face? Is it possible for indigenous people to 
appropriate IPR to their own ends without also transforming indigeneity into something 
utterly non-indigenous – that is, a form of property that is decidedly Western and that 
might actually be threatening to an inclusive, democratic politics? Are those who pirate 
fashion brands not also Maya-hackers, re-routing the codes of modernity and the 
technologies of consumer capitalism in perhaps more radical ways than their law-
abiding counterparts? 
Bernardo’s case allows for at least some consideration of the political 
implications of ethnic entrepreneurship and indigenous encounters with IPR. Rosemary 
Coombe argues that intellectual property law “may deprive us of the optimal cultural 
conditions for dialogic practice. By objectifying and reifying cultural forms – freezing the 
connotations of signs and symbols and fencing off fields of cultural meaning with ‘no 
trespassing’ signs – intellectual property laws may enable certain forms of political 
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practice and constrain others” (1991: 1853).  Coombe is deeply concerned that although 
brands are one of the most ubiquitous and powerful symbol sets in (post)modern 
society, and although they hold enormous potential as bases for diverse kinds of social 
expression and democratic dialogue, the corporations that own brands can 
“monologically control meaning by evoking the concept of property” (1991: 1853). 
Bernardo’s Saqkar label may never become a definitive symbol of Kaqchikel or 
Guatemalan or indigenous identity. He will likely never exercise the level of semantic 
control over his fashion brand that a corporation like Gap or Nike does. Yet, his branding 
strategy reveals an emerging trend toward a more intimate, consumer politics of 
indigeneity.   
Not everyone will have access to the meanings and practices of indigeneity if 
those meanings and practices are also branded commodities. “Culture, now,” write John 
and Jean Comaroff, “is also intellectual property, displaced from the ‘museum’ and the 
‘anthropological’ gaze, no longer ‘naked’ nor available to just anyone pro bono” (2009: 
3). If the symbols of ethnic affiliation are also trademarks, then culture comes with a 
price tag. It may be more or less accessible depending on one’s purchasing power, 
making it less likely for indigenous politics to reach across class divides. Moreover, what 
the Comaroffs (2009) term “ethno-marketing” and “ethno-preneurship” is not simply a 
convergence between the politics of identity and the marketing of difference. It is a new 
phase of ethnic politics, the collapsing of political agendas into market strategies and a 
claim by indigenous people to authority and authenticity mediated not by state 
recognitions or protections but by the free market. In large measure a response to the 
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failures of broad social movements and other more traditional, politically-based efforts 
to  address conditions of poverty, inequality, or exclusion, indigenous peoples in all 
parts of the world have turned to capitalist enterprise as a vehicle of “empowerment” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009: 15). This global movement is evidence of how much 
distance now stands between the kind of radical democratic politics asserted across 
much of Latin America in the early twentieth century (Grandin 2004) and a neoliberal 
mode of entrepreneurial politics (or political entrepreneurship) now embraced – 
sometimes begrudgingly, sometimes enthusiastically – by indigenous leaders who 
nonetheless have similar passions for and commitments to justice, fairness, and 
equality.   
 
The Gender Gap 
The emergent moral divide between formal and informal manufacturers in 
Tecpán traces a socioeconomic divide constituted in part by the early successes of 
producers like Bernardo’s father before the armed conflict intensified and prior to the 
implementation of structural adjustment programs that impelled more intense forms of 
local and international competition. The vast majority of Tecpán’s garment 
manufacturers will never have access to the university education that Bernardo is 
getting. There are also important gender dimensions. In business classes, Bernardo 
learns a particular diagram of masculinity premised upon participation in formalized 
national development programs as a means of resolving the country’s social and 
economic woes.   
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Garment manufacturing is already a gendered form of work.  As I have noted, 
men are positioned as owners, managers, and salespeople. Young men operate the 
machines.  Women are relegated to hand embroidery work, sewing on adornments, 
finishing seams, or packaging garments, work that is considered either more delicate or 
easier.  Anna Tsing (1993) and others have documented the fact that the formalization 
of markets across the globe often fosters a widening of the gender gap. While Bernardo 
sees his push to formalize his business and develop Maya brands in the way that 
business and legal scholarship does, as a mode of economic development and 
“systematization,” the social construction of the Maya man as a formal business owner 
with ties to higher education and political leadership perpetuates gender divisions and 
inequalities that extend back to the colonial period.   
In a pervasive cultural politics, the Maya woman and her traditional clothing are 
appropriated as a basis for Guatemalan nationalism. Naturalized as a static custom and 
treated as a form of cultural property, her clothing distinguishes Guatemala from other 
nations, and, figured as a remnant of the past, it provides the historic depth necessary 
for the construction of a national identity (Nelson 2001: 321). The mujer maya, dressed 
in traje, also serves as a “prosthetic” for the indigenous activists attempting to 
reconstruct a body politic “from the stumps and wounded body images left by conquest 
and civil war,” writes Diane Nelson. She continues, “Maya-hackers can be modern 
because Mayan women represent tradition.”  Without such a figure to lean on, “they 
would just be Ladinos, without a valid claim for a separate cultural existence” (Nelson 
1999: 274). Maya men’s relationships to the written word rather than the woven image, 
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to modern styles rather than traditional dress, to a branded ethnic identity rather than 
association with a traditional heritage, and, in Tecpán, their position as owners of 
garment workshops rather than manual workers, mean that business ventures mediate 
the changing relationship of men to the state and civil society in ways that are largely 
unavailable to Maya women. At the same time, their ethnic identity – and perhaps more 
importantly, the economic and social value of their ethnic identity for commercial and 
political branding initiatives – is contingent on a patriarchal image of the unchanging, 
culturally-distinct mujer maya.   
Bernardo’s new clothing line is for men. Here again, his business plan 
incorporates lessons learned from the previous generation of indigenous leaders. In the 
1990s, several pan-Maya activists born in Tecpán attempted to develop a distinctly 
Maya fashion, a traditional look, for indigenous men. Notably, this did not involve the 
marketing and promotion of traditional dress styles already on the scene. The 
movement leaders did not adopt the colorful traje famously worn by men from Todos 
Santos Cuchumatán in the department of Huehuetenango or the brilliant shirts, pants, 
and belts donned by men from the lakeside villages of the department of Sololá. Nor did 
they adopt the style of traditional dress now common to only the oldest males in many 
towns throughout the highlands, including Tecpán, where a handful of elders 
complement their button-down shirts and felt hats with sandals, a wool rodillera, and 
loose-fitting, white cotton pants. It is unclear why pan-Maya activists did not broadly 
promote these styles within the movement, since they were readily available symbols of 
Maya identification. Perhaps the fact that the traje of towns like Todos Santos and 
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Santiago Atitlán have such powerful and localized geographical references made them 
less than ideal for a national movement. Perhaps the leaders felt they would not be 
taken seriously in such costumes. Carol Hendrickson writes, “The values manifested by 
the colorful, hand-woven shirts and the calf-length pants of some male traje, for 
example, do not match those of, say, blue jeans and T-shirts or suits and ties. Men in 
traje are therefore seen as ‘less’ masculine, serious, and competent” (1996: 162). Diane 
Nelson adds that when a newly-elected or named national President makes the ritual 
pilgrimage to one of these towns and dons the local dress, people often “snort that he 
looks like a payaso (clown)” (Nelson 2001: 344).  
Instead, in a move fitting for “Maya-hackers,” the clothing designs promoted and 
worn by pan-Mayan activists incorporated elements of women’s traje into Western-
styled men’s fashion. These garments displayed signs of cultural difference associated 
with the mujer maya, but in a form that simultaneously figured their wearers as modern 
and cosmopolitan. The best example of this trend was a dark-hued, casual zipper-front 
jacket designed by a close friend of Bernardo’s father and constructed of cotton cloth 
dyed in the style of a woman’s corte. The cloth was woven in Totonicapán (a K’iche’ 
Maya town) and trimmed with cotton cord from Tecpán (a Kaqchikel Maya town), 
symbolically joining together two prominent indigenous communities. The jacket was 
worn proudly as a display of Maya identity by the movement’s male leaders in the early 
1990s (Brown 1996: 174). With its production and circulation tightly controlled for 
several years, the jacket was initially “an unmistakable indicator of status within the 
 187 
 
movement” (Fischer 2001: 119). The jackets were eventually marketed to the general 
population, but never gained widespread popularity.   
Bernardo referenced these fashions – the jackets and also some sweater designs 
featuring Maya hieroglyphs that his father had developed with the jacket’s creator – 
when we talked about his plans for the Saqkar brand. He explained that those styles did 
not catch on because they did not appeal to young people, they were considered “muy 
del pasado” (from the past, meaning that they were old-fashioned, but also, quite 
literally, that the hieroglyphs and corte material referred to the past). His designs are 
decidedly forward-looking. He draws inspiration from fashion websites and the latest 
styles on sale in Guatemala City. He wants the Saqkar brand to be as much about a new 
“masculine” style as it is about indigenous identity.  So, some of the potential taglines 
he has developed for the brand include: Una nueva imagen en tu personalidad 
masculina (A new image for your masculine personality), Define tu estilo (Define your 
own style), Mejora tu imagen (Improve your image), Date un toque de originalidad (Give 
yourself a touch of originality), and Tu eres original (You’re an original). There is nothing 
particularly Maya about these slogans. The connection Bernardo hopes to make is 
subtle. His jackets, shirts, and sweaters will appeal to what he sees as truly modern 
indigenous youth: fashionable males who know the value of cultural difference. The 
brand name will serve as a bit of indigenous flair, a splash of Kaqchikel cachet, an 
original inflection on garments that are otherwise indistinct from any other hip, urban 
youth apparel. Bernardo says that the styles have to sell themselves. People will not 
wear something just because it has a Maya logo. They first have to be drawn to the 
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overall look, “ruwäch.” This is a new generation of Maya-hacker who can wear all the 
trappings of Ladino modernity on the outside, but keep his indigenous identity close by, 
on the inside, sewn into the collar of his Saqkar sweater, a secret pride that he reveals in 
a retail transaction or the purposeful flash of a tag. This is a deeply gendered approach 
to modernity, given the cultural politics surrounding indigenous women’s far-from-
subtle styles of dress. It is also the kind of intimate, consumer politics of indigeneity – 
rooted in affective labor and personal identification – that the brand form encourages. 
 
Neoliberal Brands  
Charles Hale (2002) developed the concept of “neoliberal multiculturalism” to 
describe how cultural rights claims made by disadvantaged groups have been embraced 
by the Guatemalan government, but only insofar as they do not cross over into 
demands for “control over resources necessary for those rights to be realized” (Hale 
2005: 13).  The Guatemalan state, he notes, celebrates cultural difference and 
acknowledges the cultural rights that indigenous activists have worked to secure.  It has 
done little, however, to address the structural conditions that make the vast majority of 
indigenous Guatemalans vulnerable to poverty and insecurity (Hale 2006).38   
Neoliberal reforms have also fueled ongoing transformations related to the value 
and importance of branding for contemporary market systems and induced the 
proliferation of brand excesses – the pirated and counterfeit copies, grey market goods, 
and second-hand meanings that build up along transnational circuits of affective and 
                                                           
38
 Similar findings emerge from work by Gustafson (2002) and Postero (2007) on neoliberalism and ethnic 
politics in Bolivia.  
 189 
 
material production and consumption. The forms of brand piracy practiced in highland 
Guatemala are indeed symptomatic of the kinds of transformations in global marketing 
that neoliberal economic programs have encouraged. The geographical expansion of 
trademark law has made it possible for corporations to use brands (perhaps more so 
than design or price) as a way to establish themselves in new markets. The globalization 
of labor and capital and the flexible movement of commodities across borders have 
lowered manufacturing costs, freeing up capital for brand investment and promotion, 
and loosened ties among brand owners, manufacturing sites, and consumer 
communities – all of which makes branding an increasingly important driver of profit 
(Klein 2000; Lury 2004; Nakassis n.d.). Neoliberal market reforms have increased the 
value of brand images, while processes of globalization associated with neoliberalism 
have made it more and more difficult to control appropriations of those same brands.   
In Guatemala, the brand form emerges as crucial to both national and local projects 
of re-imagining the postwar nation-state. The state and private enterprise capitalize on 
culture to create a “nation-brand” around indigeneity (Mazzarella 2003). The 
government also positions itself, at least rhetorically, as a protector of brand 
sovereignty for multinational corporations, demonstrating that the country is on the 
progressive path toward development (Vann 2006: 289). Maya pirates get lumped 
together with gang members, organized crime, and “delinquent” youth in a generalized 
portrait of blame that has proven especially useful for the political right, which garnered 
widespread support during the national elections in 2007 and 2011 for its tough-on-
crime (i.e., militarization) platform (Benson et al. 2008: 39). The Guatemalan state and 
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national elite thus profit from local “exceptions” (Ong 2006) to the neoliberal logics of 
brands and branding by laying blame for development failures at the feet of indigenous 
“pirates” said to be backward and uneducated, playing into longstanding structures of 
racism and postcolonial projects of cultural and economic assimilation. 
The trademarked brand also serves as a medium for reorienting indigenous 
entrepreneurship and Mayan cultural politics toward a formal model of national 
development. The postwar indigenous movement has been a “finger in the wound” 
(Nelson 1999) of the Guatemalan body politic, a continual reminder of racial divides, 
long-standing inequalities, and the violence of a genocidal war. Appropriations of 
indigeneity in the form of a brand, as part of a marketing strategy, conform to rather 
than challenging the legal and economic structures that foster inequality. They 
encourage the expression of indigenous affiliation through formal production and 
consumption habits, a kind of consumer citizenship (Lipsitz 2006) that perhaps takes 
away from the collectivized political mobilization that characterized the pan-Maya 
movement. Globalized IPR laws shape an uneven geography of control over the 
meanings and practices of indigeneity in postwar Guatemala while also underwriting a 
process of neoliberal marketization and a politics of criminalization and moralization 
that covers over the historical burdens and social conditions that underpin patterns of 
illegal behavior and informal economic activities. 
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Chapter Five: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law 
 
The anthropologist John Bowen (2003) applies the philosophical concept of 
“value-pluralism” to his research in Indonesia, where Islam, adat, and Western notions 
of “rule of law” all inform how rural villagers argue and deliberate about how one 
should live. Mark Goodale (2009) builds on Bowen’s work to develop the notion of 
“transnational normative pluralism,” which describes how multiple moral and legal 
frameworks come together “within the transnational spaces through which the endemic 
social problems of our times are increasingly addressed” (Goodale 2007: 3). Piracy 
production in Guatemala sits at the nexus of transnational projects aimed at 
establishing democratic rule of law in the postwar era (Sieder 2011), waves of legal 
globalization that include the spread of IPR, ongoing pressures of market liberalization 
(with its accompanying narratives on human nature and proper market behavior), and 
durable histories of marginalization affecting the country’s indigenous population. In 
Chapter 4, I explored the ways that intellectual property law is engendering new 
expectations of formality, legitimacy, and legality in Guatemala’s apparel trade. This 
process depends heavily on the integration of the law and its rationalities into non-legal 
spheres, such as higher education, social movements, trade policy, the transnational 
marketplace, and the media. This is part of the broader picture of how law has been 
joined together with international political economy, especially the fusing of economic 
models with legal principles (Posner 1978) and the way that international law is used to 
promote a particular model of capitalist development (Rajagopal 2003). Law has now 
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become a favored mechanism for restructuring and reengineering global commerce. At 
the same time, discourses of law and order, national and international security, are used 
to justify all kinds of interventions into the lives of people in the developing world in the 
interest of promoting and protecting multinational capitalism. Understanding what is 
happening in highland Guatemala’s domestic apparel trade, then, is not just about 
getting at a local context, “another country heard from” (Geertz 1973: 23). It is also 
about placing localities within broader systems of power where people have little say, 
but must contend with consequential impacts. 
In this chapter, I discuss the contemporary context of crime and violence in 
Guatemala, especially forms of physical and economic insecurity faced by apparel 
producers from Tecpán in the course of their business dealings. My aim is not to 
contribute to the “pornography of violence” (Bourgois 2001; Daniel 1996) evident across 
the national media in Guatemala, newspapers filled daily with full-color photos of the 
victims of violent crime. I highlight events and recount stories told to me by Tecpanecos 
about daily insecurities and local security strategies in order to explore the multiple 
layers of legal meaning that hold sway in this social setting. As political scientist Rachel 
Sieder notes, “Any analysis of attempts to promote the rule of law must examine what 
‘law’, ‘rights’ and ‘justice’ mean for different actors in different places and to analyse 
[sic] the interplay between broader dynamics of internationally promoted judicial 
reform and national specificities” (Sieder 2003: 141). While taking Sieder’s admonition 
as a starting point for this analysis, I also wish to trouble the simple dichotomy that she 
sets up between global systems and national differences, especially since that kind of 
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language risks reinforcing the “culture of piracy” arguments put forth in the legal and 
business literatures on IPR discussed in Chapter 1. It is true that one’s social location in 
the postcolonial global field often influences perceptions of and attitudes toward 
intellectual property and law more generally (Halstead 2002). “If you live in a college 
dorm,” Ian Condry notes, “the question is not why you don’t respect copyright law. The 
question is, how could you not share music?” (2011: 347). Dorm rooms and garment 
workshops, however, are not “discontinuous spaces,” disconnected from the wider 
world (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 33). People are differently positioned in complex and 
crisscrossing “social, business, and technological networks” (Condry 2011: 346) that 
structure economic behavior and moral sensibilities. Moreover, law is a dynamic cultural 
system (Geertz 1983; Rosen 1989, 2006), a field of engagement that resists localization. 
Law reflects large-scale historical processes and diverse relations of power and 
production (Starr and Collier 1989; Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994).   
I am interested here in the particular moralities and relationships to the law that 
take shape among members of Tecpán’s commercial class, people who are deeply 
invested in capitalist enterprise but who nonetheless have an ambivalent relationship to 
capitalist competition and First World development models premised upon free trade 
and hyperconsumption (see Chapter 3). Garment manufacturers’ marketing strategies 
often take shape around the national security context (Thomas 2009), as when they 
refuse to sell in Guatemala City for fear of being robbed or pursue market contacts in 
San Francisco El Alto because it is an “organized” town (see below). Ideologies of work 
also play a large role in how people talk about insecurity in Tecpán and in the security 
 194 
 
strategies Tecpanecos adopt to contend with crime and violence. Moreover, garment 
manufacturers’ relationships to state institutions and the law is often premised upon an 
understanding of themselves as businessmen and entrepreneurs. Security is expressed, 
often simultaneously, in economic as well as existential terms, and takes on the 
meaning of protecting oneself from the state as much as from delincuentes. This 
orientation toward the law and other state institutions reflects a multi-sided 
engagement among apparel producers with the globalized neoliberal ideology of 
entrepreneurial freedom, the kinds of “security talk” (Goldstein 2007) that animate 
national and international politics, and the deep history of violence and discrimination 
against indigenous people in Guatemala. 
 
Legal Pluralism in Guatemala 
Legal anthropological studies in Guatemala have generally followed the model of 
“classical” legal pluralism (Merry 1988: 872), focused on a dichotomy between formal, 
state law and what is alternatively labeled customary, indigenous, or traditional law.39 
This research has productively illustrated the dialectical relationship between informal 
modes of adjudication and the functioning and failures of the state’s formal legal 
institutions. It often touches on the broader social conditions in which people seek 
justice in Guatemala. What this research has not examined in depth, however, are the 
“other normative orders” (Merry 1988: 880), the spheres of moral and legal reckoning 
that lie beyond the immediate context of dispute resolution, civil courts, and criminal 
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justice but that nonetheless contribute to indigenous concepts of justice, rights, and 
obligations. The turn toward a “new” legal pluralism exemplified in the work of many 
anthropologists since the 1970s40 turns on “a rejection of the law-centeredness of 
traditional studies of legal phenomena, arguing that not all law takes place in the 
courts” (Merry 1988: 874). Such studies examine how various kinds of social regulation 
shape the law and influence people’s attitudes toward and interactions with the state 
and legal institutions. The literature on legal pluralism illustrates that the law and legal 
processes constitute and are constituted by various non-state social fields (Merry 1988: 
883; see also Moore 1973; Fitzpatrick 1983, 1984).  
Multiple legal systems and legal authorities have been institutionalized in the 
highland region since the colonial period, when one set of laws governed people of 
European descent and a second set governed the República de Indios, providing for their 
segregation and paternalist protection by the Spanish Crown. This dual system remained 
largely in effect until the liberal reforms of the late nineteenth century impelled state 
centralization together with increased militarization. Still, as political scientist Rachel 
Sieder notes, “subordinate semi-autonomous legal spheres for local confict resolution 
continued to exist within indigenous municipalities” (2003: 139). Despite the broadening 
and intensification of state power and repression during the military dictatorship of 
Jorge Ubico (1931-44) and later during the internal armed conflict, many towns maintain 
parallel legal institutions today. The municipalities of Sololá and Chiyax, for example, 
continue to elect dual local governments, one headed by the alcalde (mayor), the other 
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by the alcalde indígena (see Smith 2004). The communal authorities that comprise the 
indigenous governments of these towns commonly serve as mediators, arbitrators, and 
judges in civil disputes. Although there remains a great deal of discussion about what 
“indigenous law” comprises, some appellate and lower courts in Guatemala have now 
taken the legal systems claimed by local communities into account, even applying 
principles elaborated by indigenous authorities in their decisions. The 
institutionalization of indigenous law at national and local levels and its objectification in 
international legal agreements encourages a continued, dualistic approach to legal 
pluralism in Guatemala. 
Chiyax, a town in the Western department of Totonicapán, provides the setting 
for a now famous case of the application of derecho indígena to a criminal matter and 
an exemplary model of how “legal dualism” works in indigenous communities and in 
scholarship.41 After a series of unsolved robberies in 2003 and amidst great frustration 
with what townspeople perceived as a situation of “lawlessness” overtaking their 
community, Chiyax residents nabbed three men suspected of attempting to steal a 
home stereo system. Before police arrived at the scene, several hundred people had 
gathered and the robbery suspects had been severely beaten. Another young man was 
picked up in a nearby community and suspected of acting as the robbers’ get-away 
driver. His car was set ablaze, the young man’s clothes tossed into the flames, and he 
was paraded naked through the streets before being handed over to the police along 
with the other two suspects. Even as the public prosecutor’s office and the Juzgado de 
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Primera Instancia (the local criminal court) investigated and considered the charges, a 
discussion ensued among townspeople and communal authorities as to how they might 
try the men according to what they termed el derecho maya-k’iche’. The state judge 
presiding over the case met with communal authorities, and at the urging of the public 
defendor’s office who viewed this as an opportunity to restore faith in the judicial 
system among town residents, decided to turn the case over to them. Indigenous 
leaders heard the case in a manner loosely based on an historical document, El Título de 
los Señores de Totonicapán, guided by principles of harmony and equilibrium identified 
by community leaders as indigenous values, and under the supervision and guidance of 
a non-governmental organization and state authorities charged by the communal 
authorities with ensuring that the human rights of the accused were not violated nor 
the state penal code contradicted. After the men had been tried and sentenced to 
community labor (picking up trash) by the local authorities, the criminal court judge 
formally dismissed the state’s case to permanently settle the matter. In his statement of 
dismissal, the judge set precedent for the role of indigenous law in criminal cases. 
Noting that derecho indígena privileges reconciliation over punishment and sets out 
principles of right conduct, he argued that it must be recognized as a legitimate source 
of legal principles and procedures according to the 1985 Guatemalan constitution, given 
that document’s recognition of the collective rights of indigenous peoples and 
acknowledgement of the pluricultural character of the state. 
Communal authorities in Chiyax and the NGOs assisting their efforts appealed to 
the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Convention 169, ratified by Guatemala in 
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1995, as a basis for their right to carry out “indigenous justice.” The Guatemalan 
Congress had initially vetoed the clause that recognizes indigenous peoples’ right to 
exercise customary law, “viewing the granting of greater political and legal autonomy to 
indigenous peoples as a potentially dangerous concession” (Sieder 2003: 144). In its 
place, the Congress instituted a new “community court” system in select indigenous 
municipalities with little input from local authorities. Rachel Sieder points out that these 
local judiciaries had some success in providing “culturally accessible, bilingual conflict 
resolution,” even coordinating their efforts with traditional authorities at times. But in 
1999, the Guatemalan public rejected indigenous peoples’ right to exercise customary 
law in a national referendum,42 which limited the ability of these Juzgados de Paz 
Comunitarios to recognize local conflict resolution procedures unless they 
unquestionably fell within the parameters of Guatemala’s Penal Procedures Code 
(Sieder 2003: 145). The judge’s ruling in the 2003 Chiyax case signaled a new direction in 
the recognition of indigenous law as a meaningful and authoritative part of the national 
judicial landscape. In late 2004, a ruling by the Guatemalan Supreme Court established a 
precedent that many have interpreted as a warning to the judicial branch that “courts 
cannot ignore the jurisdictional functions of traditional authorities in indigenous 
communities nor ignore their role in adjudicating crimes and resolving conflicts” (Ochoa 
García 2009: 5, my translation).   
The recognition of indigenous law in Guatemala is part of a more general 
international trend toward “legal decentralization,” meaning the spread of alternative 
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dispute resolution models that have the capacity to increase the autonomy of local 
communities from state-centered legal systems. At the same time, as Sieder points out, 
the promotion of community-based justice in Guatemala “also effectively reduces the 
direct responsibilities of the state for legal redress in certain spheres, in effect 
privatizing law by devolving responsibility for dispute resolution to communities” (2008: 
79; Nader 1988). The risk that Sieder and others point to with regard to the current 
emphasis on indigenous law in international and national contexts is that derecho maya 
comes to function as a stand-in, an alibi, for addressing and redressing the concerns 
about “lawlessness” that Maya people in towns such as Chiyax lament. Indigenous law, 
then, needs to be understood not as a simple solution to the problems of illegitimacy 
and criminality, what Sieder (2008) calls “illegal pluralism,” confronted by Maya 
communities, but as one conceptual and practical framework that has been forged in 
the ongoing interactions among local communities, the nation-state, and international 
institutions (see Merry 1988), and through which norms, values, and, indeed, 
frustrations related to conditions of insecurity are being expressed in indigenous 
communities today (Godoy 2006; Sieder and Witchell 2001). 
 
Human Rights 
 In early 2009, a lawyer in Tecpán was shot to death in the street outside his 
office. According to witnesses, the lawyer had just unlocked his office door to begin the 
business day when a black sedan, a grey pick-up truck, and a motorcycle all pulled up 
behind him. The driver of the motorcycle fired several shots, then all three vehicles sped 
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away, leaving the man lying in the busy street, the crowds of children walking to school 
terrified by what they had just witnessed. A volunteer fireman who happened to be at 
the scene tried to help the fallen man, but there was little he could do.  
Rumor and gossip about the shooting – and the lawyer – spread quickly around 
town. Just a few hours after the murder, there was a general consensus among people 
with whom I spoke that the lawyer had been working on cases that involved “very bad 
and very dangerous people,” as one middle-aged woman who runs a tienda near where 
the shooting occurred explained to me. “If you’re going to be involved with the law, it is 
better to take casos livianos (light cases),” she said. “He was in for more than he could 
handle.” In her explanation and that of many others, there was little talk of justice for 
the dead man and his family. Blame, in fact, seemed to fall on the shoulders of the 
victim rather than the narcotraficantes who were presumed to have assassinated him. 
“He should have known better,” was a common refrain. Such accusations implied that 
the lawyer, an indigenous man from a well-known Kaqchikel Maya family and one of a 
small but growing cohort of indigenous professionals in town, had acted irrationally in 
his business dealings, becoming involved in dangerous cases out of ambition or greed. 
The discourse of envidia was not far beneath the surface of such talk.  
A few days after the shooting, a woman who works at the Centro de Salud in 
Tecpán complained as we lunched in a local comedor that the lawyer’s body had been 
left in the street for six or seven hours before authorities took it away to the morgue in 
Chimaltenango. “This is the problem in Guatemala. The government services don’t 
work. It always takes so long to get anything done.” For me, this may have resonated as 
 201 
 
part of “the problem in Guatemala,” but the assassination of the lawyer seemed at the 
time a much more pressing issue than government inefficiencies and inadequate 
services. The murder rate in Guatemala now far exceeds the average number of deaths 
per year during the armed conflict, and the context of rampant impunity, where more 
than ninety-nine percent of violent crimes go unsolved (HRW 2011), leaves most 
Guatemalans convinced that the current state of affairs will continue for some time. In 
the last three national elections, right wing parties promising an “iron fist” approach to 
security garnered widespread support. Internationally-assisted processes of institutional 
reform in the judiciary and anti-corruption campaigns in the police ranks and court 
system have yielded few tangible results for the Guatemalan people. Crime and violence 
now appear to many Guatemalans as deeply entrenched in daily life, as if a natural part 
of how Guatemala functions. More violence – a militaristic approach to rooting out the 
narcotraficantes and transnational street gangs that have overwhelmed Guatemala City 
in recent years – seems to many the only sensible response.  
Indeed, drug trafficking and the violence associated with the drug trade are 
rapidly emerging as an urgent security matter in Guatemala. A crime wave that only a 
few years ago appeared to many social scientists and observers as a kind of everyday 
violence symptomatic of the conflict’s legacy and the structural violence of neoliberal 
economic reforms can now also be read as an intensifying turf war being fought among 
drug cartels. Labeled a “narco-state” in the international media, hundreds of tons of 
cocaine move through Guatemala each year, with over US$10 billion worth of illicit 
drugs seized over the last four years inside Guatemala’s borders (López 2010; BBC News 
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2011). Observers agree that increasing legal pressure from the Mexican government has 
only pushed powerful drug cartels south into Guatemala (Beaubien 2011). Los Zetas and 
other Mexican gangs have heavily recruited ex-soldiers and special operations forces 
from the Guatemalan army into their ranks and insinuated themselves into the nation’s 
political and economic networks for protection (López 2010). Staggering incidents such 
as the September 2010 shoot-out between police and a cartel member inside Tikal 
Futura, one of Guatemala City’s busiest malls, and the May 2011 massacre of 27 
peasants in El Petén, the northern province bordering Mexico where much of the 
territorial battling is taking place, have garnered significant media coverage in the US 
and Europe. International concerns about the regional “investment climate” and effects 
on the national “development agenda” are beginning to mount (World Bank 2011). 
My field work took place just as evidence of narcotrafficking’s impact on 
Guatemalan society was surfacing. Talk about maras, that amorphous category used in 
Tecpán and throughout the highlands to reference transnational gangs such as MS-13 
that control parts of the capital city but also “delinquent youth” who stay out too late in 
the streets (Thomas et al. 2011), was slowly giving way to talk about narcos. The local 
lawyer’s death, allegedly at the hands of drug runners, signaled to many Tecpanecos 
that the drug problem was quickly becoming their problem. I was asked over and over 
during my fieldwork why people in the US use so many drugs, a question routinely 
followed by a reference to the problems of violence that US drug use seemed to be 
causing in Guatemala. 
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 I knew the family of the lawyer who was murdered in Tecpán very well, and 
when invited to visit them for the novena, a Catholic ceremony of mourning, prayer, and 
remembrance nine days after his death, I sat with his widow as she wrung her hands 
and, between fits of tears, struggled to get out a few sentences in Kaqchikel explaining 
to her mother and four sisters the predicament facing her. She was troubled by all the 
rumors circulating in Tecpán blaming her husband for his own demise because his work 
involved contact with drug and street gangs. She had met with judges in Chimaltenango 
and state prosecutors from the Ministerio Público, urging them to advance the 
investigation and also soliciting protection for herself and her children in case the 
perpetrators were not finished. Officials had coarsely advised her to pack up her family 
and leave Tecpán if she wanted to feel safer. The widow was deeply angered by the 
government officials’ unsympathetic attitudes and unwillingness to help her. She 
expressed doubt that the people who killed her husband would be caught and worried 
that her children were not safe. 
 As she talked, we heard a sound like a gunshot coming from the street, and the 
muchacha (female domestic worker) ran outside to check on the widow’s young 
children. She returned to report that the noise was evidently a firecracker, not 
surprising given the ubiquity of pyrotechnics in town, which are eagerly exploded to 
celebrate birthdays, saint’s days, weddings, and baptisms. It is not uncommon to hear 
firecrackers throughout the night in Tecpán, although there is frequent speculation 
among neighbors as to whether or not there were gunshots intermingled with the 
explosions, people constantly scanning the sensory landscape for evidence of 
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delincuentes and mareros. Knowing that the children were safe brought a moment’s 
relief, but the widow and her sisters quickly embraced in a flood of tears as grief and 
fear overwhelmed them. The mother of these women suggested that we all take a drink 
of cuxa, the locally-distilled, sugar-cane liquor, to relieve our sadness and ward off susto, 
a dangerous illness brought on by fright. As the mother poured each glass, one of the 
sisters, a trained midwife and nurse, commiserated with her sibling, saying that what 
the officials in Chimaltenango were telling her about leaving town was “una 
discriminación.” She noted that she had training in “los derechos de la mujer” (women’s 
rights), and that these include the right to live where one wants to live and to decide 
what to do with one’s family. She urged that it was not right for these men to tell her 
sister that she had to move and to deny her police protection. Even if she could not 
prove that her family was in physical danger, the sister continued, she deserved 
assistance because she was in danger of a psychological breakdown due to the trauma 
of losing her husband. 
 The language of rights is now ready-at-hand for people across the globe, 
although rights discourses have been taken up in various ways and to diverse ends by 
different populations (Merry 2001; Goodale 2009). In Guatemala, the language of 
cultural rights and indigenous rights was central to the peace process and continues to 
inform local and national politics. As one Maya cultural activist commented to me, “No 
one talked about ‘rights’ when we first started [in the 1970s], but now we know that is 
what we were seeking.” Women’s rights are an important discourse in Tecpán because 
of the efforts of various international and national NGOs, which hold training workshops 
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like the one for midwives that the widow’s sister had attended. Women’s rights offer a 
new vernacular in which women often negotiate and make sense of their roles in public 
and private spheres. The term is invoked among women to parse out everything from 
proper courting behavior to reproductive health issues to one’s relationship to the state. 
In a country where domestic violence is “widespread” (IRBC 2005), where the Catholic 
Church continues to dominate conversations about family planning and women’s 
health, and where issues of gender discrimination have so often been obscured and 
suppressed even within the indigenous rights movement (Warren 1998), the 
proliferation of talk about women’s rights could be seen as an important step toward 
raising awareness about gender equality.  
Children’s rights were also a topic of popular discussion during my fieldwork, in 
part because of a highly-visible publicity campaign staged by an international NGO that 
included rather vague messaging about “los derechos del niño” on signs along the Pan-
American Highway. A few primary school teachers in Tecpán complained to me that 
they could no longer discipline the children in their classrooms because of all the 
attention given now to “rights of the children” and “rights of the parents.” One 
explained that a colleague had physically disciplined a fourth-grader after the child bit 
her arm. When she called the child’s parents in for a meeting to discuss the incident, the 
parents complained that the teacher had no “right” to hit their child and that they could 
report her to the authorities for abuse. To the teacher recounting this story, the case 
served as evidence that “things are getting really bad with everyone having so many 
rights.”  
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The term “human rights” often takes on a negative valence in Guatemala. 
Human rights are conceptualized by many Guatemalans as stumbling blocks to justice, a 
set of protections that seem to apply to delinquents more than to law-abiding citizens, 
and which impede the prosecution and punishment of criminals. An older apparel 
manufacturer from Tecpán expressed such concerns as we talked about the dangers of 
selling goods in Guatemala City’s wholesale markets.  
It’s been a long time since I sold in Guatemala City. Things have been bad there 
for a long time. I don’t remember when it was, maybe fifteen years ago. I was 
robbed three or four times in one year. One time, I was just travelling through, 
looking for a bus back from Esquipulas. I had to stay overnight in Guatemala City. 
I got up at six in the morning, and when I was waiting for the bus, just like that, 
they grabbed me and took all my money. They left me half-dead. When I woke 
up, I went straight to the hospital because I was couldn’t stand the pain. 
Guatemala City is tough right now, even worse than before. Now, the thieves are 
taking over. And the government doesn’t do anything. They let them go, 
because, it’s like this: Human Rights43 are what is helping them. There’s no law. 
There’s nothing. The police grab them, but what for? They take them in [to jail], 
but there are others walking out at the same moment. Now they’re killing 
people in Guatemala City every day, and no one is doing anything, as if they 
were animals.” 
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With more than twenty percent of the population living in the capital region, Guatemala 
City is an important center of commercial life. Rising crime rates discourage many 
producers from selling there, however, especially smaller-scale workshop owners who 
do not have the provisional safety of their own automobiles for traveling back and forth 
and making deliveries.  As with the gossip that surrounded the lawyer’s death in Tecpán, 
blame for crime and violence is often directed not just at the criminals themselves, but 
also toward individuals and institutions viewed as promoting criminal activity through 
their actions. Indeed, this producer expresses a common perception that “Human 
Rights” encourage crime. Bail and due process are viewed as unfair privileges granted to 
people who are “known” criminals, who are said to be released in spite of the fact that 
they were caught “con las manos en la masa” (with their hands in the dough). In point 
of fact, Guatemala’s “failed prison system” operates at 170 percent capacity, making it 
difficult to keep even convicted prisoners behind bars for the full length of their 
sentences (O’Neill 2010).  
Human rights are often contrasted by scholars and citizens in Guatemala with 
the swift justice meted out by local communities in the practice of derecho indígena. As 
anthropologist Stener Ekern writes, “Many Mayas find the work of human rights 
activists – governmental or nongovernmental – to actually reproduce and even to 
further state power in their communities and therefore conclude that, at least locally, 
human rights are out of place” (2008: 126). He interprets indigenous people’s concerns 
about human rights as evidence of a suspicious attitude toward the state conditioned by 
histories of state violence and discrimination. Ekern cites Maya leaders in Totonicapán 
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who say that “human rights favor the guilty” and who express concern that the legal 
system’s emphasis on human rights comes at the expense of a more locally-salient 
emphasis on respect for community obligations (2008: 136). The critique of human 
rights in Guatemala is not limited to indigenous Maya, however. While I found that 
Tecpanecos are concerned that “derecho kaxlan” (state law)44 poses a threat to 
community stability, these concerns were expressed in terms of the safety and security 
of family members and neighbors and not necessarily in terms of “indigenous” justice. 
Indeed, explanations for the resistance to human rights evident among the Maya that 
are based on local or national cultural difference fail to take into account the 
widespread circulation of such critiques across ethnic groups throughout Latin America 
and the Caribbean.45 As the anthropologist Daniel Goldstein (2007) argues, reactionary 
stances against human rights in Latin America are not always attributable to “culture,” 
nor are they evidence of romantic resistance movements among indigenous citizens or 
the poor. Rather, attention to human rights seems to many Latin American citizens to 
directly contradict the discourse of security and “talk of crime” (Caldeira 2001) that 
permeate local conversation and which powerful groups continuously exploit to further 
national political campaigns and international development agendas. In the context of 
so much “security talk” (Goldstein 2007: 50) that is also a mechanism for displacing 
blame from governments and world capitalist systems onto the backs of individual 
“criminals,” many Latin Americans – faced with the kinds of insecurity that neoliberal 
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 In Kaqchikel, kaxlan refers to both Ladinos and foreigners, so the phrase encompasses laws that come 
from outside of Maya communities (i.e., state law) as well as international law.  
 
45
 See Tate 2007; Speed 2008; Goldstein et al. 2009; and Smulovitz 2003. 
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capitalism and the war on drugs have deeply entrenched in daily life – tend to view 
certain rights frameworks as contributing to the problem. “Children’s rights,” for 
instance, appear as a gateway to delinquency, and “Human Rights” seem unfair 
protections for people who pose a danger to local communities. 
 
Local Dangers 
Despite their discontent with the state judiciary and suspicious attitudes toward 
human rights and government institutions, Maya people in Tecpán have an ambivalent 
relationship to indigenous law, and many do not see it as a welcome alternative to 
derecho kaxlan. In popular discourse throughout Guatemala, indigenous law is often 
equated with lynching.46 The kind of violence carried out by Chiyax residents in the 
immediate aftermath of the suspected thieves’ capture, for example, tends to 
overshadow, in the popular imagination, the procedures and values the community 
leaders enacted and espoused in the course of carrying out the trial. Social scientists 
tend to frame the incidence of lynching as an inevitable outcome of the internal armed 
conflict – the enduring social and psychological trauma it caused and the militarization 
of daily life it impelled through institutions such as the Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PAC) – 
and the social and economic conditions of the postwar period, including widespread 
impunity, a lack of access to formal judicial institutions, socioeconomic inequality and 
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 See, for example, a news story in Guatemala’s Prensa Libre (Castillo et al. 2011) in which a 
representative of the President’s Commission on Human Rights describes a recent lynching incident in the 
majority-indigenous department of Huehuetenango as the people “quenching their thirst for justice” (my 
translation). There were at least 500 cases of lynching in Guatemala between 1996 and 2002, and these 
incidents are a favorite topic of the national media, exploited in colorful images of burning cars and 
beaten bodies. 
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chronic poverty.47 Lynching and other forms of collective violence have been associated 
in much of this literature and in the Guatemalan media with indigenous people and the 
rural regions they inhabit. Meanwhile, fifty-three percent of lynchings and attempted 
lynchings reported in 2008 occurred in urban areas, mostly in the capital department of 
Guatemala (Camus 2011: 65). 
In Tecpán, people with whom I spoke described a fine line between indigenous 
law and “dangerous” tendencies in many towns toward violent reprisals against 
suspected gang members and criminals. Miguel Tecúm, the thirty-five-year-old garment 
manufacturer introduced in Chapter 2, described what he called “el castigo Maya,” 
Mayan punishment, in starkly negative terms.   
It’s not that the Mayas were always like this. El castigo Maya is what the 
indigenous people do over there in Sololá and Quiché. The indigenous 
municipalities have it as a kind of rule that when a person is captured, they tie 
him up and put him in the center of the plaza and, in a public display, they whip 
him [lo azotan] … they punish him, take his clothes off, and beat him. In Tecpán, 
we’re not capable of that kind of thing.  We say that those people are backwards 
[atrasadas].”  
He adds with a sly nod toward my anthropological studies, “Like cannibals.” I point out 
that no one is being eaten. He laughs and continues,  
Well, we say they’re backwards. I mean, not moderate. And they don’t go along 
with our principles, our religious principles here in Tecpán. For us, our religion 
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 See, for example, Godoy 2002, 2006; Fernández García 2004; Handy 2004; Adams and Bastos 2003; and 
Kobrak and Gutiérrez 2001. 
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doesn’t permit us to act like that, and our customs don’t allow it either. Over 
there in Sololá, they still have a lot of respect for their ancestors, really. So, the 
custom from long ago, before there were any police, was immediate 
punishment. In Quiché, the immediate punishment is to burn the criminals. 
Miguel points to his Catholic faith as a source of principles for dealing with 
questions of justice and punishment. He also contrasts the “customs” in Tecpán with 
those of the departments of Sololá and Quiché. In other conversations, Miguel, like 
many other garment manufacturers, expressed to me that Tecpán has lost much of its 
traditional values and ways of life because of the growth of commerce and industry (see 
Chapter 3). Here, this distinction between Tecpán and other, more traditional regions, 
takes on a positive valence and is evidence of the complex relationship that garment 
manufacturers have to the various meanings of indigeneity in Guatemala. Indeed, it is 
reflective of the complex politics of indigeneity that, in large measure, defines 
Guatemala as a postcolonial nation-state. At once, there is the long-standing “Indian 
problem,” the idea that Maya people – poor, uneducated, mired in tradition, inferior in 
every way to Ladinos – pose an obstacle to the state’s social modernization and 
economic development (Handy 1989). This “problem” has been addressed in various 
ways by the nation’s elite, from assimilation projects during the liberal periods of the 
nineteenth century to the genocidal violence of the armed conflict. At the same time, 
resistance to such a characterization among long-suffering Maya men and women, who 
have often turned inward and congealed their own bonds of solidarity and community 
for protection against racism and discrimination (Smith 1995), has been bolstered by the 
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work of indigenous activists and the significant international support garnered by the 
pan-Maya movement. Indigeneity has emerged in the post-war context as an objectified 
identity that offers significant symbolic capital. 
Tecpanecos occupy an ambivalent location in relation to these competing 
portraits of indigeneity. Edward Fischer writes that, since colonial times, Tecpán “lay on 
the border between the Indian and Spanish worlds” of Guatemalan society (2001: 51), 
situated close enough to the Spanish and later Ladino-dominated capital region to 
facilitate access and exchange, but also serving as a gateway to the indigenous West. 
The departments of Sololá and El Quiché, which border Tecpán’s municipal boundaries, 
are part of the Western ethnoscape, conceptualized as more indigenous, more rural, 
more remote, and more closely linked to tradition in the national spatial imaginary.48 In 
Miguel’s discussion, this spatial distinction takes on temporal dimensions as well. He 
says, “the Maya,” among whom he counts himself, “weren’t always like that,” and yet 
situates practices of community justice as part of a shared past, a time before 
modernity, “before there were any police.” Lynching here is both evidence of the 
contemporary problems of insecurity in Guatemalan society, having made the Maya into 
something they haven’t always been, and also evidence of the backwardness and 
perhaps backward-looking tendencies among Maya who have not adapted their 
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 I refer here to Ghassan Hage’s (1996) concept of the “spatial imaginary,” which emphasizes how 
particular kinds of space, such as the nation or the city, are thought to have particular qualities and how 
senses of community and belonging are often mapped onto geographical spaces. As part of the 
Guatemalan national spatial imaginary, it is interesting to note that anything outside of Guatemala City is 
referred to as “El Interior” by capital-city Ladinos, despite the fact that the capital sits near the 
geographical center of Guatemala. The term connotes, therefore, the kind of colonial geography that 
associates modernity with the colonized coast, and indigeneity or “the primitive” with the uncharted, 
inner regions of the continent and the colonial subject (Said 2008).   
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customs to modern times or transitioned from the ways of “their ancestors” to the 
norms imposed by institionalized religion and state law.  
 Other garment manufacturers with whom I spoke idealized “immediate 
punishment” as the answer to the kinds of insecurity that threaten commerce and the 
social order more generally, though many also expressed a similar ambivalence related 
to whether or not it is an appropriate way for people to behave. Jorge Costop, the 
young man who so adamently defended his practices of copying sweatshirt designs (see 
Chapter 3), talked with me about issues of security related to selling in the market in San 
Francisco El Alto. 
The market in San Francisco is the biggest in Central America. Twenty million 
quetzales move through there each week. In December, when trade is really 
lively [because of the holiday season], there are lines at all the banks. Everyone 
wants to deposit the money he made that day so he doesn’t have to risk being 
robbed on the highway, because people rob the buses all the time. But in town, 
the people are really organized. That’s why there are so few thieves in the 
market. If the people there see a thief, he won’t make it more than three blocks 
before they grab him. Now, in the capital, if they see a thief who is robbing 
someone, they don’t do anything. San Francisco is a really small town, but very 
organized, and the economy is huge! 
As we talked in his workshop, he turned away from the table where we were standing to 
answer a question from the cortador. The teenage boy is not sure which colors of fabric 
he should cut next for the seamsters. Once Jorge relayed a few instructions, we picked 
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up our conversation. I asked him whether people in Tecpán are organized the way they 
are in San Francisco. He said they are not, and lifting his gaze from the finished 
sweatshirts he had been folding, looked me in the eye to ensure that I got his meaning.  
Here, people are afraid. Look, there are two things. A lack of education makes a 
person do a lot of things that are wrong. Here, we know that people have rights, 
and we have respect for life. But, there [in San Francisco], maybe because people 
work so much, and that makes them very violent, and because they are 
uneducated, they take the laws into their own hands. They even burn people – 
they’ve burned them! So, here, our town is known as a tranquil town. If you 
walked around with your backpack in other towns, when you sat down, they 
would grab it. People aren’t organized because they don’t have to be. But in 
other places, people are organized because it’s necessary.49  
Jorge’s initial enthusiasm for the level of “organization” among the people of San 
Francisco quickly fades when he begins to explain why the same is not true of Tecpán. 
Perhaps motivated by my status as a gringa, who he no doubt suspects is aligned with 
“Human Rights,” he sets out to clarify this difference. First, this young man, who 
completed some high school training (much more than his grandfather who helped him 
get his start in the garment trade), emphazes the importance of education. There are 
similarities here to how IPR scholars talk about the need for educational programs to 
promote respect for trademark law (see Chapter 1). The idea so common to the legal 
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 As Judith Zur (1999) notes, the Guatemalan state has a history of suspicion with regard to “organized” 
indigenous communities. The formation of agricultural cooperatives, cultural groups, and peasant unions 
were all viewed by the government as “subversive” actions in the aftermath of the 1954 coup and often 
served to justify violence. 
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and business literatures that people must be ethically reoriented to proper behavior 
through a process of informed reasoning does not actually resonate, however, with this 
manufacturer’s comments. Significantly, he does not argue that people in Tecpán do not 
lynch criminals because “people have rights,” but because “we know that they have 
rights.” There is a distancing, an objectification of the discourse of rights evident here, in 
which Jorge claims access to modern forms of knowledge and acknowledges the power 
of rights discourse to define proper and improper behavior, albeit without 
substantiating or endorsing those forms of knowledge. In effect, he refrains from 
embracing the rights project as his own politics and ethics.  
Jorge engages in the same kind of stereotyping as Miguel, characterizing those 
people up “there” as more violent and less educated that Tecpanecos. San Francisco El 
Alto is even further west than Sololá or El Quiché, a sure indication of its backwardness 
according to the national spatial logic. Still, San Francisco shares Tecpán’s history of 
commerce and enterprise. For Jorge, this is a dangerous combination. People from San 
Francisco “work so much,” he comments, “which makes them very violent.” Possibly 
basing this comment in a personal sense of economic frustration that he feels with 
regard to his own hard work in the garment trade, Jorge also participates in a logic that 
equates commerce with a loss of values, even a loss of the physical and spiritual 
“balance” associated with agricultural labor, which many Maya people say keeps a 
person healthy (both physically and in the context of the social body), centered, and 
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sane.50 Thus, collective violence takes shape in Jorge’s explanation not simply as a 
symptom of ignorance and backwardness, but as a response to the conditions of 
intensive capitalist competition, the pains of the consignment system, and the long 
hours of difficult factory labor that characterize work in the apparel trade. In keeping 
with this view, then, the tranquility he ascribes to Tecpán comes not from some innate 
quality of Tecpanecos or their proximity (spatial and symbolic) to the center of modern 
life in Guatemala. Rather, Tecpán is not as big of a market. The volume of trade is not 
nearly as high as in San Francisco, which means that thieves don’t have as much to steal, 
but also that people are not as unbalanced as they are in the midst of a market that is 
“the biggest in Central America.” 
 
Living Off of Others 
 Tecpán may be known as a tranquil town, but locals are increasingly concerned 
about the presence of delincuentes and mareros. In at least three of the town’s four 
central barrios, men have organized into neighborhood watch groups and regularly 
“hacer rondas,” walking through the streets at night to investigate any suspicious 
activity and “prevent crime,” as Miguel explained to me. A prominent businessman in 
his barrio, Miguel is actively involved in his neighborhood organization and participates 
in weekly patrol shifts. Neighborhood watch associations are common around the 
world, from US suburbs (Low 2003) to Brazilian favelas (Caldeira 2001). Yet, there is a 
                                                           
50
 On the importance of the concept of balance to indigenous senses of self and well-being across the 
Mesoamerican region, see Carlsen and Prechtel 1991; Boramanse 1993, 1998; Monaghan 1995; 
Watanabe 1992; Fischer 2001. 
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particular relationship between these organizations in highland Guatemala and the 
nation’s recent history. In the mid-1980s, after the Guatemalan military had weakened 
the guerrilla movement and decimated indigenous towns with its scorched-earth tactics, 
people throughout the highland region were forced to hacer rondas as members of local 
Civil Self-Defense Patrols and surveil their neighbors. Tecpanecos insist that the 
neighborhood watch organizations they are forming now are utterly distinct from the 
PAC and disconnected from that history. They point to the fact that people had no 
choice but to serve as patrulleros (patrollers) during the conflict, and that the military 
was in charge of those organizations, providing training, arms, and enforcing 
participation. Patrulleros were not protecting their communities, insisted Miguel, but 
following orders. They were forced to report on neighbors who were not abiding by 
government curfews or limitations on civic associations. The PACs also provided the 
opportunity for people, especially the comisionados selected by the military 
commanders as local leaders, to accuse local rivals of subversive actions.51 In contrast, 
Miguel and others told me, neighborhood watch associations are voluntary, democratic, 
and unarmed. Yet, current desires for increased security are often expressed and 
experienced in relation to the wartime context. Many highland residents, for example, 
express nostalgia for the 1980s, when, they say, heavy-handed political administrations 
kept the streets clear and the civilian crime level low. This is a common reason cited 
among Maya men and women for their support for former-dictator Efráin Rios-Montt’s 
presidential bid in 2003 and for former-general Otto Pérez Molina’s popularity in the 
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 For more on the patrol system and its abuses, see Manz 1988; Paul and Demarest 1988; and Schirmer 
1998.  
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2007 and 2011 elections (Benson et al. 2008). Neighborhood associations are, at least in 
part, an attempt to regain certain feelings of security and control associated with the 
conflict era’s empty streets and narrativized in terms of cohesive families, obedient 
youth, and organized communities. 
 Neighborhood watch patrols sometimes harrass and even assault young men 
who are presumed to be criminals simply because they are out in the streets after dark. 
There have also been attempted lynchings and other episodes of collective violence 
directed toward suspected criminals in Tecpán. In 2009, at least two cases of near or 
attempted lynching took place, one directed toward a young man accused of stealing 
meat from a local butcher shop, the other against a group of young men caught 
breaking and entering in a home on the outskirts of town. In the latter case, the young 
men were bound, beaten, and doused with gasoline, although “no one dared” light 
them on fire, as one man explained to me, because “if you commit that crime, it doesn’t 
matter if the thief is guilty. Killing someone is a major offense, and that’s a problem that 
it’s better to just avoid.” Human Rights and rule of law figure as obstacles to swift justice 
in this man’s account. Everyone with whom I spoke about these two cases – even 
people who were standing by as others tied up the young men and beat them – 
expressed doubts, however, about the ethics of the harsh treatment the suspected 
thieves received at the hands of community members.  
 Many of my conversations with apparel producers and others in Tecpán turned 
to the causes and consequences of delinquency. “Here [in Guatemala], people want to 
have their own things, but they don’t work,” asserted Alberto Ixim, the small-scale 
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garment manufacturer introduced in Chapter 2, as we talked about the extortion 
threats that he and others in Tecpán have received in recent years. These threats follow 
a general pattern. The extortionist calls up a business owner, threatens his family 
(whom he claims to have been following for some time), and demands a one time or 
regular payment deposited in a bank account or dropped off at a set location. In 
Guatemala City, these kinds of arrangements have become common place for bus 
drivers and store owners in many neighborhoods. Impuestos, or “taxes” paid to local 
gangs, are a cost of doing business in urban and, increasingly, rural Guatemala. Alberto 
described this widespread phenomenon in terms of the personal pathologies that lead 
youth into an “easy life” of crime. Several manufacturers in Tecpán similarly commented 
to me that the problem of delincuencia is a problem of work ethic. They explained 
incidents of home invastion and robbery, pickpocketing in the busy municipal market, 
even alcoholism and fist fights in terms of the laziness and selfishness of young people.  
Although Tecpanecos talk about crime and violence as national problems, they 
were also eager to root local incidents in the particular history of their town. An older 
garment manufacturer told me the story,  
There used to be a finca outside of town. The man who owned it had fincas on 
the coast, too. Our whole raza went to work on the coast, worked for many 
years. One day, this man says, “Leave.” “But we’ve given a large part of our lives, 
so give us somewhere to live.” “Okay, I will,” he says. So he divided up the finca, 
and I don’t know if he gave it to them or sold it to them, but everyone who was 
working on the coast came here to that land. They made it into a colonia. So 
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those people have all the bad habits from over there [de por allá], and that’s why 
they turned into mareros. They love to assault people and steal. That’s another 
lifestyle [rollo], but they’re indigenous people, just like us. 
The colonia to which he refers, known as La Giralda, has grown over the last two 
decades to include a couple of hundred homes constructed of block and sheet metal, 
mostly along dirt paths that cut through fields toward the mountain range on Tecpán’s 
northern edge. People living in the center of town often cautioned me against visiting 
the several dozen garment workshops scattered among these houses or even walking 
along the street leading to the colonia. The general consensus among Tecpanecos who 
do not live there is that La Giralda is overrun with gang activity. The older manufacturer 
recounting the story of the colonia’s founding continued the tale by offering an 
explanation for why its inhabitants, many of whom were originally from Tecpán, turned 
to crime and violence.   
Things are different on the coast. The system of work is different. There, you get 
up early, and because of the heat, by eight or nine o’clock in the morning, all you 
can do is rest. So, they pass the whole day doing nothing. Well, all of a sudden, 
they’re getting into trouble everyday. It’s like that sometimes when you have 
free time. It’s just what comes to you to do, what is not correct. So, this was 
about fifteen years ago, and it started to cause problems. The kids were drinking, 
doing drugs, hanging out in the streets, robbing people. I think the problems we 
have today are rooted in that. The seed was planted years ago. Now it’s a way of 
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life for the kids: hanging out, wearing black, and messing around (fregar) on the 
weekends. 
In this man’s narrative, shared among so many town residents, problems and 
problematic social types come from some other place, outside of Tecpán’s social and 
geographic boundaries. Delincuencia is understood in terms of spatial and social 
disjunctures between the highlands and the coast, and between the rhythms of work in 
each setting. Work is a principal causative agent in the illness models that many Maya 
people in Guatemala share (Cosminsky 1977). The harsh conditions of plantation labor 
(as opposed to milpa agriculture in the highlands) make one especially vulnerable to 
sickness, many say, given that the hot, humid climate, distinctive plant and animal life, 
and difference in diet on the coast all compound the effects of the work itself, leaving 
the person’s natural and metaphysical defenses against disease and disability 
dangerously weak (see McCreery 1994; Offit 2011). It is not surprising that conditions 
believed to produce physical illness are also invoked to explain the moral defenciencies 
of these migrant workers, given the complex relationship between psychophysical 
factors, emotional states, and moral actions that researchers have identified as central 
to illness models in Guatemala (Cosminsky 1977). For example, nervios, a common folk 
illness in Guatemala, is said by sufferers to be caused by anger or emotional trauma, and 
is sometimes interpreted in terms of a moral failure to control one’s emotions (Low 
1985). Illness is also commonly explained by Maya men and women as a punishment for 
“angry living” (Brintnall 1979). There are interesting similarites here to how Ladino 
residents of Guatemala City explain crime and violence in urban colonias. As the 
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anthropologist Manuela Camus (2005) notes, capitalinos say that Maya men and 
women who move to the city from the countryside become corrupted not only by 
delincuentes who prey on their naivete, but also because they become unmoored from 
the moral and social structures of agrarian life. They “get lost” in the unfamiliar terrain 
of the city (Camus 2011: 59). The cultural importance of place as a determinant of 
identity, morality, and health and the close association between forms of work and ways 
of life evident cross the ethnographic literature on the Maya (see Chapter 2) come 
together in these tropes of spatial displacement, disorientation, and corruption.  
 Part of the story of plantation labor in Guatemala is the harsh work conditions 
and pestilent climate of the coast. The older manufacturer’s story recounted above also 
cited an abundance of “free time” as a major factor in shaping the morality of people 
now residing in La Giralda. This was indeed a common theme in explanations of 
contemporary crime in Tecpán. Another producer commented to me, “This is why there 
is so much violence, robberies, extortion, impuestos, all of that: because they want to 
have things, but they can’t have them, not because there is no work, but because they 
want things to come easy.” He continued with a modified version of the story of the 
finca owner, this one focused on the rich man’s family.  
That’s what happened with some folks who lived on a finca nearby, whose father 
owned the land, and he provided work for the indigenous people, and his 
children just watched. We watched those people, and how they have all grown 
up. They make all kinds of trouble. They live disordered lives. 
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He paused, then added, “People just want to live off of others (quieren vivir de la 
gente).” Deep histories of forced labor and inequality come together in these tales that 
link contemporary problems of crime and violence with a particular lifestyle encouraged 
by the accumulation of land and capital. It is significant that in the earlier story, people 
in La Giralda were displaced from their native lands by the plantation system and also 
given land by a rich patron. It is important here that wealth led a second generation of 
landowners to lives of “trouble” and “disorder.” In keeping with the discourse of envy 
discussed in Chapter 3, the fact that people “live off of others,” deriving benefits at the 
expense of neighbors – the very structure of capitalist exploitation mimicked here in 
criminal exploits – makes delincuencia more than a physical security threat. It is also a 
moral problem akin to envidia and just as threatening to social stability and community 
solidarity. 
The notion that crime mimics formal, legal systems and the economic systems 
they support finds purchase in other stories told to me by Tecpán’s manufacturers. For 
example, many compared contemporary threats of extortion to the road blocks set up 
along the Pan-American Highway during the armed conflict, where armed soldiers 
demanded money or valuables for passage. This practice continues today among 
national police who stop drivers to demand bribes. Not only do legal and illegal actors 
engage in the same sorts of crime. As suggested by stories about how the plantation 
system fomented criminal behavior, extortion and theft are also echoes of the kinds of 
“plunder” (Mattei and Nader 2008) that colonial political structures and postcolonial 
rule of law have allowed in Guatemala, including the confiscation of community lands 
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and the exploitation of indigenous labor. John and Jean Comaroff highlight this 
relationship between official systems and criminal behavior in their account of the 
increasing crime rates evident in many postcolonial settings. They write, “[The] latter-
day coming of more or less elected, more or less representative political regimes – 
founded, more or less, on the rule of law – has, ironically, brought with it a rising tide of 
lawlessness” (2006: 1). As the monopolization of force by authoritarian regimes gives 
way to what I have described elsewhere as the “neoliberalization of violence” (Benson 
et al. 2008), those who are “excluded from the spoils” of neoliberal capitalism, continue 
the Comaroffs, “do not so much repudiate the rule of law or the licit operations of the 
market” as appropriate the very forms of democratic governance and market systems to 
create “parallel modes of production and profiteering, sometimes even of governance 
and taxation, thereby establishing simulacra of social order” (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2006: 5, 9). Impuestos are paid more faithfully to gang members than to state agencies 
in Guatemala, a fact that is justified by garment producers in terms of government 
corruption. “A million quetzales in the pockets of some official are gone in under a year, 
spent on failed projects and luxuries,” said one manufacturer. He continued, “A hundred 
quetzales in the pockets of an entrepreneur, it multiplies. The official who steals is really 
the guilty one.” Drug traffickers have taken over large sections of Guatemala’s northern 
departments as well as capital city neighborhoods, acting as sovereigns over these 
territories in order to move cocaine and other illicit drugs northward. The transition 
from authoritarianism to nominal democracy created a security vacuum insofar as the 
post-war police force and judicial system have never been sufficiently funded (Glebeek 
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2001; Sieder 2003; Thale 2011). With similarities to the Colombian case, violence and 
security have now become two sides of the same coin, with private security forces hired 
by the nation’s elite and ex-military enlisted by drug cartel bosses patrolling the streets 
and maintaining their own “simulacra of social order” (see Laplante and Theidon 2006).  
 If lawlessness is a simulacrum of the models of law and order promoted by the 
state and international institutions, local forms of delincuencia are also viewed by many 
Tecpanecos as copies of the “real” crime that plagues the capital city. Threats of 
extortion and violence against garment manufacturers in Tecpán are often serious and 
indeed dangerous. In one case, a young seamster at a large workshop was identified by 
police as having been involved in a kidnapping in Chimaltenango, and although 
subsequently arrested, began making threats through his accomplices to the workshop 
owner and his family. At the same time, there is a sense among many producers that 
youth adopt the dress styles and bodily hexus of delincuencia that they see in the media, 
perhaps even engaging in petty criminal activity due to pressure from peers, but that 
their delinquency is merely an imitation of the criminal lifestyle. They are, in effect, 
copycats. A young manufacturer who said he knew many of the supposed delincuentes 
who hang around the corners in their baggy jeans said to me,  
There are some kids here who don’t have any power, who just imitate others but 
don’t do anything. They are kids who imitate, they do drugs and all that, but they 
don’t kill anyone. Sometimes they grab a person and extort money from them, 
from people who come from the aldeas. They grabbed my brother once, and he 
told me, so I went with him and told them to back off. So, maybe they tried to 
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get money from people here [in town], but the people didn’t let them, so they 
started up with people from the aldeas. 
He implies here that people from the aldeas, more naïve about youthful pranks and 
perhaps less able to discern between the “original” criminals and the “imitations,” give 
in to demands for money more easily than residents of the town center. In other stories 
I was told about experiences of crime and violence, this ability to distinguish between 
real and fake threats was an important dimension of how people contend with 
insecurity. The owner of a well-known workshop that specializes in men’s sweaters 
recounted how he had received a phone call from a man demanding a thousand 
quetzales. “It was extortion. And because I didn’t know any better – one gets confused 
and doesn’t know how to handle things – so I paid them.” He goes on to describe how, 
after additional phone calls and payments, he began to sense that the threats the caller 
was making against him and his family were not real, and ventured to gamble on that 
feeling.  
They called again and told me the same story over and over, a story about how 
they are with an organized crime ring, that they know me, they know when I 
come in and when I go out, they know my family … and they need this amount of 
money. So, they start to tell me this same story over again, and I reacted. I said, 
“Look, you’re screwing with me. Why are you asking for money again?” And I 
had the receipt from the bank where they told me to deposit the money, and 
there was a name on the receipt. So, I told them, “I know who you are. I have 
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proof against you, so now I’m going to screw with you. Go fuck yourself!” And 
pum! [He slams the phone down.] And that was it. That was three months ago.  
Based on the fact that the caller seemed not to remember having told him the story 
before, and emboldened by possibly having the extortionist’s name on the receipts for 
the bank deposits, he refused to deliver another payment. I asked him how this could 
happen, that someone would be acting like a dangerous criminal, but not actually pose a 
threat. He replied,  
Just like in the capital, they say, “Let’s charge an impuesto,” and they say to you, 
“We’re from Mara 18 and we want this.” But maybe they are not even really 
mareros. After I hung up, I disconnected the telephone, and they never bothered 
me again. In the end, I realized that they were in jail.  
It is indeed common for extortion rings to be run by gang members in prison (O’Neill 
2010), and this fact circulates among manufacturers as they and their neighbors 
confront threats and decide how to deal with them. This man determined that if the 
people were calling from jail, they could not likely carry out the threats made against 
him and his family. Even so, when I asked him why he had not turned the receipts over 
to the police, he replied that escalating the matter to an official accusation could also 
transform it “into something real.” His mistrust of the police and the criminal justice 
system led him to assume that if he “informed” on the extortionists, they would surely 
avoid prosecution, and his act of aggression against them would be reason for them to 
come after him and inflict real harm. Here, engagement with the formal, legal system is 
viewed not as a security strategy, but as a way to augment a situation of insecurity.  
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Safe for Business 
I asked Miguel Tecúm if his neighborhood watch group hopes to discourage 
youth from being out in the streets at night. He replied:  
No, we’re not going to enact a state of siege! On the contrary, what we want is 
to be out and about. Principally, we’re a group of reasonable people, people who 
are in charge of businesses, and our businesses make us people who try to do 
things in ways that are thought out, so that we don’t have any problems. Our 
main goal is to continue working. 
Miguel invokes the military’s enforcement of curfews during the armed conflict by the 
PAC – facilitated by the declaration of a national “state of siege” – to vividly contrast 
that security approach with the activities of his watch group. He views the group’s 
activities as preventative rather than punitive, as productive of economic activity rather 
than repressive of activities and freedoms. Business success, in his explanation, is a main 
impetus for securing the streets in town. Jorge, who described San Francisco El Alto as 
an “organized” town, also discussed how the community had come together principally 
to protect and promote commerce. These explanations align with neoliberal security 
approaches that presume the interests of capital will ensure public safety, since capital 
needs safe places and secure consumers to flourish.  
What a narrow focus on this kind of convergence might miss, however, is the 
understanding, also expressed by so many garment manufacturers, of how the capitalist 
system is itself a source of deep tensions and insecurities, crime and exploitation. What 
is more, violence, security, and corruption do not always inhibit commerce. 
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Multinational capital, notes James Ferguson (2006), is often keen on exploiting 
conditions of insecurity and government corruption to its own ends. Numerous social 
scientific studies characterize Guatemala as one of many “failed states” in post-Cold 
War Latin America,52 with intellectual property protections, for instance, understood as 
yet another victim of institutional weaknesses that prevent the state from carrying out 
its basic functions. But from an ethnographic perspective, the effective enforcement of 
rule of law, including IPR laws, is not an unambiguous sign of a successful government or 
robust economy. Even as the social epidemiology in perpetually developing countries 
worsens, opportunities for extraction are often consolidated and there exist strong legal 
and economic protections for multinational capital – from patents for essential 
medications (Biehl 2007) to licensing agreements for mineral extraction and mining 
(Kirsch 2006) to trademark laws for global brands – that disadvantage citizens.  
Ineffective governance linked to institutional problems such as corruption and 
the hemispheric problem of drug trafficking may be what is most visible about 
Guatemala to policy analysts and social scientists in the current moment. But the crisis 
of legitimacy facing Guatemala and other Latin American states is deeply connected to 
historical legacies of colonialism and postcolonial modes of exploitation that leverage 
legal and trade relationships to satisfy international market needs over and above those 
of the nation’s poor majority. The neoliberal economic reforms that Guatemala has 
adopted since the 1980s have exacerbated conditions of inequality that often break 
down along ethnic lines, with increasing disparities in education, health, housing, 
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 See, for example, reports by the Brookings Institution (Rice and Patrick 2008) and Foreign Policy and the 
Fund for Peace (2011).   
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socioeconomic status, and access to capital affecting indigenous Guatemalans (Thomas 
et al. 2011, Chase-Dunn 2000, Robinson 2003). Despite the role of international finance 
institutions and formal colonial powers in creating these conditions, the blame for such 
outcomes generally falls on the backs of the governments of resource-poor nations 
when “structural-adjustment policies begin to bite” (Ferguson 2006: 101). International 
law, including intellectual property protections, in turn, provides a globally-sanctioned 
discourse that governments can readily adopt to transfer blame directly onto groups of 
citizens that come to be seen as illicit and problematic. In Guatemala, one encounters 
not so much a culture of piracy as a shifting context of accountability, what Mary 
Douglas (1992) might refer to as an unfolding “forensics” of blame in the context of 
large-scale political and economic processes that often involve the delegation of risk and 
responsibility onto marginalized groups.     
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Conclusion 
 
The local context of clothing production and consumption explored in this 
dissertation offers an ideal case for thinking about the global spread of neoliberal legal 
and economic regimes. I have analyzed significant gaps in the universal application of 
IPR law between what fashion and branding mean in highland communities and how 
they are understood in international projects of legal harmonization that are also about 
re-branding and re-imagining the Guatemalan nation. Most critical engagements with 
brands are ethnographically and analytically oriented toward contexts where branding 
logics presumed by trademark law hold up, where logos are understood as “signatures 
of authenticity” (Coombe 1996), for example, that connect corporations and consumers 
through webs of affect and meaning.53 My concern has been with how brands figure 
into a cultural setting where the rationalities promoted in IPR law cannot be taken for 
granted; in this case, a lifeworld where brands are viewed as design elements, markers 
of gender, ethnicity, and class, and abstract signs of global modernity. I argue that the 
differences and exclusions produced as IPR law circulates globally constitute a valuable 
object of anthropological study insofar as the moral and political economies at the edge 
of the hegemonic brand form help us to understand how neoliberal regimes of 
governance and ownership reproduce structures of inequality and disenfranchisement 
on an international scale and on a national level in countries like Guatemala.  
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The brand form is intrinsic to postwar statecraft in Guatemala. Neoliberal 
economic reforms amplify the presence of brands in the public sphere by opening the 
national market to imports, encouraging export production that positions Guatemalans 
as laborers in factories that produce branded commodities, and impelling the nation-
state to publicize itself in order to attract foreign investment and tourism dollars. These 
same reforms imply piracy since they compound conditions of social and economic 
inequality, making it impossible for Maya people to access “authorized” versions of 
cosmopolitan signs of status and affiliation even as they provide the infrastructure and 
materials necessary for piracy production. Crackdowns on piracy in local markets and 
harmonization with global IPR frameworks disadvantage Maya producers vis-à-vis 
foreign capital. Yet, like other Guatemalans, they are invited to participate in a 
modernist vision of citizenship and social progress, emphasizing Western ideas about 
property, legality, and multiculturalism. In the highlands, participation in such projects 
tends to exacerbate class and gender inequalities in local communities and encourages a 
privatized model of indigenous identity mediated by branded commodities and formal 
market transactions. The brand emerges within this context as a powerful medium 
through which claims to legitimacy and authority and senses of belonging are 
negotiated at national and local levels. 
This dissertation challenges scholarly and popular portraits of piracy as a deviant 
and underground activity that states must root out in order to protect the national 
welfare and national sovereignty. IPR protections are one set of legal mechanisms 
through which Guatemala is supposed to become a fully modern nation-state in the 
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aftermath of the armed conflict, demonstrating to the international community that the 
country is on the “progressive path” toward development (Vann 2006:289), and its 
citizens reoriented toward formal, rational market participation. An ethical problem 
arises when the structural inequalities that make such modes of participation unlikely 
are transformed into legal problems of guilt and innocence.  
Participants in Guatemala’s informal sector are not strategically engaging in 
illegal behavior because of a proclivity toward crime. Indeed, crime and violence are a 
central concern for many of them. Rather, garment manufacturers and other 
participants in informal economic activities are structurally positioned as illicit actors in 
the context of neoliberal economic programs that promote entrepreneurship as the key 
to national progress at the same time that global regimes of governance criminalize 
modes of entrepreneurship that challenge hegemonic definitions of ownership and 
authority. Approaches to legal reform and business ethics that do not take into account 
such paradoxes and local responses will have little impact on piracy markets and risk 
contributing to conditions of inequality and marginalization affecting already 
disadvantaged populations. 
This dissertation has also traced a complex politics of mimicry, imitation, and 
assimilation that animate daily life more generally in contemporary Guatemala. Brand 
pirates copy global brands, but they also negotiate an uneasy relationship to First World 
models of development and progress touted by the Guatemala government and 
networks of international agencies and volunteer organizations. Anthropologists have 
looked at how market ideologies become embedded in development programs at 
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national and local levels through the work of state agencies and NGOs.54 In Guatemala, 
various development projects, from Peace Corps initiatives to microcredit programs, 
attempt to rectify the economic disparities that face indigenous Guatemalans by 
encouraging petty capitalist activities, often offering small loans or technical training to 
jump-start an individual or group’s enterprising potential. Yet, the value, in economic 
terms, of entrepreneurship for the people of Guatemala seems greatly exaggerated 
given the failures of neoliberal reforms to address the country’s social and economic 
problems (Chase-Dunn 2000; O’Neill and Thomas 2011).  
It would be difficult for this type of intervention to attend to the broader 
contexts of social suffering and structural inequality that make life difficult for Maya 
people. Still, the discourse surrounding entrepreneurship in scholarship and among its 
promoters on the ground in Guatemala treats capitalist enterprise as if it were the 
answer to improved quality of life and standards of living. As my analysis of the apparel 
trade demonstrates, some Maya people have improved their level of cash flow and 
comfort by participating in capitalist enterprise. My point, then, is not that 
entrepreneurship never benefits individuals and families in highland Guatemala. 
Capitalist development, even at this small scale, however, is uneven. The gap between 
affluence and poverty widens and contributes to contexts of local conflict and feelings 
of insecurity. And the material gains that families in Tecpán have made are as much the 
result of communal networks of resource and information sharing and exchange as they 
are the product of development projects or the market’s invisible hand. 
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Campesino to Comerciante 
Piracy production intersects in important ways with the politics of indigeneity 
and multiculturalism in Guatemala. Throughout this dissertation, I have examined the 
cultural implications of commercial enterprise for Maya men involved in the apparel 
trade, from the moral hazards that accompany business success to the privatization and 
marketization of indigenous identity through formal branding initiatives. In this 
conclusion, I want to briefly highlight the ambiguities and existential insecurities that 
surround entrepreneurship and commerce in the highlands in order to emphasize the 
contribution this dissertation makes to the study of economic change and capitalist 
development in Guatemala.  
Anthropologists have written a great deal about economic transformation and 
occupational change among Maya men and women. These studies focus on the 
complexities of the proletarianization of Maya people through plantation and factory 
work (Watanabe 1992; Goldín 1992, 2001; Green 2003) or the resistance of indigenous 
comerciantes to proletarianization through the development of their own cottage 
industries and marketing networks (Smith 1978, 1984; Tax 1957). Other work examines 
processes of political and religious reorganization that have accompanied the rise of an 
indigenous commercial class or landed elite in Maya towns.55 One goal of much of this 
literature has been to analyze change and continuity in “Maya culture,” a term that held 
traditional ethnological significance in early studies, as when Manning Nash relied on 
the “customs” of the K’iche’ Maya of Cantel, whose “blend of Spanish-Indian culture 
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[had] more or less stabilized in the area some 400 years ago,” as a “base line” from 
which to chart changes that accompanied the founding of a textile factory in that 
Western highland town (1958: 6). More recent ethnographic accounts of the Maya have 
troubled “the ‘archaeo-romanticism’ evident in studies of Maya cultural continuity” 
(Fischer 1999: 475). As is true across the field of anthropology, culture has become a 
much more fraught concept.  
Reflecting on a public debate in Guatemala City between an indigenous activist 
and a Ladino critic regarding the legitimacy of Maya cultural rights claims, Edward 
Fischer writes that “Maya scholars and peasants alike continue to assert the legitimacy 
of an essentialist paradigm, arguing that there is a metaphysical quality to Mayaness 
that transcends the minutiae of opportunistic construction to unite individuals and 
communities across both time and space” (1999: 476). Kay Warren writes of the 
“invisible thread of ethnicity,” an idea promoted by some Maya activists that connotes 
“a common history [and] culture, a collective memory, religion, ways of dress, and 
future aspirations – in short, a deeply felt essence no one else shares” (1998: 197). Such 
assertions by indigenous leaders, although politically expedient and reflective of 
genuine sentiments of group identification and solidarity, leave contemporary 
anthropologists in a jam. Fischer, initially compelled by his social science training to 
“document the constructed nature of Maya identity,” found himself “reexamining his 
own preconceptions” (1999: 476). His fieldwork in Tecpán and neighboring towns 
provided mounting evidence, he writes, of what he calls a “Maya cultural logic spanning 
community boundaries that simultaneously conditions individual agency and reflects 
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changing consensual ethics that have emerged from practical activity in local and global 
contexts.” Maya culture, he reasons, is localizable in a logic that provides a “broad 
shared foundation for comprehending and producing thought and behavior” (1999: 
478). Drawing on other research in the Maya region (Hunt 1977; Watanabe 1983; 
Carlsen and Prechtel 1991), Fischer asserts that Maya cultural logics find their bases in 
cosmologies derived from interactions with the natural world, especially agricultural 
cycles. He writes,  
The agrarian roots of Maya culture … are historically related to contemporary 
cultural concerns and conceptions. This cultural heritage has conditioned the 
high value placed on ownership of land and control over one’s means of 
production by most Maya in Tecpán … This valuation is, in turn, a key 
organizational principle of Maya cultural economies and has had a significant 
impact on changing modes of production. (Fischer 2001: 216)  
Fischer’s work on pan-Maya activism and cultural logics provides a rich context 
for analyzing forms of nostalgia for rural life that I encountered among Tecpán’s apparel 
manufacturers, whose stories about the changing values and practices associated with 
commercial enterprise revealed a significant degree of reflexivity on their part about 
what it means to be Maya when one is not a rural farmer. Indeed, the oral histories I 
drew on in Chapter 2 often revolved around two stereotyped figures: first, the Maya 
campesino, imagined as a penniless farmer who struggles to find a way to better himself 
and his family’s prospects; and, second, the Maya comerciante who has adopted 
modern life ways and is a few steps removed from the cultural beliefs and practices, and 
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the poverty, of rural life. In these stories, the campesino often emerges as a figure who 
belongs to the past, either the workshop owner’s personal past or some shared history 
in which he implicates himself. My inquiries into the history of the industry and the 
biographies of individual producers seemed to stir up a desire in them to share, at least 
with an outsider and an anthropologist, something of the lives of an older generation 
imagined as bastions of Maya culture and indigenous values. Even as they espoused 
progress narratives about their own entrepreneurial success, many producers sought to 
ground their identities firmly in the traditional figure of the campesino.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, class and ethnic solidarity are important values among 
Maya garment producers, and emphasis on a shared agrarian past is one way to 
mediate the realities of class stratification and economic differentiation among 
indigenous men. At the same time, the politicization of indigenous identity since the 
1970s means that what it means to be indigenous is a topic of regular conversation and 
reflection not only among indigenous leaders, but among Tecpanecos in general. The 
town is a dish for culturing culture and dishing. Fischer and others document the kinds 
of conversations that took place in the early days of the pan-Maya movement when 
leaders began to sort out what symbols, values, and practices would be treated as most 
significant and emblematic for advancing a cultural rights agenda (Warren 1998; Cojtí 
Cuxil 1987, 1996; Fischer and Brown 1996). For example, language was considered a 
politically-innocuous starting point for many groups in the early days of democratic 
reform in Guatemala, though there was lively debate among Maya intellectuals and 
activists about how Maya languages should be promoted and protected (Fischer 2001: 
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98-99; see also Warren 1998, Appendix 2). These debates continue in the most 
mundane of contexts in towns such as Tecpán that have been so thoroughly enmeshed 
not only in a national political movement but also in waves of cosmopolitan interactions 
that have repeatedly called on Maya men and women to identify in particular ways and 
be ready to explain what that identification means to them. In my conversations with 
various men and women in Tecpán, some of whom identify as indigenous activists, the 
conversation often turned to gossip about just how “Maya” a neighbor was, given that 
he no longer bathes in the traditional tuj (sweat bath); whether or not Evangelical 
families are still “Maya” since they reject traditional spiritual practices; or, how other 
people around town have lost their “cultural values” because they no longer keep 
chickens or tend their own milpa plots.  
There are many reasons that a Maya person might share such gossip with a 
gringa anthropologist. There is likely the expectation that anthropologists are looking 
for authentic Maya culture, which informants might then attempt to represent or on 
which they might claim to be an authority. Many other North American anthropologists 
have spent time in Tecpán, whether passing through or carrying out extended field 
studies, and most of this work has indeed centered on understanding various aspects of 
“Maya culture.” Peace Corps volunteers, international aid organizations, and, more 
recently, microloan agencies arrive in Tecpán looking for Maya men and women to 
involve in their projects and programs. All of this is not to mention that Guatemalans 
live in a society that has long defined all kinds of political, economic, and social 
relationships based on a binary between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. 
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Tecpanecos are accustomed to reflecting on difference, talking about culture, and 
thinking about themselves and other people in terms of ethnic categories and outward 
signs of ethnic identity. Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to take this 
context of reflexivity into account in my analyses. I am not as interested in locating the 
origins, finding the common threads, or even identifying contemporary forms of Maya 
culture as I am in understanding indigeneity as a complex set of practices and 
negotiations and a heavily politicized and commercialized form of identification not only 
in Guatemala but on a global scale. How people relate to the beliefs, values, and 
practices that they or others view as part of “Maya culture” must be understood as part 
of a dynamic and discursive field. 
A conversation with Francisco Toc, an ex-guerrillero turned apparel producer 
now living in Chimaltenango, began with a simple question about how his parents 
earned a living, but unfolded into a model example of the campesino to comerciante 
story. 
Well, working in agriculture is part of our culture as indigenous people, certainly 
part of our formación [formation, upbringing]. In my case, personally, with my 
father, there were ten of us children, and it was very difficult to send all of us to 
school. So part of indigenous culture is that you don’t know what a vacation is, 
what trips to the country [al interior] are, not to mention to another country! 
Because the size of the family limits what you can do. 
Immediately, Francisco enjoins his personal narrative to a broader image of “indigenous 
culture,” procuring a definition for that term from his own experience, but also drawing 
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on stereotypical images of the Maya that circulate nationally. Indeed, the cultural traits 
that he emphasizes – indigenous people have large families, no knowledge of life 
beyond the village and the fields, are uneducated – are at once nostalgic images of a 
shared agrarian past that is also a context of deep subordination, as he later points out, 
and also the markers of difference that the Guatemalan state and Ladino citizens have 
exploited in order to justify discriminatory policies and practices.  
As Francisco continues, the story becomes more deeply personal, not least 
because he seeks to explain to me, the anthropologist, why he no longer fits such 
stereotypical portraits. 
My father had animals, and before we left for school we had to bring them hay, 
then we’d eat something at 6:30 in the morning and we were off to school. So, it 
is part of the culture – working in the fields, everything having to do with the 
harvest and agricultural work. But, based on the strength and effort of my father 
– he had a very broad vision – he didn’t want us to stay like we were in the 
country, he didn’t want us to follow his same footsteps, so that we could do a 
little bit better. He made huge sacrifices to allow us to pursue our studies, and 
made us realize how far we could really go.  
Here, Francisco firmly grounds himself in the day-to-day life of the campesino: rising 
early, feeding the livestock, placing work above studies – “before we left for school, we 
had to bring them hay.” That he returns again to a refrain about indigenous “culture” 
seems strategic, as if he wishes to underscore that he is, at base, an authentic 
indigenous person, raised in the traditional ways of life. Yet, I have not questioned that 
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fact. Instead, Francisco seems to be responding to a larger social context, in which his 
lifestyle, his work, and his fluent Spanish might be interpreted as signs that he has 
abandoned, perhaps even outright rejected, “indigenous culture.”  
 Francisco is one of a generation of Maya men who, on an intimate level, wrestle 
with dramatic differences between their lives and social positions and the rural spaces 
and ways of life they left behind in the 1970s and 80s. The image of indigeneity they 
carry with them, and that promoted by the political movements in which they have 
been involved, is of a person who works the land, speaks only Kaqchikel or K’iche’ or 
Tz’utijil or Mam, and has little or no access to education. This new generation, like the 
“Maya hackers” about which Diane Nelson (1999) writes, find themselves relatively 
well-educated, some with university training, speaking Spanish fluently but perhaps 
feeling a bit clumsy with the Maya language spoken by their parents, and working under 
a roof each day rather than out in the sun. They not only travel by bus and hired pick-up 
trucks, but sometimes own cars. They talk on cell phones, whereas a generation ago, for 
instance, there was only one telephone in Tecpán and none in the aldeas. They use 
computers to keep business records and surf the Internet for design ideas.  
Francisco feels compelled to explain how it is that his life differs so dramatically 
from that of his parents, but also why it is that he left the hamlets and the indigenous 
towns, the places where “culture” thrives, to live in Chimaltenango, where Ladinos 
make up at least twenty percent of the population but are “generally dominant in 
relation to the indigenous majority,” and where indigenous people themselves are 
increasingly moving into a “large and growing sector of chimaltecos,” a term that, like 
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capitalinos (residents of Guatemala City), implies that one refuses “both sides of the 
Ladino-Indian binary” in favor of an identity based primarily on urbanism (Hale 2006: 2). 
Francisco continues, “So, why are we in Chimaltenango? Because of the same old 
problems in Guatemala.” He goes on to detail the “US invasion” in 1954 that sparked 
the “revolutionary movement,” and explains,  
We were born in conflict, in a war-torn country. Even if we weren’t born in 1954, 
we were born in the middle of a conflict that was building and building until 1975 
and into the 80s, and we had to come to terms with the politics of our society, 
one way or the other, and we saw that it was necessary to involve ourselves in 
the political life of this country. 
His use of the first-person plural could refer simply to him and his wife, who is sitting by 
his side throughout the conversation and who also joined the leftist political movement 
during the armed conflict. It could also refer to his fellow guerrilleros, all those who felt 
a similar pull to participate in “political life.” But, in the context of this story about 
leaving his father’s fields and pursuing something “a little bit better” than the life of a 
campesino, there is also the implication that he is speaking for an entire generation of 
indigenous people, those born after the coup, who were forced by international events 
and an internal war to choose sides and, at times, pick up arms.  
Land remains a central motif in the story. Rather than working the land, he says 
that those of his generation “had to either run away or die en la tierra de uno (in one’s 
fields).” After some time training with a political party and fighting “in the mountains,” 
he and his wife and infant daughter soon faced the kidnappings of three close family 
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members by the army, and decided to flee their home in Tecpán. “We first went to the 
capital, then came back as far as Chimaltenango, with the hope of returning to our 
hometown some day because it was part of our identity,” he explained.  
But time passed, our children grew up, and it was difficult here [in 
Chimaltenango] because it wasn’t our culture. We had to work very hard, my 
wife didn’t want to go back to Tecpán, and, in the end, we had to stay here. But 
always with the uneasiness of not having a steady job and having to just find 
something to do to earn a living. Eventually, I had the great necessity of setting 
up a business, which is where we still are today.  
Francisco exerts a great deal of effort at this point in the story to explain his decision to 
become a businessman. For certain, his current occupation as a capitalist negociante 
and comerciante seem to contrast with the leftist ideology he took up during the conflict 
– on two occasions during our various conversations he quoted Marx, and several times 
quoted the writings of Latin American leftist revolutionaries. His current occupation also 
threatens his identification with the campesino figure represented by his father and the 
“pueblo” whom he fought to defend. “We had to find a way to survive, so we took up 
the life of comerciantes without knowing where it would lead. … And now, as part of the 
commercial life, even as a Guatemalan I’d say, one has to adopt the ideas of the 
transnational countries, the ideas of commerce, because they work, and we don’t know 
how else to be.” In the end, he justifies his current occupation, without being asked for 
justification, by citing his forced displacement from indigenous life and the indigenous 
community in which he and his wife were brought up, which meant that traditional 
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forms of work were also no longer available to them. The need to simply make a living 
led him to adopt commerce, which is, in any case, what the “transnational countries” – 
those that have influence in determining world affairs – push on countries like 
Guatemala that have no other alternative: “we don’t know how else to be.” 
 Francisco’s story illustrates the brand of nostalgia that has taken shape among 
apparel producers who lament that Maya culture and values have been lost during the 
transition to commercial enterprise. As the anthropologist Kathleen Stewart notes, 
nostalgia often emerges as a way to place oneself in time and space within late 
capitalism (1988: 227; Neitz 2005: 245). She writes, “On one ‘level’ there is no longer 
any place for anyone to stand and nostalgia takes on the generalized function to provide 
some kind (any kind) of cultural form. In positing a ‘once was’ in relation to a ‘now’ it 
creates a frame for meaning, a means of dramatizing aspects of an increasingly fluid and 
unnamed social life” (Stewart 1988: 227). Nostalgia is an act of demarcation, a 
desperate attempt to fix the free-floating signifiers, the simulacra, that Jean Baudrillard 
(1994) argues fill the tableau of postmodern life. It is expressive of a desire to make the 
past and its cultural objects legible, something that can be understood and evaluated 
within a hierarchy of cultural distinction. Maya men and women, who are perpetually 
posited within a national cultural in Guatemala as belonging in some primordial way to 
rural spaces (Nelson 1999), but who have been either forcibly, as through war, or rather 
gently, as through the inheritance of a workshop, “displaced” from the fields, find a new 
sort of grounding in images of a rural past marked by clearly-defined patterns of work, 
value, and sociality. Late capitalism is evident here not only in the emergence of 
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commercial enterprise as the path to development in Guatemala, but also in the model 
of “neoliberal multiculturalism” promoted by international organizations, the 
Guatemalan state, and ordinary people in Tecpán, Chimaltenango, and other towns 
around the highlands who are trying to come to terms with emergent national 
discourses that delegitimize historical forms of racism but nonetheless uphold a myth of 
clearly-defined and demarcated ethnic categories within the newly “pluricultural” 
nation-state (Hale 2006).   
 
Mimesis and Assimilation 
“The wonder of mimesis,” writes the anthropologist Michael Taussig, “lies in the 
copy drawing on the character and power of the original, to the point whereby the 
representation may even assume that character and that power” (1993: xiii). In his 
example of the carved dolls valued among Cuna shamans, he argues that the replica 
takes on the power of the original – that is, the Western colonial figures after which the 
dolls are fashioned – through its reproduction of an external form. The history of piracy 
is a history of mimesis. The same processes of movement, contact, violence, and 
globalization that condition the modes of colonial mimesis that interest Taussig fuel 
both old and new kinds of piracy. Eighteenth-century buccaneers mimicked the form 
and function of the colonizing states they irritated with their plundering attacks, 
bothersome for European powers not so much because of their disruptions of formal, 
legal trade, but because of their indiscriminate nature, their refusal to choose sides, to 
declare allegiance to one nation or another (Konstam 2008).  
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Guatemala’s “modern pirates” (Menocal 2005), from the clothing manufacturers 
in Tecpán to the DVD vendors in the capital city, are masters of mimesis, reproducing 
the simulacra of popular culture that is at once global and not theirs, a culture that 
everyone shares but that someone else also owns. Brand piracy in Guatemala asserts 
itself in that gap, in the space between the cultural commons and the privatization of 
intellectual and cultural property, between the shared space of globalization and the 
exclusionary forces of neoliberal capitalism. On multiple levels, brand pirates trouble 
boundaries between authentic and inauthentic, real and fake. They simultaneously 
harness the representational capacity of the brand form and of fashion and refuse full 
allegiance to the law, the state, or the global economy’s hegemonic models of progress 
and modernity. Garment manufacturers have embraced entrepreneurship, some of 
them with great conviction, but never without continuously struggling with the social 
and moral dilemmas that commercial enterprise poses to themselves and their 
communities.  
This study of brand piracy thus speaks not only to the failures of “legal 
harmonization,” that is, the standardization of legal systems across nation-states in the 
new global order, but also ongoing struggles over assimilation and difference in the 
postcolony. In post-apartheid South Africa, a central goal was to establish “One Law, 
One Nation.” Jean and John Comaroff describe the national and international focus on 
singular rule of law in this transitional context as follows: “The ways and means of the 
law are attributed an almost magical capacity to accomplish order, civility, justice, and 
empowerment” (2004: 192). As critical legal scholar Balakrishnan Rajagopal puts it, 
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development experts, security analysts, and human rights activists all “desire to escape 
from politics by imagining the rule of law as technical, legal, and apolitical” (2008: 1349). 
Legal scholar Ugo Mattei and legal anthropologist Laura Nader echo these 
interpretations: 
The false representation [of rule of law] starts from the idea that good law 
(which others “lack”) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, 
technical, non-political, non-distributive, and reactive rather than proactive: 
more succinctly, a technological framework for an “efficient” market. Because of 
these false representations, good governance that ostensibly characterizes the 
law’s purposes becomes the backbone of naturalized professional arguments 
that are marshaled to legitimize plunder. (Mattei and Nader 2008: 5)  
International institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, they contend, operate 
with one goal: “build a simple and universal rule of law capable of stimulating efficient 
transfers of property from whoever values them less to whoever values them more” 
(2008: 75). 
My view of the global spread of intellectual property law to countries such as 
Guatemala is similarly concerned with the outcomes of legal globalization for people like 
Tecpán’s garment manufacturers. The very frameworks of free trade and “good 
governance” promoted by international finance institutions and First World nation-
states has “contributed to the growth of piracy” by impelling small-scale, informal 
enterprise and allowing the importation of inputs that facilitate copying (Cross and 
Hernández 2011: 515; Cross 2008; Aguiar 2010). In the apparel business, these inputs 
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include the surplus of second-hand knitting, sewing, and embroidery machines from the 
US and Europe, where firms are often in the process of off-shoring production to Asia or 
Latin America. Maya producers face intense competition from multinational and foreign 
firms who import “authentic” goods but also pirated versions of popular brand-name 
fashions. International law ignores these contextual factors, the conditions of possibility 
for the proliferation of piracy, in favor of a moralizing discourse of criminality. In 
Guatemala, then, I find that efforts to establish rule of law in the domain of intellectual 
property more often serve as alibis for not attending to empirical conditions of 
insecurity than as mechanisms for promoting economic welfare or social justice. The 
kinds of problems confronting Guatemalan Mayas, including historical burdens of 
discrimination and exploitation and the social structures perpetuating those histories, 
often fall outside the purview of the law, or are, as in the case of the war on drugs or 
neoliberal trade policies that underpin criminalized behavior, effects of the global legal 
regime.  
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